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My thesis argues that shared anxieties embedded in representations of 
transnational migration fortified societal orientations in Britain and Australia. The 
language of political leaders in liberal democratic societies frequently interpret the 
transnational movement of people in conflicting ways. On the one hand, there are 
appeals to a more open society with more diverse sets of identifications and the 
loosening of societal regulations. On the other hand, there are appeals to a more 
closed society, with more narrow sets of identifications and the tightening of 
societal regulations. I build a sociological model for shared anxieties that 
synthesises features of process and risk sociology, developed by Norbert Elias and 
Ulrich Beck respectively. This synthesis offered a conceptual vocabulary to 
investigate the migration representations embedded within the speeches, 
interviews and press conferences of British and Australian Prime Ministers from 
2001 to 2017. I reconstructed the societal processes that have propagated the 
relations expressed in the Brexit vote and the distortion of Australian diplomacy. 
Broader societal fears of various established groupings infused images of 
transnational outsiders. These stigmatising representations have raised the 
barriers to societal inclusion and widened forms of societal exclusion. British and 
Australian leaders circulated and cultivated more reductive modes of thinking and 
orientating.  
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Political leaders in liberal democratic state-societies frequently interpret the 
transnational movement of people in contradictory ways. These interpretations 
encompass a welcoming outlook that is more comfortable with diverse forms of 
identification. Openness to transnational movements symbolises an open society 
proclaimed by political leaders. Appeals to inclusion open possibilities for forging 
deeper forms of human relations. This open perspective is contrasted by a more 
exclusive outlook, which rejects the transnational movement of people and 
symbolises greater hostility towards migrants and ‘foreigners’ . There is the 
reassertion of stringent forms of societal1controls, less comfortable with multiple 
identifications. Closure towards transnational movement symbolises a closed 
society as painted by political leaders, which cultivate practices that appeal for the 
greater exclusion of certain societal groupings.  
 
Societal tensions between openness and closure, inclusion and exclusion are 
present in a range of liberal democratic state-societies. German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel (2017) illustrated a set of contradictory outlooks in her 2018 New Year 
Address. She remarked that “on the one side” there are people who believe that 
Germany is an economically prosperous, cosmopolitan society bound by the Basic 
Law of the constitution2. Efforts to assist refugees are an example of how Germany 
is “a wonderful country” where millions of people willingly help others. “On the 
other side” she said that there are people struggling with the pace of societal 
changes, concerned about the management of immigration into “our country” based 
on personal struggles, and worries about the presence of crime and violence. 
Merkel’s address demonstrates the interdependencies of open and closed forms of 
                                                 
1The term 'societal' is used in preference over the term 'social'. Terms such as ‘social’, 'political' 
‘economic', ‘international’ and ‘global’, can falsely sub-divide the processes of human relations into 
seemingly independent spheres, This conceptual division blocks understandings of the 
interconnection, the interdependence of all of these areas.  
 
The only exception to this preference is in Chapters 1 and 2 that note the development of reductive 
terms in the historically distinct field of ‘social science’.  For a further socio-historic account of the 
development of the sciences see Gouldsblom (1990).   
    
2 Also known as the Bonn Constitution inaugurated in 1949 in what was then West Germany.   
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societal understandings, showing the combination of receptive and hostile attitudes 
to transnational movement.  
 
My thesis will examine how political leaders in Britain and Australia have dealt with 
these contradictory trends, and the associated anxieties.  
 
In particular, I examine how leaders represent transnational migration. The 
language of British and Australian leaders the show negotiations of attachments 
and disengagements between cosmopolitan humanist-egalitarian and anti-
cosmopolitan collective-nationalist moral codes. Often simultaneous appeals to 
these interdependent codes stretched the habituated identifications within these 
societies and situated relations across broader globalised3 societies.     
 
I investigate the speeches, interviews and press conferences of political leaders in 
Britain and Australia from 2001 to 2017. The British example will focus on Prime 
Ministers Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Theresa May. The 
Australian example will concentrate on Prime Ministers John Howard, Kevin Rudd, 
Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull. Leaders in Britain and Australia 
share a common language and forms of expression. This provides the foundation 
for a comparative study into the contradictory representations of transnational 
movement in liberal democratic state-societies at the turn of the 21st century. I will 
explain these contradictory societal representations through a methodological 
framework that synthesises features of Process Sociology developed by an 
international network of scholars influenced by Norbert Elias, and a strand of Risk 
Sociology developed by Ulrich Beck.      
 
                                                 
3 I have used the term globalised to emphasise the forms of interdependent organisation that bind 
relations between people and other living organisms across ‘the globe’ .  This term is used to 
replace and expand what IR has called ‘international society’ (see Bull and Watson 1984). Other 
similar terms are the term ‘global’ appearing sociology under heading “global sociology” for 
example see Cohen and Kennedy’s textbook (2012).   
 
There is confusion that arises through ambiguous use of the concept of global/world. On one hand,  
it more accurately refers to a geological process (Gouldsblom 1996:  f.n1 16, 30). On the other hand,  
it is used synonymously to describe humankind as whole, which is the meaning that Beck (1999) 
channels for example in the title World Risk Society. This seemingly subtle difference has large 
ramifications, because discussions of globalised relations are not reducible to geophysical processes.    
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My thesis argues that shared anxieties embedded in representations of 
transnational movement fortified British and Australian society.   
 
The language of leaders in Britain and Australia reflects the standpoint of various 
‘established’ societal groupings that pro ject conflicting representations of 
transnational outsiders. They mobilised shared anxieties through simultaneous 
commitments to a cosmopolitan humanist-egalitarian, and an anti-cosmopolitan 
collective-nationalist codes. Repeated overtures to the collective-nationalist 
normative code circulated an anti-cosmopolitan consciousness sustained by the 
idealised protection of borders from harmful transnational outsiders. The ‘border’ 
symbolised and signified increasingly insecure modes of thinking. Party-political 
insecurities attached to the maintenance of ‘public confidence’ infused the 
expression of more harmful risk orientations towards transnational movement.  
 
Political leaders dominated what process sociologists have called the means of 
societal orientation, in the form of criminalised and objectified depictions of 
refugees/asylum seekers/migrants. British and Australian leaders propagated 
harmful imageries of transnational movement with broader societal fears, which 
steered wider relations within and beyond these societies. Overtime, the language 
of political leaders harnessed the processes accentuated in the Brexit vote in 
Britain, and the distortion of Australian diplomacy. These modes of thinking and 
orientation raised barriers to inclusion, and widened forms of exclusion, circulating 
orientations that fortified British and Australian societies.   
 
The thesis is divided in into two parts. The first part builds a model for 
understanding shared anxieties. Chapter 1 explains the model of process sociology, 
and Chapter 2 illustrates the model of risk sociology. I argue that a dialogue between 
these models can further understandings of shared anxieties, shaping relations 
within and beyond liberal democratic state-societies.  
 
The second part of the thesis investigates the representations of transnational 
movement by Prime Ministers in Britain and Australia that fortified societal 
orientations.  Chapters 3 and 4 evaluate the migration vocabulary of British Prime 
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Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (2001-2010), David Cameron and Theresa 
May (2010-2017). Chapters 5 and 6 assess the migration vocabulary of Prime 
Ministers John Howard and Kevin Rudd (2001-2010), Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott and 
Malcolm Turnbull (2010-2017).  
 
Contribution & Literature 
 
Understanding the sociological processes that fortify attractions for some forms of 
human movement and the repulsions towards others remains under researched.  
The following section outlines the two interconnected contributions of the thesis. 
The first is a sociological model for shared anxieties that synthesises features of 
process and risk sociology. This provides a conceptual vocabulary that leads into 
the second contribution, which is to trace the migration language representations 
that have fortified British and Australian societies. I will show how current 
discussions of contradictory representations of migration in societies such as 
Britain and Australia rely on the problematic use of three models: liberal paradox, 
securitisation, and classical moral panic. More recent revisionist moral panic 
research that explores both moralising and emotionalising processes offer an 
incomplete but more process sociological way forward for understanding societal 
contradictions. 
 
Process Risk Synthesis & Sociological Model For Shared Anxieties  
 
The first contribution of the thesis is to build a sociological model for shared 
anxieties. Anxiety in liberal democratic state-societies is commonly understood as 
a singular attribute of isolated individuals4: a highly personalised experience 
divorced from broader societal processes. This is seen for instance in phrases such 
as “our anxieties”, the “our” noting people in the singular (Jacobs 2015: 800 ). 
Alternatively, it is “a social condition” and “shared experience”, which prompts 
perceptible action by large numbers of people (Jackson and Everts: 2010: 2792 -
2793). Anxiety is also connected to fear, which is understood as an immediate 
                                                 
4 This can become an extreme condition requiring intervention and treatment by trained specialists. 
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objective existential threat motivating people ‘out there’, while anxiety is a more 
generalised internal condition of unease (Gilpin 1984: 290; Bourke 2003: 126).  In 
all of these accounts, anxiety is an inert experience that is unconnected from 
ongoing developments of human relations.       
 
In contrast, my thesis articulates a more sociological conceptualisation of 
collective/shared anxieties. Elias (2009 [1948]: 138-140) mentions what he calls 
“social anxieties” resembling particular societal situations and the fears th at inform 
people’s lives, shaping their individualised characteristics. Beck (1992: 49, 100) 
mentions the “social power of anxiety”, how social crises have become solely 
understood as individual crises, which has blocked the interconnections between 
individual crises and wider social crises. For Beck (2013b: 69), the 
conceptualisation of ‘risk’ replaces notions of crisis. The personalised anxieties and 
risk orientations of individuals are bound with their membership in an ever-larger 
globalised interdependent array of societal groupings, which stretches and 
questions their common attachments and identifications towards groups such as 
nation-states.   
 
Anxieties are the shared tensions of collective experiences, identifications and 
associations. There has not been a prolonged attempt to conceptualise shared 
anxieties, and reconstruct the societal processes that sustain the orientations, 
which contribute to the growth of socio-psychological fortifications and/or 
defortifications in societies.   
 
Political leaders mobilise diverging appeals to the societal codes that affect 
orientation. These figures and other recognisable persons can propagate the 
societal tensions noted by Elias (2013 [1989]) as the duality of nation-state 
normative codes: the habituated development of humanist-egalitarian and 
collective-nationalist normative codes. The societal tensions highlighted by Elias 
parallels the dialectical pressures of cosmopolitanisation and anti-




Highly idealised appeals to cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and anti-
cosmpolititianised collective-nationalist codes may reduce the space of societal 
reflection and narrow the forms of societal orientation creating power struggles 
within individuals themselves and across societies as a whole.  
 
My conceptualisation of shared anxieties synthesises the sociological vocabulary of 
process and risk sociology, developed by Elias and Beck respectively.  
 
On the one hand, ongoing5 professionalization has fragmented sociology into a 
range of competing conceptualisations frequently associated with the works of a 
particular researcher and/or sets of researchers. On the other hand, this has opened 
possibilities for the development of more synthetic sociologies that more verifiably 
encapsulate the diverse, multifaceted interdependencies that define the 
identifications, experiences and associations of contemporary human societies.  
 
The work of Elias and Beck synthetically grapples with the socio-psychological 
tensions that interweave the relations of ever-larger human groups. Dunning and 
Hughes (2013) note that the contribution of process sociology involves an 
interconnected conceptualisation of the development of human knowledge, 
interdependence and power relations.  The sophistication of Elias’ model is through 
his synthetic engagement and amalgamation of the work of Karl Marx, Max Weber 
and Sigmund Freud (Dunning and Hughes 2013: 30).  
 
My contention is that the sociology of Beck through his conceptualisation of risk 
shares a sustained interest in similar human knowledge, interdependence and 
power relations nexuses.  The risk synthesis of Beck is unpinned by his 
amalgamation of works by Marx, Weber and Jürgen Habermas. Beck (1999) is more 
explicit in his engagement with the likes of Marx and Weber. Elias’s work is more 
implicit, and assumes that his reader already has a firm grasp of ‘classical’ sociology, 
although he tries to remedy this assumption in What is Sociology?  (2012b [1978]).  
 
                                                 
5 Elias (2012b [1978]: 46) observed this process in 1970s.  
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Elias and Beck were chosen over other candidates for synthesis such as Pierre 
Bourdieu and Michel Foucault6 because of their common thematic interest in 
human knowledge, interdependence and power relations nexuses, and 
commitment to conceptual amalgamation. The synthesis of process and risk 
sociology pursued in this thesis, should not be confused as an attempt to canonise7 
both researchers.  
 
They also share some common criticisms due to the ways in which their work 
navigates contempory polarisations between deterministic reification and 
voluntaristic individualisation. These polarisations often come under the umbrella 
of structure–agency or society–individual questions. Both have been chided for 
being conduits of ‘Eurocentric’ onto-epistemological scholarship that perpetuates 
contemporary Western Enlightenment ignorance of the views, knowledges and 
experiences of non-European peoples (Pepperell 2016; Bhambra 2013; Goody 
2002; c.f. responses to Linklater 2016 in Hobson et. al. 2017). Eurocentrism 
critiques of Elias and Beck present a deterministic reification accusation of being 
Trojan horses for European ‘progress’ power superiority, because of their concepts 
of civilisation in the case of Elias, and cosmopolitanisation in the case of B eck. There 
is also the voluntaristic individualisation allegation that their work dismisses the 
agency of non-Western peoples.  
 
Both sets of critiques are premised on an egocentric model of knowledge 
development that places exclusive categories as the sole object of study. The 
egocentric model presumes that the only ‘valid’ forms of knowledge are those 
pertaining to particular individuals, nations, and/or larger societies, with no 
possibility for any form of relational understandings between these categories.  
 
In contrast, the sociologies of Elias and Beck offer a more relational model that 
reorientates research to the study of human interdependencies  and power 
relations. Beck’s later accounts of cosmopolitanisation processes engages with 
                                                 
6 For differing accounts on the possibility for a sociological synthesis of Foucault see Hughes (2010); 
Dunning and Hughes (2013); Fox (1998).   
 
7 For a critique of this approach from an IR perspective see Jeffery (2005).    
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Elias’s figurational sociology to highlight changing patterns of identifications that 
interweave smaller particular figurations with larger universal figurations (see 
Beck and Levy 2013: 9-10). Firstly, Elias (2012a [1939]: 474) and Beck (1992: 184) 
are highly critical of linear accounts of ‘progress’ highlighting the ambiguities of 
Western state-societal formations. They spoke of progressions in the technical 
sense of expanding human interdependencies (Liston and Mennell 2009: 53; Beck 
2006: 74). Secondly, both focus on the development and perpetuation of unequal 
societal power relations that has affected Western and non-Western identifications 
(Elias 2012a [1939]: 472-474); Beck 2006: 80). Elias and Beck would be hesitant in 
replacing one form of subjective methodology with another form of subjective 
methodology (see Beck 2006: 2), because that in turn ignores how groups have 
become interdependent and the forms of power relations that affect the boundaries 
between peoples. 
 
Elias and Beck share a common commitment to Wissenssoziologie (sociology of 
knowledge). The investigation of the mutual expansions and contractions of human 
knowledge processes in ways that are both planned and unplanned. Beck’s 
sociology of risk is a cognitive sociological effort: “political sociology and [the] 
theory of the risk society is in essence cognitive sociology” (Beck 1992: 55). By 
“cognitive” Beck is referring to the development of knowledge processes. This 
parallels the links between Elias and Karl Mannheim highlighted by Richard 
Kilminister (2007). The model of the risk society is an account of the unintended 
consequences of long-term human relations. The awareness of these processes 
often arouses modes of unawareness of these same developmental relations, 
shaping the reciprocation of societal power relations.   
 
There is also a mutual ethos to develop a more practical conceptual vocabulary, 
which does not reduce conceptualisations of societal processes to static conditions. 
One of the defining features of process sociology is resistance to the common 
tendency to reduce the development of human relations into isolated, static, 
unchanging objects, through conceptualisations such as agency – structure, and “the 
individual and society” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 106-108; Dunning and Hughes 2013: 
50-56). Beck shares this commitment to eschewing “process-reduction” (Elias 
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2012b [1978]: 107; Dunning and Hughes 2013: 51), remarking the need for a 
“process-orientated sociology” to investigate cosmopolitanisation “i.e., the systemic 
attempt to avoid the reduction of process to static concepts” (Beck 2006: 94).  
 
Beck (1992; 1999) draws attention to how understandings of risk have become 
process reductive. He tries to processualise risk through the interconnection with 
the concept of “reflexive modernisation”. The process theorisation of risk by Beck 
connects with Elias’s observation about the “scientification of modes of speaking 
and thinking”. How certain conceptualisations from the natural sciences have been 
superficially appropriated into explanations of human relations in the social 
sciences (Elias 2012b [1978]: 12-13).  
 
Migration & Societal Fortification 
 
The second contribution of the thesis is to offer a unique way of understanding the 
socio-psychological tensions circulated by interpretations of transnational 
migration. I do not devote sustained attention to secondary material in migration 
studies, because the focus is on the socio-psychological power struggles and 
changes in power balances amongst the diverse societal groupings that make up 
liberal democratic state-societies. My approach moves beyond Torpey’s (1998) 
Weberian account of state monopolisation over the means of movement. It is less a 
study of migration and more an investigation into forms of the societal relations 
that often come under the umbrella ‘migration studies’. Conceptualisations of 
migration are inseparable from the wider conceptualisations of societal 
development (for attempts see Castles 2010; Castles 2007; Zolberg 1989; Castles 
et.al 2014).  
 
Representations of transnational migration mobilise the tensions within the duality 
of normative codes, reviving dormant webs of association within the habituated 
identifications that constitute liberal democratic state-societies.  
 
My study reconstructs the ongoing socio-historic processes embedded in depictions 
of migration. Suliman (2015: 705) remarks that migration is “constitutive of the 
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politics of development, by which social relations are organised through world 
historical processes” (c.f. Manning 2014). Migration implicitly refers to the 
development of long-term, large-scale processes that include for example, 
militarisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, technization8, and the broader 
developments of ever-larger human groupings across the course of human history.  
 
My thesis investigates how the migration language of British and Australian Prime 
Ministers propagated more fortified modes of societal orientation. Fortification 
processes emphasise the restrictive forms of thinking and narrow means of societal 
orientation that are mutually interdependent with substantive practices. The 
building of ‘walls9’ and wider militarisation processes within and beyond societies 
are evidence of wider socio-psychological fortification processes that are more than 
just a “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994; c.f. Andreas 2003; Carter and Poast 2015). 
Physical fortifications and practices are interdependent with broader socio-
psychological fortifications, and perpetuated by particular forms of societal 
relations. Socio-psychological fortifications may continue even after the elimination 
of physical fortifications10. The societal processes and forms of power relations that 
sustain the continuation and/or expansion of socio-psychological fortifications 
demand greater examination and reconstruction.  
 
Reductive Conceptualisations in Literature 
 
Interpretations of transnational movement by political leaders can circulate shared 
anxieties.  Contemporary discussions of the migration experienced by societies such 
as Britain and Australia utilise reductive conceptualisations that diminish 
understandings of shared anxieties and societal fortification processes. I have 
categorised these frameworks as liberal paradox, securitisation, and classical moral 
panic literatures.  
 
                                                 
8 See Elias’s (1995) essay on Technization and Civilization.  
9 See recent efforts by US President Donald Trump (Durkin 2018).  
10 For example, the reunification of Germany in the 1990’s did not automatically resolve the societal 
inequalities between West and East Germany (Beck 2013a; Fuchs-Schündeln et. al. 2010; Nolte and 
McKee 2004).     
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The first model is the liberal paradox literature informed by politico -economic 
theory. This model uses “container state” understandings of society, where the 
facilitation of internal movement has impeded external movement (Mau et. al. 2012: 
24; Agnew 1994). Mau et. al. (2012: 2) have remarked that “liberal states face the 
challenge of facilitating wanted mobility and restricting unwanted mobility”. These 
contradictions formulate the “liberal paradox” of markets versus rights, where 
humanitarian and economic liberties are set against the rights of sovereign groups 
(Hollifield 1992: 231-232; McNevin 2007: 626).  
 
Liberal paradox models have an implicitly thin account of conflicting societal power 
relations. International economic forces prompt greater openness and domestic 
political forces prompt greater closure (Hollifield 2004: 886). For Hollifield, 
migration forms part of economic forces that include trade and investment. Highly 
skilled professionals are welcome into ‘the nation’, while low-skilled and unskilled 
migrants/proletarians are unwelcome (Mavroudi 2010: 223). Efforts to 
conceptualise the inconsistency of inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies have 
taken a more functionalist turn, exemplified in Boswell’s (2007) account of the 
state’s pursuit of legitimacy. Hampshire (2013: 12) uses a similar model to build an 
account of liberal statehood noting how openness in the form of capitalist 
accumulation and constitutionalism, is juxtaposed with nationhood and 
representative democracy.  Liberal paradox literature reproduces a series of self -
contained reductive models.   
 
The second model is securitisation literature. This model has developed in the field 
of international relations (see Balzacq et. al. 2016). Securitisation introduces 
language to understand societal contradictions.  This is through the exploration of 
“threats to referent objects”, where ‘actors’ use speech acts to ‘securitise’ particular 
threats and to support emergency measures (Buzan et. al. 1998: 4-5, 25; Waever 
1995: 54-58). There are divisions between an internalist textual speech act focused 
reading, and an externalist social structural reading (Stritzel 2007: 359). Societal 
contradictions are reduced to combinations of linguistic utterances and structural 
‘logics’. The focus of securitisation models is  more on a pronouncement of danger 
towards a referent object most commonly ‘the state’, which simulates an 
12 
 
‘extraordinary’ reaction to an identifiable threat. There is much less discussion of 
how certain ‘threats’ become understood as endangering particular societal groups.   
 
Discussions of migration as a threat to societies have encouraged applications of the 
securitisation model to cases in Australia (McDonald 2011; Curley and Vandyk 
2017; McKay et. al. 2017), the EU (Léonard 2010) and the UK (Huysmans and 
Buonfino 2008). Immigration discourses illuminate the interrelation of three 
modes of securitisation:  national, societal and human, each bound to the 
relationship between the self and the other (Doty 1998: 72- 74). The combination 
of concerns around internal security, cultural security, “crisis of the welfare state” 
has contributed to the representation of migration as a danger to Western European 
societies (Huysmans 2000: 752, 758). Huysmans and Buonfino (2008: 767) note the 
securitising frames within UK parliamentarian political debates around counter -
terrorism and migration/asylum. These frames create a politics of exception and 
unease: the threat to national life brings a trade-off of liberty for security, and the 
use of policing technologies to combat deviant practices. In the EU and Australia, 
migration management involves the intertwinement of humanitarian and 
securitisation logics, forming part of the biopolitical modes of governance with the 
focus on care and the continuation of life, which has developed into an autoimmune 
crisis (Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017: 543). The securitisation model repeats 
the same reductive conceptualisations of liberal paradox scholarship with greater 
obsession over concepts like ‘threat’ and ‘security’, demonstrating an insufficient 
understanding of how perceived societal threats come about.    
 
Liberal paradox and securitisation models are process reductive. They provide thin 
conceptualisations of societal relations in ways that are ahistorical, unchanging and 
presume false demarcations that separate interconnected areas such as economics 
and politics, international and domestic, groups and individuals.  
 
More recent critiques of liberal paradox note the intersection of politics and 
economics: the interconnections between the development and maintenance of 
middle-class national status groups along class/status, ethnic, gender lines 
(Garapich 2008: 739; Elrick and Winter 2017). Horvath and Meeus (2016: 101) also 
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note that the model lacks “a diagnosis of concrete historical constellations”. Paradox 
as a concept is a static understanding that presumes that something is contrary to a 
commonly accepted attitude or view. What those attitudes are and how they 
developed remains unclear.  
 
In securitisation literature, there is an unspoken and unchanging prescription of 
what ‘ordinary’ societal relations should be, which is deeper than McDonald’s 
(2011) preference for the desecuritisation of issues. Desecuritisation assumes that 
societal relations can return to a static condition of normality. De/securitisation 
models ignore how those societal relations have changed through persistent 
representations of extreme threat/ catastrophe that directs attachments into the 
fetishized mythologisation of particular groups. Securitisation models slice societal 
relations into threats and non-threats reducing any comprehension of the long-
term processes that situate how something becomes securitised and threatening in 
the first place. Emergency measures can overtime become more permanent 
features of societies11. Persistent repetition of the need for emergency measures 
creates a new normal that can become part of habituated identifications. What is 
also missing is an account of how certain groups come to feel insecure and how their 
desire to be more secure often involves the stigmatisation of other societal groups.  
 
The vocabulary of liberal paradox and securitisation literatures such as ‘self and 
other’, ‘liberty and security’, ‘threat and non-threat’ blocks the conceptualisation of 
sociological processes. These self-contained terms cultivate restrictive 
conceptualisations that cannot grasp the interconnected development of how some 
forms of movement are more desired while other forms of movement are less 
desired in societies like Britain and Australia.  
 
The third model is classical moral panic literature, elaborated in the area of cultural 
studies and sociology. Moral panic literatures introduce emotions to understanding 
societal contradictions. There is a deeper account of societal relations that 
                                                 
11 See Elias’s (2012 [1939]) example of how French kings repeatedly invoked ‘emergency taxation 
decrees’ to gradually monopolise orientation in feudal French society. A more contemporary  
example is in sections of the Malaysian Constitution that can be traced to emergency measures from 
the Malayan Emergency (see Whiting 2013).   
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recognises both conflicting power relations and language practices compared with 
liberal paradox and securitisation literatures. 
 
First conceptualised12 by Stanley Cohen, moral panic emphasises a phase of 
societies where particular people and/or social groups become understood as 
threats to social values. Depicted as stylised folk devils by the mass media, which 
serves as examples of who ‘we’ should not be (Cohen 2002 [1972]: 1-2). Moral 
panics depict cultural conflict driven by emotional energy between resistance and 
innovation on one side, and indignation and outrage on the other, which arouse 
feelings of anxiety (Young 2009: 4, 13). The depiction of refugees and asylum 
seekers as objects of moral panic show politicised clusters of social identities 
(Cohen 2002 [1972]: Xxi).  
 
A range of studies exploring migration representations have utilised the ‘classical’ 
model of moral panic13. Slovenia experienced three cyclical moral panics around 
immigration in 1992, 1999 and 2000-2001. This was where the media contributed 
to ethnic antagonisms between Slovenes and foreigners, creating national 
identifications that distanced Slovenia from the Balkans and Eastern Europe and 
embraced the “European, civilised world” (Erjavec 2003: 97). Exaggerated and 
politically opportunistic fears of mass migration from new EU member states in the 
Netherlands from September 2003 to February 2004 constituted a contemporary 
moral panic (Pijpers 2006: 95). Bogen and Marlowe (2015:1, 6) note that in absence 
of critical discussions, contemporary depictions of asylum seekers by politicians 
and the media, a “culture of indifference”, is moving New Zealand towards a moral 
panic. In Australia, the moral panic over asylum seekers and refugees has become 
“relatively permanent” due to recurring “fears and anxieties” bound to “a global 
moral panic over fundamentalist Islam” and the demonization of people from the 
Middle East (Martin 2015: 307-308). In the aftermath of the 2005 Cronulla riots in 
                                                 
12 Cohen (2002 [1972]) admits that he and Jock Young borrowed the term from Marshall McLuhan 
(2001 [1964]). A mark of the success of the term has been its transition into popular usage. For 
example see Devetak (2004: 103-104) and Baumann (2016). An unplanned process/unintended 
consequence of the popularisation of the term moral panic has been the distortion of moral panic as 
a sociological concept. This is changing with the work from the likes of Rohloff et.al.  (2016).     
13 There is also the term “migration panic” recently used by Baumann (2016; cf. Walters 2006: 32), 
which showed an unawareness of the work of Cohen.  
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Australia, there has been the revival of  ‘ethnic crime’ moral panics by the NSW 
government, manipulating fears of immigrant crime gangs to support law and order 
policies (Poynting 2006: 90).   
 
The classical model of moral panic has been challenged by more revisionist efforts. 
This research highlighted problems of normativity, temporality, and 
(un)interntionality (Rohloff, and Wright 2010). These efforts further sociologise 
moral panic and offer a more dynamic way of conceptualising societal 
contradictions through the interconnected development of power relations, 
language practices and the resonance of emotions.   
 
Revisionist moral panic research highlights the interconnection of moralising and 
emotionalising processes. This is through engagement with “wider historical 
structural processes” from process/figurational sociology (Hier 2011: 12;  Rohloff, 
and Wright 2010; Rohloff 2011a; Rohloff 2011b; Rohloff 2008), as well as the risk 
sociology of Beck with the merger of moral panic and risk research (Hier 2011: 12; 
Howarth 2013; Ungar 2001; Hier 2003). There is an effort to further conceptualise 
morals and panics in a processual sociological way in order to show the connection 
of moralisation processes to longer-term developments, and how the deployment 
of moralising discourses can obscure practices of power (Rohloff et.al.  2016: 7 -8).  
 
‘Panics’ involve constellations14 of emotions. Rohloff et.al (2016: 12) note the 
neglect of emotive processes. This is what Christopher Husbands (1994: 193) has 
called the anxieties of national identities that appear as “crises”, which erupt in 
response to certain events, expressing latent concerns.  Panics about migration are 
long-term societal disputes that have become “well established” into societies with 
ownership of the issue being dominated by particular societal groups (Best 2011: 
49). How migration panics continue to repeat in an almost never-ending cycle is yet 
to be fully conceptualised. The sociological conceptualisation of moral panic by the 
revisionists remains incomplete, as the interconnections between process and risk 
sociology need to be further elucidated.  
                                                 
14 This is used in preference to ‘constitution’ to direct attention not just to the structure but also the 
relations of emotions.  
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My work builds on the research of the revisionists to further the research in an 
expanding space of sociological conceptualisations in International Relations (IR)15 
that also integrates emotional management (for instance see Ross 2014: 154; 
Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Bleiker et. al. 2014; Hutchison 2016). IR, Sociology and 
Psychology are part of wider Societal Scientific efforts to understand the 
development of human relations both chronologically and phaseologically 16.     
 
Method: Language, Leaders & Societal Power Relations 
 
My thesis reconstructs the societal processes embedded in the speeches, interviews 
and press conferences of British and Australian leaders. Process reconstruction and 
the model of process sociology is further elaborated in Chapter 1. The following 
section explains the combination of process constructive and discursive methods 
that inform the thesis, the decision to focus on the language of political leaders, and 
the choice of material.  
 
Process reconstructive method offers a model of power and interdependency that 
can reveal the common ideologies and mythologies17 that accentuate shared 
anxieties and the developmental tensions fortifying/defortifying British and 
Australian societies. The goal of process reconstruction is to reassemble the blind 
societal processes and forms of power relations that situate how people and their 
groups orientate themselves across interweaving webs of societal interdependence 
(Elias 2012 [1978]: 149; Dunning and Hughes 2013).  
 
This method complements a specific focus on textual performative material. 
Societal scientific research that focuses on texts often comes under the umbrella of 
discourse analysis (Milliken 1999; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002; Neumann 2008; 
Krebs and Jackson 2007). One of the more dominant forms of discursive analysis 
                                                 
15 For example examples of Process Sociology see van Benthem van den Bergh 1977, van Benthem 
van den Bergh 1992, Linklater 2004, Linklater 2011, Linklater 2016, and Linklater and Liston’s 
edited edition of the journal Human Figurations 2012. The only sustained example of an IR 
engagement with the Risk Sociology of Beck has been Clapton 2014,  
16 See Gouldsblom (1996: 18-21). 




takes inspiration from the work of Michel Foucault (2002 [1966]). This is where 
discourse can be understood in three approaches: a general area for all statements, 
an individualised group of statements referring to structures within discourse, and 
a regulatory practice concentrating on the rules that produce texts (Mills 1997: 6-
7).  
 
The focus on societal discursive formations and forms of power regulation is a 
common18 theme across the diverse range of discursive methods in the societal 
sciences. The intersection of power/knowledge and the continuum of societal and 
self-restraints developed by Foucault intersects with the work of Elias (Hughes 
2010),  as well as the strand of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), employed by 
Richard Jackson (2005), who in turn builds on the work of Norman Fairclough 
(2015; 2012; 2003).  
 
CDA emphasises argumentative structures within the text, which complements 
process reconstructive methods. The approach developed in CDA understands the 
language in texts as “a socially conditioned process” practiced by sections of society 
(Fairclough 2015: 55-56). CDA concentrates on the argumentative structure and 
makeup of texts to reveal the power practices within and the behind the content 
(Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Arguments can disseminate “imaginaries”: 
future visions of societal relations that “give people reasons for action” (Fairclough 
and Fairclough 2012: 104; see Jessop 2003). 
 
The argumentative claims and vocabularies within texts as understood by CDA are 
interdependent with the power relations of groupings within societies. Language 
practices and rhetorical performances disseminate the boundaries of how people 
come to understand particular societal relations and orientations.  
 
My thesis concentrates on the argumentative claims and rhetorical performances in 
the texts of political leaders, who intersect the range of groups that made up liberal-
democratic societies that broadcast a range of often competing identifications. 
                                                 
18 The differences as noted by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:18-23) are in questions of ideology, 
ontology and analytical focus. 
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Their texts set the tone for societal orientations in the society they lead, through 
their embeddedness across both ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ (see Putnam 1988) 
web of relations. In degrees, political leaders can raise and maintain the salience of 
certain issues in the forefront of public consciousness, while lowering and 
overlooking other issues.  
 
Political leaders are more visible societal coordinators, articulating risk 
orientations that morally propagate forms of emotional management.  
 
Political leaders are coordinators of societal functions. In liberal-democratic 
societies, groupings that come under headings such as ‘state’/government/polis 
incorporate the coordination of functions across a variety of interconnected bonds. 
The functional differentiation of societal roles through developing webs of the 
interdependence generates power opportunities. Access to and occupation of 
coordination and integration roles circulates dilemmas of institutional control over 
‘who’ should occupy these roles (Elias 2012b [1978]: 140).  
 
Decreasing power differentials between government and governed can circulate 
higher degrees of involved insecure forms of thinking within political 
establishments. These developments increase the chance for political leaders to be 
less focused on the functional practices of governing/coordinating, and more 
focused on short-term political survival. Blends of involved and detached forms of 
orientation can swing towards the pursuit greater fantasy based understanding of 
societal relations. In this context, the pursuit of “planned actio ns in the form of 
government decisions may have [even greater] unanticipated, unplanned 
consequences” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 141). The infusion of greater fantasy content 
into the language of leaders increases the likelihood for situations where the 
singular pursuit of goals such as political survival or ‘the national interest’, can block 




The language of political leaders19 disseminates a range of risk orientations.  
Articulations of the term ‘risk’ itself assemble certain blends of societal relations, 
which legitimise their power claims. Political leaders raise the awareness of some 
globalised relations and lower the awareness of other relations. Leaders are the 
producers of some transnational risks that are categorised as harmless, and the 
protectors from transnational risks categorised as harmful. Risks deemed relatively 
safe and harmless can direct attention away from more harmful repercussions, 
which sustain particular power relations, revealing the kinds o f sub-state societal 
groups reliant on the harmfulness/harmlessness of a particular risk.  
 
Political leaders such as Prime Ministers are moral propagators20. They circulate 
forms of emotional management oscillating across a continuum of societal–self-
restraints and releases. The vocabulary of leaders is both a response to underlying 
societal developments and attempts to direct those same experiences with varying 
degrees of success. They are involved in a constant array of negotiations that 
showcase forms of emotional management (see Mastenbroek 1999): circulating 
greater restraints of some emotions and greater releases of others. The language of 
leaders helps substantiate the kinds of practices that become accepted as 
‘reasonable’ actions. Their texts detail the circumstances for societal action, 
establishing the parameters of thinking, building public narratives, through a 
voluminous corpus of official speeches, media interviews, press releases and other 
public addresses (Jackson 2005: 2, 17). Leaders are also reliant on what Richard 
Rose (2001) calls “managed populism”. The  democratic features of liberal 
democratic societies require leaders to hold degrees of popularity and affective 
connections within their own political parties, and across society as a whole.  
 
By investigating the language of leaders, I provide an insight into the power and 
interdependency tensions, which highlight the kinds of societal formations that 
make up liberal democratic societies.  A more cohesive study of leader language 
verifies, how “the axes of tension and figurational dynamics in the one case 
                                                 
19 See Beck’s (2013a) evaluation of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who is given the moniker 
“Merkiavelli”.   




facilitates comparisons and an understanding of how other instances came of 
develop differently” (Mennell 1998: 88).  
 
Textual performative representations of migration by leaders are one way of 
understanding the development of shared anxieties in liberal-democratic societies.  
The migration texts of Prime Ministers in Britain and Australia provide a unique 
insight into socio-psychological tensions and orientations of these societies, 
because of ambiguous movement of various groups with varying power ratios. The 
thesis contributes to wider inquiries into societal representations of migration, 
such as those projected in the media (see Pickering 2001; Gale 2004; Lueck et. al. 
2015). Further research would need to corroborate the extent to which the 
processes and forms of orientation found in migration representations are also 
present across other forms of societal relations. 
 
For the British case, the primary source material was taken from the UK 
Government Web Archive accessed through the National Archives. This is the 
repository of public statements and transcripts made by Prime Ministers Blair, 
Brown, Cameron and May. As well as the British Political Speech online archive, 
with speeches made at annual Political Party Conferences. For the Australian case, 
I used the PANDORA Archive of Australian Prime Ministerial Websites run by the 
National Library of Australia. These websites hold a repository of public statements 
and transcripts by Prime Ministers Howard, Rudd, Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull. 
Each of these archives included some addresses to parliament. I did not undertake 
an exploration of Hansard. The emphasis of my study is on public statements to a 
wider societal audience, as opposed to the more narrow audience of Parliament21. 
 
The migration language of Australian Prime Ministers displayed heavy engagement 
with popular media22 through the vast number of press conferences and doorstop 
interviews. They have become media celebrities in themselves. Blair was an 
                                                 
21 Future research would need to do a comparison of the parliamentary addresses and the media 
addresses, as well as how television news reports selectively distort certain parliamentary  
addresses.     
22 Future research could build on this study through a long-term popular media analysis across both 
British and Australian societies using a range of mediums such as both news and social media.    
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exception among the British Prime Ministers of this period, as Brown, Cameron and 
May all preferred set piece speeches and addresses to a captive audience, rather 
than more spontaneous interviews. Spontaneous interviews can give equally as 
much information as set piece speeches, through glimpses into the thoughts and 
orientations resonating at the forefront of a leader’s consciousness in ways that are 
both purposeful and accidental. Constant public engagement makes Australian PMs 
more receptive to the concerns of their societies, but they can also be held hostage 
by certain sections on whose support they are dependent.  The greater reliance on 
set piece speeches by British PMs has the advantage of providing greater detail and 
explanatory depth, because of the more explicit influence of speech writers and 
other members of staff. That said the content of any public performance by a PM 
shows degrees of influence exerted by Ministerial staff23.   
 
My thesis is an exploration of how Prime Ministers circulate particular claims and 
tensions from their attempts to steer the kinds of societal relations that 
contextualise large groupings such as Britain and Australia. It is not a systematic 
fact-checking exercise of each and every claim made by leaders under discussion.  
 
Each primary reference expresses sets of relations that form part of wider societal 
processes. These have been cited using an 8 digit combination of day.month.year. I 
separated mentions of migration using the following keywords: refugee, asylum, 
migration/migrant/immigration, population, border, risk, movement, 
interdependence. Over the course of the study, particularly in the Australian case, 
iterations around the term “boat” gained particular prominence. The Appendix at 
the end of the thesis has a full list of primary sources. It enables the verification of 
the claims made in the thesis, and provides a repository for futur e research.      
 
The study begins in 2001 and ends in 2017, a timeframe of approximately 16 years. 
2001 was chosen as a starting point because it was an election year in both Britain 
and Australia with the re-election of Tony Blair and John Howard. The year 
                                                 
23 The vocation of ‘spin doctors’/Communications Managers was depicted in the Australian political 
satire The Hollowmen broadcast in 2008, as well as the British political satire The Thick of It.  For a 
more detailed of explanation satire as a form of political education see Hall (2014).  
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coincided with the beginning of the US led ‘war on terror’, discussions in Britain 
about the Sangatte refugee camp24 near Calais, and the Tampa25 crisis in Australia.  
It ends in 2017 with the Brexit process in Britain and the ongoing efforts by 
Australian leaders to mitigate the effects of mandatory detaining asylum seekers 




The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part involves the conceptualisation of 
shared anxieties. Chapter 1 explains the model and vocabulary of process sociology.  
Chapter 2 explains the model and vocabulary of risk sociology. These 
complementary frameworks help interpret the language of transnational migration 
projected by political leaders.   
 
The second part evaluates the migration language of British and Australian Prime 
Ministers from 2001 to 2017. Showing how these representations  fortified British 
and Australian societies. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the British Prime Ministerships 
of Blair, Brown (2001-2010), Cameron and May (2010–Present). Chapters 5 and 6 
examine the Australian Prime Ministerships of Howard, Rudd 1 (2001– 2010), 
Gillard, Rudd 2, Abbott, and Turnbull (2010–Present). The conclusion will 
summarise the conceptualisation of shared anxieties, the fortification processes in 








                                                 
24 See Schuster 2003; Cohen 2004. 
25 See O'Doherty and Augoustinos 2008; Marr and Wilkinson 2004.  
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Chapter 1. Shared Anxieties & Process Sociology 
 
My first chapter explains the model of process sociology and how it relates to  the 
conceptualisation of shared anxieties. Soren Kierkegaard (2015 [1844]: 51) 
describes anxieties as the dialectic of “sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic 
sympathy”. Anxieties are more than just a psychological experience. They reveal the 
socio-structural tensions and overlapping identifications that can pull and stretch 
societies in different directions, the shared anxieties. Political leaders portray 
certain features of the society they speak and act for. They propagate the 
developmental tensions of those broader groupings. A process sociology 
framework can reconstruct the relations that situate representations of 
transnational migration by political leaders.  
 
I will argue in this chapter that the model of process sociology provides a foundation 
for understanding shared anxieties. Process sociology presents a set of synthetic 
models that conceptualise the ways in which people have come to think and 
orientate themselves across a range of interconnected groups overtime. This blend 
of socio-psychological synthesis can help refine a larger sociological outlook for 
shared anxieties, through an amalgamation with risk sociology.   
 
Processual models have been developed and refined by an international community 
of scholars influenced by the work of Norbert Elias (Dunning and Hughes 2013). 
These models offer sophisticated ways of understanding the development of 
knowledge, webs of interdependence and power relations. The growth of human 
knowledge (epistemic philosophy) parallels the development of human relations 
(history). Developmental knowledge processes are interdependent with the 
expression of societal identifications and the expansion of societal and self -
constraints (psychology/psychoanalysis).  
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explains the  models of 
processual sociology. The second section explains that the vocabulary of process 
sociology can build a sociological model of shared anxieties. The third section shows 
24 
 
how the language representations of transnational migration by political leade rs, 
can mobilise shared anxieties, dominate societal orientation, and steer the 
directions of societal change.  
 
The Models of Process 
  
The following section illustrates the models of process sociology that problematizes 
reductive conceptualisations in social science. Process sociology developed from 
the sociology of knowledge discussions in Weimar Germany. Sociology of 
knowledge approaches challenged the separation of thinking and being. The growth 
of reductive, static conceptualisations often linked to the perpetuation of political 
and intellectual ideologies form knowledge blockages that demand investigation.  
 
The sociology of knowledge proposed by process sociology offers a more relational 
reconstructive model to understand the development of knowledge processe s.  It is 
an open people model that focuses on webs of human interdependencies, and 
shifting power ratios, illustrating how people (including researchers) develop their 
most rudimentary orientations of themselves in the world. This is through a balance 
of involvement and detachment, as part of overlapping interdependent groups. The 
tensions and anxieties of human groups are bound with webs of societal 
interdependencies, and intertwined with power relations. Process sociology offers 
an interplay of conceptualisation and empiricisation to understand the shared 
anxieties of human societies.    
 
Reductive Knowledge Approach 
 
Process models problematize the separation between thinking and being. This 
puzzle illuminated the sociology of knowledge (Wissensoziologie). A strand of 
sociology that emerged from the intellectual milieu of Weimar Germany and inter -
institutional intellectual status competition in German speaking universities from 
the 1900s to the early 1930s. It became a response to the ontic (objects of science) 
– ontological (questions of being) dualism in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time 
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(2008 [1927]). Ontic–ontological discussions illuminated debates across 
Heidelberg and Frankfurt sociology in the late 1920s and early 1930s (Kilminster 
2007: 43-44; Kilminster 2015: 500). The sociology of knowledge is most closely 
associated with the work of Karl Mannheim, but also related to the scholarship of 
Max Horkeimer, Theodore Adorno, Hannah Arendt, Georg Lukács, and S.H. Foulkes 
(Mennell 1998: 14; Kilminster 2007: 24; c.f. Fisby 1992). 
 
The epistemological polarisations that characterised the political, philosophical and 
sociological discussions of Weimar Germany contextualised Elias’s development of 
a process/relational sociology. These polarities included subject–object, 
rational/irrational, relativism versus absolutism, culture versus civilisation 26 
(Kilminster 2007: 44-45). The common thread between Mannheim and the work of 
Elias, noted by Kilminster (2007: 47-49), is the concept of existential boundedness 
(Seinsverbundenheit). Sentience, the ability for human beings to perceive and feel is 
relationally bounded with consciousness, the awareness and perception of one’s 
surroundings, which varies overtime.  
 
Polarisations that illuminated discussions in Weimar sociology continue to contort 
discussions in both sociology and international relations today. More recent 
literature that builds on the work of Elias argues that contemporary trends and 
relations in Weimar Germany (both intellectual and political) could be understood 
and potentially overcome, through “the recovery of long-term horizons” (Bjork 
2005; Linklater and Mennell 2010: 385).  
 
Elias’s approach emphasised conceptual reconstruction that is verifiable through 
greater empirical research. Elias’s magnum opus On The Process of Civilisation 
(2012a [1939]). first published in 1939 suggests a more relational way of 
understanding the polarisation of societal relations. He reconstructs the long -term 
processes by which European societies came to see themselves as “more civilised” 
and better people. The study investigated the interdependencies between 
                                                 
26 My addition, Elias’s preliminary solution to the culture civilisation debate is in first section of On 
the Process of Civilisation (2012a [1939]). 
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emotional regulations, changes in societal structure, and state dominations over 
violence and taxation across both domestic and international relations.  
 
Process sociology problematizes the metaphysical, epistemic–methodological and 
spatial–organisational polarisations that have developed in the social sciences 
(Goudsblom 1987: 322; Quilley and Loyal 2005: 813-814; Linklater and Mennell 
2010: 410 with my additions). Metaphysical polarisations comprise debates about 
mind–body, individual versus society27, material versus ideational28, agency versus 
structure, self and the other29, ‘we’ versus they30’ and friend versus enemy31. 
Epistemic–methodological polarisations encompass discussions around theory 
versus practice/empirics32, natural science versus social science33, and micro 
versus macro. Spatial-organisational polarisations comprise debates about ‘the 
economy’ versus ‘the state/politics34’, order versus disorder35, and ‘domestic policy’ 
versus ‘foreign/international36 policy’. These polarisations as well as terms such as 
human condition37 and human nature38 often appear in everyday speech and the 
media39. The terms presume an unchanging insight of a particular group of people, 
defining what is human and juxtaposing relations/practices that are non-human.    
 
                                                 
27 In The Society of Individuals Elias expends significant effort in explaining this false distinction.   
28 See Katzenstein and Sil 2004; Sil and Katzenstein 2010 
29 For example, see Neumann 1996, and Neumann and Welsh 1991.  
30 See Elias’s (2012 [1978]: 132-133) discussion of this polarisation, where he notes that many 
sociological theories such as those of Durkheim focused on exploring ‘they’ functions/attachmen ts ,  
missing interconnected ‘we’ attachments.   
31 This distinction is made by political theorist Carl Schmitt (1996 [1932]).  
32 In conversations with some fellow PhDs during the first year of my doctorial research, I expressed 
my desire to do a project that combined theorisation with empiricisation. This was met at best with 
bewilderment, at worst with indignation of why are you doing that? I found myself categorised by 
some PhDs as a ‘theorist’ incapable of and someone who should never attempt empirical research.   
33 See Gouldsblom’s (1990: 28-30) critique of the distinctions drawn by biologist Richard Dawkins.  
34 Belief in an autonomous economic sphere can be traced to the development of the industrial  
entrepreneurial bourgeoisie relations with pre-industrial aristocracy. The belief ignores the 
interdependencies between occupational organisation and state organisation (Elias 2012 [1978]  
135- 139).  
35 See Bleiker (2005); Elias 2012 [1939].  
36 For an attempt to move this polarisation see Linklater (2016).  Elias (2012 [1978]: 64 my italics). 
remarks how “it is even more unrealistic than before to make a theoretical distinction between, on 
the one hand, a social  development seen as internal to the state in question and, on the other hand,  
the development of relationships between states, of the world-wide balance of power system, or in 
other words the society of states, which are seen as matters of 'foreign policy'.”  
37 See van Benthem van der Bergh 2012.  
38 This is also the name of an Australian popular music group formed in 1989.  
39 For example, see Dreger 2015; Brändlin 2017; DW 2010; Rooksby 2010. 
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The development static polarisations in the social sciences corresponds with the 
ongoing growth of universities as research/learning institutions (see Gouldsblom 
1990), and personalised political and intellectual identifications. They have become 
both a conceptual vocabulary and form of intellectual identification. Each of these 
dichotomies set up an either/or exchange of knowledge, where the most correct, 
most authentic, the most ‘real’ explanation becomes the one favoured by the 
speaker themselves. More idealised explanations become confused for more 
realistic explanations, becoming monolithic categorical imperatives. Explanations 
are ideologised40, becoming static nouns.   
 
Ideologised explanations in the forms of -ism41 and/or -ity suffixes cultivate basic 
forms of societal orientation in the form of exclusive doctrines, standards, and/or 
pathological42 conditions. These forms of orientation can be emotionally satisfying, 
with the promise of short-term immediate relief and cures for societal ills, 
encouraging actions dictated by wishes or fears (Elias 2012b [1978]: 65; Elias 
2008b [1990]: 209). Elias (2013 [1989]: 173) remarks how “in many cases norms 
are conceptualised in a highly idealised manner which allows the user to see those 
functions of norms which he or she wishes them to have and blocks the perception 
of those functions which he or she does not wish to perceive”. Knowledge blockages 
facilitate narrow and often insecure forms of orientation that inhibit broader long-
term understandings of societal relations.    
 
All of these polarisations are false dichotomies. Attempts to bridge these gaps are 
fruitless exercises43, when each side is understood as an independent self-contained 
sphere of human relations. There has been an ongoing distortion of sociology and 
ideology, bound with shifts in the distribution of societal power and tussles 
                                                 
40 My term that means make into an ideology.  
41 A suffix denoting a unique doctrine.   
42 Alcoholism is one example.    
43See Kilminster (2007: 30-31), quotes a question and answer exchange during a seminar at the 
University of Leeds in 1974, where Elias continually replied “Why do you ask that question?” when 
asked “How do I know what I know”. This partially explains the struggles and reservations about 
International Relations theorising during my Honours year. Where I attempted to bridge a gap that 
was tenuous in the first place (see footnote 5) and none of the scholars around me could help because 
they themselves were invested in closed person models, all be it in different ways.  
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between “great social belief systems44” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 148; Dunning and 
Hughes 2013). This twists conceptualisations of societal organisation45 by 
mistaking one form of human arrangement as illustrative of all forms of human 
arrangement.  For example, in the contemporary era, there is the ongoing 
misunderstanding by some sections of societies that ‘economic’ organisation is the 
only form of human arrangement that exceeds all others. 
 
Polarised outlooks reproduce a “we-less I” model that understands the relations of 
human beings as a closed person (homo clausus) (Elias 2010: 178-17946). It is an 
image of a mature ‘rational’ unchanging western adult male as the model for the 
human sciences (Quilley and Loyal 2005: 813). The model has dominated Western 
understandings from the Renaissance onwards. Closed person models understand 
knowledge to be ‘produced’ by a singular isolated person completely separate from 
the people around them.  
 
The attenuation of emotional identifications and legitimisation of some 
attachments over others increases the likelihood for antagonised societal relations, 
when one group of people understands themselves in complete exclusion from 
another group of people47. For example in Schmitt’s friend–enemy dichotomy, there 
is little contemplation of how people identified as ‘friends’ came, and continue to be 
distinctive from people identified as ‘enemies’. The development of static categories 
such as race, gender, ethnicity and class are “ideological avoidance” actions, 
isolating peripheral characteristics from the legitimisation of unequal societal 
relations (Mennell 1998: 121-139). There is the process reduction 
(Zustandsreduktion) of the longstanding development of human interdependence, 
and the forms of societal power relations. 
 
                                                 
44 For example, between capitalism and communism during the period understood as the Cold War 
from 1945-1991.    
45 I use the term organisation, as a substitute for the term ‘structure’,  
46 Here Elias is particularly critical of Jean-Paul Satre’s work and Albert Camus’s (2014 [1942]) 
character Meursault from The Outsider (L’Etranger).  
47 Certain forms of societal binding such as friend – enemy dichotomy can escalate into a primal 
contest (see Elias 2012 [1978]: 71).  
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To summarise, reductive knowledge processes perpetuated through frozen 
dichotomies diminish, rather expand the ways in which people have come to know 
and relate to the world around them.  
 
Process Sociology Approach 
 
Process sociology reorientates conceptualisations in the social sciences away from 
static, reductive polarisations, towards more dynamic relational models. This is the 
shift from singular closed person (homo clausus) understandings to open people 
(homines aperti) in plural (Elias 2012b [1978]: 120). There is no “‘I’ without ‘we’” 
(Elias 2007: 19). 
 
Process models understand the forms of interdependent relations within and 
between groups of peoples and wider living organisms: “the manifold ways in which 
people are bounded to each other, in co-operation as well as conflict” (Goudsblom 
1987: 330).  
 
The focus on human interdependencies is a departure from contemporary attitudes 
in the social sciences in two ways. The first is the idealised desire for either a more 
pleasant, or more conflictual image of society (Goudsblom 1987: 331-322). The 
second attitude is what Hughes (2013) calls the “habits of good sociology”. These 
habits include the prioritisation of empirical legitimacy, political alignment, and the 
relativistic egalitarianism of increasing specialisation over synthetisation. There is 
the need to shift from the use of static nouns, in the form of –ism, and –ity suffixes, 
to more processual terms to avoid process reductive formulations (Quilley and 
Loyal 2005: 814).  
 
The start of a process sociological inquiry is to focus on webs of interdependenc ies, 
and fluctuating power ratios. The term power ratio provides a more dynamic way 
of explaining the tensions within diverse interweaving characteristics of 
relationships, across a range of societal relations such as work, leisure, love and 
learning. These tensions develop in conjunction with uneven regulations over non-
human events, interpersonal, and personal relationships, the “triad of basic 
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controls” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 111, 151-152; Elias 2007: 106; Goudsblom 1987: 
331-322). Mennell (1998: 115) remarks that the struggle for societal power is “a 
polymorphous, figurationally generated property of all social interdependencies” 
where “the styles of life competing and coalescing groups were neither static nor 
isolated traditions, but developing over time, changing and adapting in response to 
each other and in accordance with changing power differentials in each strata”.  
Power relations and ratios can resemble static objects, frequently in the form of 
symbols, which one group of people can hold over another group of people.  
 
Symbolic power representations are shared between people in ways that 
characterise forms of interdependent relations.  For example, through instruments 
of violence, monuments, gestures, clothing, decrees and/or other societal codes. 
Process sociology asks how have particular polarisations “emerged and become 
rigid in repeated contests between interdependent groups of adversaries” 
(Goudsblom 1987: 322).  To understand how events and polarised practices are in 
contemporary society. There needs to be an understanding how these came to be. 
 
A processual approach to understanding the interdependent development of 
human relations involves a sociological conceptualisation of knowledge. In blends 
of involvement and detachment that refer to the “different ways in which human 
beings regulate themselves. In their self-regulation people can be more detached or 
more involved" (Elias 2007: 29). Involvement and detachment is an open ended 
conceptualisation of “whole persons”, their emotional balances and relations with 
other people (Kilminster 2007: 115). It is a five dimensional understanding of how 
people come know about the world around them. This orientation comprises the 3 
dimensions of space, the 4th of time/history, and the 5th of experience (Elias 2011). 
The fifth experiential dimension includes emotional regulations through symbols 
and other societal codes (Elias 2012b [1978]: 132-133). Blends of involvement and 
detachment break through the Weberian polarisation of political–values and value–
freedom, and the reduction of knowledge processes into purely subjective or purely 




Processual approaches to the development of human knowledge directs attention 
to the socio-psychological attributes of human relations. This opens the space for a 
higher degree of synthesis. One thread of the sociology of knowledge is to trace the 
development and consequences of the ‘sciences’ as understood by human societies.  
 
The other thread is to focus on the development of what process sociologists call 
the means of orientation. This refers to the rudimentary ways in which people 
navigate their multifaceted relationships across a range of overlapping 
interweaving groups. I focus more on the socio-psychological means of orientation 
thread, noting that both strands are not mutually exclusive.  
 
Human knowledge processes form an open spectrum in blends of subject and object 
orientation. More involved magical-mythical knowledge that is relatively subject–
orientated, and more emotive, forms an elastic tension with more detached 
verifiable48 knowledge that is relatively object–orientated, and less emotive 
(Mennell 1998: 160). People orientate themselves through blends of involved and 
detached knowledge. Blends of fantastical and verifiable content situate how they 
regulate themselves as well as others. There is no mutually exclusive polarisation 
between independent oppositions.  According to Kilminster (2007: 121-122), it is 
misleading to equate involvement with passionate feeling and detachment with 
emotionless reason. Passionate advocacy with greater subject orientation is 
mutually inclusive with the pursuit of more verifiable knowledge that has greater 
object orientation49.      
 
The challenge faced in the social sciences is that people are both the subjects, and 
the objects of study. It is easier for more involved ideological magical-mythical 
knowledge to distort the pursuit of more detached verifiable understandings of 
human societies. For example, Elias notes how Marx managed to distort a more 
detached insight about human ‘class’ stratification into a more involved teleological 
narrative, which turned the working class into an idealised unchanging model for 
                                                 
48 This is what process scholars have called reality-congruent/reality-adequate knowledge (Mennell  
2016; Linklater 2016; Kilminster 2007).   
49 A recent example is Alice Dreger’s (2015) memoir navigating her advocacy for intersex rights and 
her attachment to scientific research.   
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all of humanity (Elias 2012b [1978]: 181-182; see Saramago 2015). Eric Dunning 
highlights the “need for human beings is the production of a solid body of reliable 
knowledge about themselves, the complex societies that they form and why people 
recurrently drift into crisis after crisis” (Rojek 2004: 343).  These crises are periods 
of sustained highly involved modes of thinking50.  
 
The ratio of unplanned unintended consequences to planned intended 
consequences of societal practices is bound to particular power ratios. These 
develop from webs of interdependence, in ways that have exceeded societal 
understandings of these interconnections (Dunning and Hughes 2013: 47; Elias 
2007: 115; Mennell 1998: 170).       
 
“Viewed over a long time span, social sequences proceed 
blindly, without guidance – just like the course of a game. The 
task of sociological research is to make these blind, 
uncontrolled processes more accessible to human 
understanding by explaining them, and to enable people to 
orientate themselves within a web of interdependences – 
which, though created by their own needs and actions, is still 
opaque to them – and so better to control it”  (Elias 2012b 
[1978]: 149) 
 
Process models contend that the task of social science is to reconstruct the 
interconnected webs of relations that constitute ever-larger human societies, from 
which people draw their unique sets of identifications and associations. Process 
reconstruction helps trace the development of the blind societal process that often 
become discernible through polarised representations of human relations. There is 
a more normative preference for reconstruction over deconstruction, a “priority to 
synthesis over analysis” (Goudsblom 1987: 330; Elias 2007: 16).  
 
                                                 
50 Sustained episodes of what process sociology would call high involvement has been characterised 
by Cohen (2001 [1972]: 1) other moral panic scholars as “periods of moral panic” with constellations  
of more visceral emotions shaping forms of societal relations (Rohloff et.al (2016: 12).   
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Process reconstruction encompasses the synthetic amalgamation and refinement of 
interconnected understandings to build a larger outlook. This facilitates a 
sophisticated synthesis that provides a more realistic five dimensional picture of 
societal relations. For example, in On The Process of Civilisation Elias (2012a [1939]) 
references historical discursive material in form of manners books, pictures and 
documentary evidence. He develops a reservoir of verifiable evidence to support his 
conceptualised reconstruction of the process of civilisation. Other process scholars 
note a range of methods to gather evidence, from documentary and archival 
material (Hughes and Goodwin eds 2014), to media (Dunning 2014), ethnographic 
fieldwork (Gornicka 2016) and visual material (Hughes ed 2012).  
 
The process model emphasises the interplay of empiricisation and 
conceptualisation.  There is the need for more synthetic research that is verifiable 
and open to refinement to replace myths and metaphysical speculations about 
human relations (Elias 2012b [1978]: 48-49; Gouldsblom 1987: 334; Mennell 1998: 
15). The replacement of myths involves the creation of relational orientations, “the 
course of which theoretical and empirical knowledge becomes more extensive, more 
correct, and more adequate” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 49; Dunning and Hughes 2013: 2, 
201). Empiricisation and conceptualisation are interconnected. 
 
The development of more relationally orientated research offers practical 
recommendations to provoke constructive societal catharsis. More comprehensive 
reconstructive research about webs of interconnected relations, knowledge 
processes and power relations can inform more conscious ‘political’ interventions 
that “have a cathartic effect” (Dunning and Hughes 2013: 47; Elias 2013 [1989]: 24).  
Reconstructive research facilitates more skilful51 negotiations of contemporary 
crises, through further reflections on how particular events came to be.   
 
 
                                                 
51 This is similar to the often cited definition of ‘diplomacy’: “the application of intelligence and tact 
to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states”  (Roberts ed 
2009: 3).  
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A Process Vocabulary For Shared Anxieties 
 
Process sociology offers a model and vocabulary for conceptualising shared 
anxieties from the webs of interdependence and forms of power relatio ns within 
and beyond societies. The goal is to explain how “people are exposed even today to 
pressures and anxieties they cannot comprehend”, recognising that when “people 
in distress are unable to live without some explanation, the gaps in understanding 
are filled out by fantasy” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 22). Understanding shared anxieties 
requires a vocabulary to conceptualise the pressures from processes of societal and 
self-conscience formation.  
 
The following section explains the vocabulary of processual models, and how these 
terms inform a sociological model for understanding shared anxieties.  
 
The terms of process models adopted in this thesis are applicable to understanding 
the societal relations of larger groups such as liberal-democratic societies. The 
vocabulary conceptualises the processes of societal and self-conscience formation 
through terms that include webs of interdependence, the duality of nation-state 
normative codes, I-we images and ideals, habituation, established–outsider 
relations and stigmatisation. The power struggles from webs of interdependencies 
and conflicting normative codes can circulate guilt, shame and embarrassment 
anxieties. Struggles for status by insecure and secure sections of established groups 
contextualises forms of societal orientation. Outsider groups become feared 
through the greater dissemination of more involved magical-mythical forms of 
thinking. This cultivates double bind processes and fear-arousing constellations 
unpinned by fears of decline, disorientation and contact, which can invoke forms of 
societal survival organisation.  The vocabulary remains imperfect and open to 
further refinement, as terms such as established and outsider can lend themselves 





Societal & Self-Conscience Formation  
 
Liberal-democratic societies are the organisational outcomes from developing 
webs of interdependence. These large societal groupings and their populations 
have become bound by a globalised web of interconnected relations shaping  
localised life practices (see Gouldsblom 1996: 16; Linklater 2016). This is what Elias 
calls “functional democratisation”, a process described by Mennell (1994: 183) that 
“longer and more differentiated chains of interdependence mean that power 
differentials diminish within and among groups because incumbents of specialised 
roles are more interdependent and can thus exert reciprocal control over each 
other”. Liberal-democratic societies are characterised by forms of societal and self -
regulation. These identifications situated particular forms of conscience formation 
that amalgamated smaller groups into larger groups.   
 
Democratisation and nationalisation processes contextualised the societal and self-
conscience formations of liberal democratic societies.  
 
Democratisation processes encompass the equalisation of some societal power 
relations in the form of emancipation52 struggles. This has disseminated an 
understanding within these societies that they are more equal, and morally ‘better’ 
than non-democratic societies (Elias 2008b [1990]: 209). Differentiation between 
liberal-democracies and non-democracies accompanied the mutual awareness, 
identification and attachments towards other liberal-democratic likeminded 
groupings as well as themselves53.  
 
Nationalisation processes54 stress the power differentiation of international 
societal relations (Elias 2013 [1989]: 168), for example in self-determination 
struggles55. There are attachments towards a particular liberal-democratic state-
                                                 
52 For example, in from of ethnic, gender, class struggles and societal movements.      
53 One recent development concerns the development of illiberal democracies (NYT 2018; Bayer and 
Grey 2018), linked to de-democratisation (see discussions by Mennell 2014; Wouters 2016)  
54 Nationalisation processes are also bound to processes of state-formation, consistent with, in a 
European context, the monopolisation of violence and taxation (Elias 2012 [1939]; Linklater 2016).  
55 Such as decolonisation movements accelerating from the end of the Second World War onwards.  
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societies are based on ‘national’ cultures that are exclusive from other national 
cultures.   
 
Processes of democratisation and nationalisation cultivated the development and 
learning of a dual set of conflicting nation-state normative codes56.  There is a 
collective nationalist code with principled attachments to state-society, and a 
humanist egalitarian code with principled attachments to fellow individuals (Elias 
2013 [1989]: 169-170). The collective nationalist code stresses the process of 
nationalisation, and an aristocratic ethos. Adherence to this code is through a 
reservoir of symbols, physical structures in form of parliaments, flags, songs 
(national anthems), and institutions such as the military. Nationalised symbols can 
project more mythical narratives of national development. This is through the 
arousal of more visceral collective experiences such as war against an opposing 
state-society, as well as more pacified national sport activities. 
 
In contrast, the humanist egalitarian code emphasises the process of 
democratisation. This developed from the growth of the bourgeois societal 
groupings, and an tiers-état ethos. Attachment to the code underpins symbols such 
as education and healthcare57 institutions and law courts, accentuating the notion 
that no one person is ‘above the law’. There are mythical narratives of individual 
entrepreneurial development, recounting how particular people managed to 
advance themselves through society against other individual opposition.  
 
Mutual identifications and attachments from both collective-nationalist and 
humanist-egalitarian codes can formulate blends of I-we images and ideals. These 
terms conceptualise the interdependencies of mutual identifications, which 
overtime are habituated into conscience formation.  
 
 “A person’s we-image and we-ideal form as much part of a person’s self-image and 
self-ideal as do the image and ideal of him- or herself as the unique person to which 
                                                 
56 Elias (2013 [1989]: 169) calls this the “duality of normative codes within the nation state”.  
57 Education and healthcare also have a national dimension that demonstrates the habituation and 
interdependence of both codes. Remarks in Chapter’s 3 and 4 will further discuss the notion of 
healthcare fears.   
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he or she refers as ‘I’” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 27).  Societal attitudes are elastically 
bound to individual attitudes. People have multiple interconnected identifications, 
informing sets of relations, capable of invocation at any particular time 58. Each has 
degrees of fantasy and verifiable-adequacy content.  These amalgams of involved 
fantastical and detached verifiable understandings become motivations for actions 
and practices (Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 28; Mennell 1998: 171). I-
identifications are bound to we-identifications, a person’s membership in a range 
of interweaving groups. None of these identifications is static. Each strand of 
identification has developed and emerged overtime, often incorporating many 
strands of personal and shared experiences. 
 
Habituation is the incorporation overtime of certain images, memories, and 
experiences into conscience formation, with the development of psychologised 
personal structures59. Habitus refers to the “taken for granted” quality of shared 
traits within one’s own group. There are aspects that appear to be natural and 
innate, which are contrasted with the habitus of other groups that may appear 
unusual and/or bizarre (Mennell 1994: 177).  
 
The development of liberal-democratic societies encompassed the habituation of 
collective-nationalist and humanist-egalitarian codes into ‘taken for granted’ 
identifications. Attachments to these codes signify particular historical narratives 
of national and personal development. Varying degrees of attachments towards 
particular societal groups motivate and legitimise individual practices. This 
corroborates Mennell’s (1994: 178) remark that “various layers of habitus 
simultaneously present in people today may be of different vintages”.  
 
More powerful established groups in liberal-democratic societies utilise processes 
of conscience formation in relations with less powerful outsider groups. 
Established–outsider relations are a universal process where “members of groups 
which are, in terms of power, stronger than other interdependent groups, think of 
                                                 
58For example, in advertising particular identifications and attachments as a ‘parent’ are attempts to 
elicit the purchase of a certain product.   
59 The phrase “psychologised personal structures” is my way of avoiding the reduction of conscience 
formation to static understandings implicit in terms such as ‘personality’.   
38 
 
themselves in human terms as better than the others” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 1). The 
terms established and outsider, come from Elias and Scotson’s (2008 [1965]) study 
of Winston Parva, a small Leicestershire community in the 1960s. This study 
investigated how older residents of the community came to understand themselves 
as more powerful, and “better human beings” than their neighbours, the 
‘newcomers’ from other regions (Elias 2008a [1976]: 2). The study is an empirical 
conceptualisation of societal power relations, formulating a small scale model that 
is verifiable, enlargeable and open to revision (Elias 2008a [1976]: 3). Mennell 
(1998: 138) summaries established outsider relations as the following.  
 
“In studying the relations between groups of people, look first 
for the ways in which they are interdependent with each 
other. That will lead directly to the central balance of power 
in the figuration the groups form together. In assessing how 
far power ratios are tilted towards one side or the other, how 
stable or fluctuating they are, look at what goals and 
objectives, what human requirements are actually being 
pursued by each side. Ask to what extent one side is able to 
monopolise something the other side needs in pursuing these 
requirements. Then, if the balance of power is very uneven, 
be alert for the operation of group charisma and group 
disgrace, the process of stigmatisation, the absorption of the 
established group’s view of the world within the very 
conscience and we–image of the outsiders, producing a high 
measure of resignation even though the tensions remain. 
Where the balance of power is becoming more equal, expect 
to find symptoms of rebellion, resistance, emancipation 
among the outsiders. In all this it will be relevant to look to 
the past, to how one group came to impinge on the other, to 
how the way they are bonded to each other makes them 





Established groups are characterised by their greater socio-psychological 
organisation. More cohesive group attachments cultivate proficiencies to mobilise 
a system of attractive attitudes and beliefs, which stresses the superiority of 
themselves and the inferiority of outsiders (Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 59).  
Elias notes that the term noble refers to a higher societal rank and compliance 
towards higher valued human beliefs. These more elevated beliefs define the 
attractive group charisma of established groups, who have a high power  ratio, in 
comparison with other interdependent groups in society (Elias 2008a [1976]: 2). 
The projection of value supremacy within established groups forms a common 
reservoir of memories and experiences codified in sets of communal norms, codes 
and laws that define standards of respect.  
 
To be ‘established’ is to hold a positive attitude and more assured form of societal 
orientation, which corresponds to a higher power ratio. This status is maintained 
by reserving societal power positions and exclude other groups (Elias 2008a 
[1976]: 5). Established groups circulate particular blends of more realistic I-we 
images and more fantasy based I-we ideals that dominate societal resources and the 
means of orientation. The course of becoming ‘established’ requires not only 
degrees of detachment to recognise and seize power opportunities, but also degrees 
of involvement to solidify higher status through highly emotive societal symbols, 
for example through practices like marriage60. The representations that ruling 
sections of society have of themselves is often through “minority of the best” 
members (Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 49). There is the elevation of sections of 
the established, whose attitudes and actions most closely co rrespond to the I-we 
ideals of the group. These role models are able to exercise degrees of influence, to 
steer the course of the group as a whole.   
 
Outsider groups are distinguished by their lesser socio-psychological organisation.   
Less group cohesion means that outsider groups are more ambiguous, and are often 
partial strangers to each other. Smaller bonds of mutual identification make it 
                                                 
60 Marriage has been used to reaffirm and raise the status of families. For example see the depiction 
of familial relations in the novel War and Peace by Leon Tolstoy (2008 [1867]), which is a 
fictionalised account of tangible sets of societal relations.  
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difficult for outsider groups to develop forms of communal attachments, creating 
the circumstances for misunderstandings within outsider groups (Elias and Scotson 
2008 [1965]: 108).  
 
Established groups also exploit the looser forms of attachment and organisation to 
sustain their higher power ratio and perpetuate the lower power ratio of outsider 
groups.  The self-perceived nobleness and elevation of established groups contrasts 
to the notion of villain, which refers to groups of lower societal standing and lower 
human values/morals (Elias 2008a [1976]: 2).  Images of outsider groups can 
become modelled on a “minority of the worst” members (Elias and Scotson 2008 
[1965]: 49), allowing the vilification of sections of outsider groups that appear most 
opposed to the I-we-ideals and images61 of the established. There is the projection 
of value inferiority justifying forms of denigration. “Established groups with a great 
power margin at their disposal tend to experience their outsider groups not only as 
unruly breakers of laws and norms (the laws and norms of the established), but also 
as not particularly clean” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 2).  
 
To be an outsider is to experience stigmatised exclusion from accessing societal 
resources, perpetuating a less assured orientation. Where power differentials are 
particularly stark, outsider groups are expected to internalise societal power 
differentials into understanding themselves as being personally inferior.   
 
Established groups are able to stigmatise outsider groups. “Stigmatisation as an 
aspect of an established–outsider relationship is often associated with a specific 
type of collective fantasy evolved by the established group. It reflects and, at the 
same time, justifies the aversion – the prejudice – its members feel towards those 
of the outsider group.” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 19). Stigmatised depictions of outsiders 
are an insight into the kinds of contesting attitudes and orientations held by 
established groups in liberal-democratic societies.  
 
                                                 
61 For example, a Christian church has a different physical appearance from an Islamic mosque.   
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However, tensions can emerge from the ongoing societal power shifts that 
contextualise the development of conscience formation. Outsider groups are not 
total strangers to wider society, though their images are often distorted by highly 
involved mythical depictions.  
 
The lower power ratio of outsiders is also never absolute. There are chances for 
societal advancement, should they gain greater group cohesion to counter the 
stigmatisation and reverse overtime the domination of orientation enjoyed by 
established groups.  
 
The high power ratio of established groups is never absolute. There are always 
pressures from within the group, from other members of the established, and 
beyond ‘from below’, from perceived outsiders.  
 
Societies experience power shifts in either direction. Overtime, former outsider 
groups can become established, where the experiential knowledge of being an 
outsider can be forgotten, and/or subsumed into conscience formation. Likewise 
members of established groups can perceive themselves as becoming outsiders, and 
cling onto more magical-mythical I-we ideals of themselves from a time where their 
group enjoyed greater societal supremacy.  
    
Power Struggles and Webs of Interdependence 
 
Understanding the webs of interdependence and interconnected power struggles of 
established–outsider relations helps expand the conceptualisation of shared 
anxieties. Established groups exert greater societal and self-regulation with 
identified outsiders as well as towards themselves. These regulations can lead to 
greater domination and subjugation of outsiders through coercive practices such as 
enslavement. The “impact of group charismatic belief upon  group members has its 
most exemplary form in the case of powerful nations dominated by party-
government establishments and, thus, united against outsiders by a common social 
belief in their unique national virtue and grace” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 26).  
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In liberal-democratic societies, established group attitudes to outsider groups are 
situated by appeals to both collective-nationalist and humanist-egalitarian 
normative codes in ways that induce greater restraint on some behaviours and 
lesser restraints on other behaviours.   
 
Relations with outsider groups can mobilise shared anxieties from the struggles for 
dominance by both collective-nationalist and humanist-egalitarian codes. Blends of 
involved idealisations towards both collective-nationalist and humanist-egalitarian 
normative codes can induce the development of neuroses (Elias 2013 [1989]: 24). 
These socio-psychological contestations that bind established groups to outsider 
groups help circulate experiences of guilt, shame, and embarrassment anxieties. 
Guilt emerges when the breaking of one code results in castigations from the other 
code (Elias 2013 [1989]: 172). This can also lead to embarrassment and feelings of 
‘bad conscience’. Elias (2012a [1939]: 460) has remarked that:    
 
“Just as shame arises when someone infringes the 
prohibitions of his own self and of society, embarrassment, 
occurring when something outside the individual impinges 
on his danger zone, on forms of behaviour, objects and 
inclinations which have early on been invested with fear by 
his surroundings…..Embarrassment is displeasure or anxiety 
that arises when another person threatens to breach, or 
breaches, societies prohibitions represented by one’s own 
superego.”  
 
Expanding webs of interdependence have also expanded the ‘danger zone’ 
experienced by liberal-democratic societies through the awareness of globalised 
power differentials. Widening dangers zones show blends of idealisation and 
irritation (Wouters 1992: 241). This is bound to the awareness of potentially 
harmful globalised outsiders beyond, whose behaviours and practices that can 
affect the relations of established groups within societies.  There is the sharp 
idealisation of the both normative codes, as well as an irritation that particular 
outsiders seem incapable of adhering to the rules and ideals of the established. This  
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can also lead to frustration that other members of the established group do not 
share the same impassioned attitudes towards the outsiders.    
 
Established groups have different interpretations of the outsiders depending on 
their balance of relatively insecure to relatively secure forms of orientation. They 
are aware of their precarious societal position and fear the development of harmful 
events in the future should they lose it. Fear is an ubiquitous characteristic of human 
relations, something that “all human groups are prone to induce in each other. It 
may be fear of total enslavement, fear of exploitation, of robbery, of bodily 
destruction” (Elias 2008b [1990]: 230). Societal pressures produce self-pressures 
in a sensitisation to actions and practices that could threaten their status 62. Blends 
of realistic I-we images and more fantasy based I-we ideals forms of thinking can 
swing towards more involved orientations.  
 
Depictions of particular outsider groups can reveal changes from more insecure to 
more secure, or conversely from more secure to more insecure forms of thinking 
and orientating. There is the ongoing development of circles of association and 
disassociation. This is similar to what Abram de Swaan (1995; 1997) calls widening 
circles of identification and disidentification.  
 
Association and disassociation emphasise the interweaving bonds of affective 
collaboration and aversion that situate relations between societal groups. If the ‘we’ 
of established groups shifts towards greater openness and inclusion.  These 
identifications indicate decreasing distance with outsider groups and greater forms 
of association. If there is the increased use of personal pronouns: ‘we’ identifications 
exclusive to the ‘they’ identifications of outsiders. This indicates growing distance 
between established and outsider groups and widening disassociation. Circles of 
disassociation circulate the possibilities for more insecure forms of orientation. The 
insecure established are 
 
                                                 
62See Elias’s (2012 [1939]: 466) example of how ‘established’ members of European court 
aristocracy were sensitised to the practices from ‘outsider’ bourgeois groups, whose customs in their 
eyes, infringe on their “hereditary privileges”.    
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“sections of an established group whose members are most 
insecure, most unsure of their own value and standing as a 
group, tend to be most hostile in their stigmatisation of 
outsider groups, most unrelenting in their effort to preserve 
their status quo and not allow the barriers between 
established and outsider to be lowered, let alone be torn 
down” (Elias 2008b [1990]: 230).   
 
Highly insecure members of the established foresee that any greater openness to 
outsiders comes at the expense of their own interests. These sections can include 
both more affluent and less affluent ‘economically disadvantaged’ members of 
established groups (Mols and Jetten 2017). They can fear loss of status should the 
outsiders gain any form of empowerment, which encroaches on their lifestyles and 
practices. Insecure established collectives can interpret outsider groups as a threat 
to their own group cohesion. They enforce greater, harsher collective measures 
aimed at stigmatising the outsiders, as well as advocating new rules and norms 
aimed at maintaining, even increasing the barriers between themselves and the 
outsider groups.  These cultivate greater attachments towards themselves and 
other ‘like’ individuals, as well as greater stigmatisation of outsiders, which raises 
and perpetuates high socio-emotive barriers.  
 
In contrast, the secure established interpret relations with outsiders with greater 
detachment and relatively secure orientation. In the Maycomb model essay, Elias 
gives the example of Atticus Finch, from Harper Lee’s novel To Kill A Mockingbird 
(1997 [1960]). Finch forms part of the “exceptional minority” acting on more 
detached insight, and did not share the same fears of the insecure established in 
Maycomb (Elias 2008b [1990]: 218, 224). His more secure orientation and realistic 
I-we image of himself enabled him to empathise and defend Robinson.  He overcame 
the societal trap, the double bind that ensnared the insecure established of 
Maycomb with the fate of Robinson. Elias (2008b [1990]: 230) remarks that “one 
may expect greater equality to prevail among human societies only if one is able to 
lower the level of fear humans arouse in each other, individually no less than in 
groups”. Finch serves as an example of how the more secure sections of the 
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established can act with greater detachment and be more empathetic towards 
outsiders, by lowering the socio-emotive barriers between them.   
 
Development of Fear-arousing Constellations 
 
Established groups hold three fears: decline, disorientation and contact. These fears 
are illustrated through Elias’s Maycomb, Brahimin and Burakumin examples. These 
constitute the creation of fear-arousing constellations that stigmatise relations 
between established and outsider groups.  The term constellation 63 emphases the 
steering features of these sets of fears. “Deep-rooted in the customs of each skein of 
more or less interdependent subgroups is often the notion or  legend that one of 
them brought fear into this world. It is usually one of the others. The beginningless 
character of fear-arousing constellations is quickly forgotten; so is their reciprocity” 
(Elias 2008b [1990]: 228).  
 
Established groups fear decline from the presence of outsider groups: the 
weakening  of their group charisma and distinguishing qualities that indicate their 
higher status. Elias again uses the example of John Robinson from Harper Lee’s To 
Kill a Mockingbird (1997 [1960]) to explain established fears of decline. Groups of 
white families and farmers formed the establishment of Maycomb. Their group 
charisma was bound to maintaining the barrier between themselves and the black 
community through the domination of violence and interaction with white women. 
Robinson “lived in a situation in which every single option open to him in relation 
to a white girl could easily turn into disaster” (Elias 2008b [1990]: 221). The gravity 
of the injury suffered by the established of Maycomb, seemingly left no other 
possibility, other than the death of Robinson (Elias 2008b [1990]: 224). Established 
groups in Maycomb believed that Robinson’s continued existence would lead to an 
inevitable decline of their group charisma that situated their status and orientation 
in Maycomb.  
 
                                                 
63 Also emphasising the historical cosmological constellations that guided sailors in maritime 
voyages.   
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Established groups fear disorientation from outsider groups. The circumstance 
where they are no longer the centre of communication and knowledge, and 
experience a powerlessness to situate and place themselves in society. Elias’s 
example of caste–outcaste relations from India illustrates fears of disorientation. 
“The priestly establishment, the Brahmins, used their domination of the means of 
orientation and of the control of the invisible powers systematically as an 
instrument of rule and a weapon of exclusion” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 33). The 
established Brahmin monopolised orientation to maintain superiority through the 
claimed access to magical-mythical knowledge. They emphasised their uniqueness 
and connection to the gods to preserve their domination, reserving power positions 
for themselves, and rejecting the claims other castes.  Established groups “deny 
information to those they exclude. And, in one sense or another, the denied 
information serves those who withhold it as a source of superiority, as a means  of 
higher status and power” (Elias 2008b [1990]: 225). They maintain their status by 
regulating knowledge, creating and regulating particular images, symbols and 
impressions, which can elevate themselves, and relegate outsider groups.  
 
Established groups fear contact with outsider groups. The moral contamination 
from closer relations, which jeopardises their moral supremacy. The example of the 
Burakumin in Japan demonstrates fears of contact.  Established groups in Japanese 
society have maintained a longstanding stigmatisation of the Burakumin ‘class’.  In 
societal beliefs that deemed the Burakumin to be a dirty64, filthy people based on 
their social occupations65, with an imaginary myth of a blue birthmark that 
symbolised their lower status and intrinsic vilification (Elias 2008a [1976]: 13-15, 
19; Sunda 2015). The stigmatised mythologisation of the Burakumin maintained 
the high societal barriers and the socio-psychological distance between themselves 
Japanese established groups. “The avoidance of any closer  social contact with 
members of the outsider group has all the emotional characteristics of what in 
another context has come to be called ‘the fear of pollution’” (Elias 2008a [1976]: 
9). Stories such as those told about the Burakumin limit deeper societal contact with 
                                                 
64 The dirty stigma indicates a societal inclination towards certain standards of cleanliness and 
hygiene, which is exemplified in Japanese society but can be found in many other societies.  
65 For example, these occupations have included slaughterman, undertakers , leatherworkers ,  
executioners, and sanitation workers,  
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the outsiders, maintaining the distance and perpetuating unequal relations , in order 
to prevent established groups from being ‘polluted’ .   
 
Fears of decline, disorientation and contact interweave insecure sections of 
established groups in double bind processes, which reproduce highly involved 
modes of thinking. "Ideas about dangers are therefore heavily charged with fantasy, 
leading to the constant reproduction of the high level of danger and therefore 
modes of thought governed more by fantasy than by reality" (Elias 2007: 107). The 
practices of outsiders confirm, and cultivate further established group measures 
that extend widening circles of disassociation to maintain a ‘safe’ distance between 
themselves outsider groups. Often, the maintenance of safe distance perpetuates 
high degrees of experiential danger posed by outsider groups in a seemingly endless 
cycle.  
 
Insecure sections of the established experiencing high degrees of experiential 
danger appeal to the survival unit figuration. This refers to the bonds of human 
groupings that pursue common survival through physical force against other 
groups that is interdependent66 with the development and continuation of 
occupational67 bonds (Elias 2012b [1978]: 134). The survival unit is the figuration 
of figurations, a “community of fate” in Hegelian terms (Kaspersen and Gabriel 
2008: 376). People live in a survival unit that situates their orientation and 
development of societal relations.  Greater functional differentiation of societal 
functions/occupations parallels amalgamations into larger physical survival groups 
that at present take the form of nation-states. Occupational survival has become 
interdependent with physical survival.  
 
Appeals to the survival unit can influence sections of society through the 
mythological infusion greater fantasy content.  Memories of trauma 68 and 
                                                 
66 This is an example of the Weber – Marx synthesis that Elias (2012a [1939] employs. Where Weber 
discusses the monopolisation of violence, and Marx notes the monopolisation of the means of 
production. Elias shows in Part III of On the Process of Civilisation that these processes are not 
mutually exclusive. Monopolisations of violence and production developed in parallel.   
67 These “cannot be reduced to ‘economic’ functions, neither is it separable from them” (Elias 2012 
[1978]: 134).  
68 See Hutchison 2016. 
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articulations of fears from a previous phase69 of societal development are passed 
from generation to generation. These recollections of how a survival unit behaved 
in the past and the kinds of demarcations they constructed to defend themselves 
offer paths for present and future actions. For the insecure established, appeals to 
the survival unit become a powerful weapon for the stigmatisation and exclusion of 
outsiders, who are deemed to be such a threat to group charisma that the survival 
society as a whole is believed to be in jeopardy. This opens the space for a range of 
practices that normalise unequal relations between established and outsider 
groups, through perpetuating fear-arousing constellations.  
 
Political Leaders & Language Representations  
 
The following section demonstrates how the vocabulary of process sociology 
provides a method to understand the language representations of transnational 
migration articulated by political leaders. The language of political leaders 
mobilises shared anxieties. Competing identifications and associations from 
conscience formation processes can dominate societal orientation, and steer of the 
direction of societal change.  
 
Political Leaders & Process 
 
Liberal-democratic societies oscillate between degrees of socio -psychological 
openness and closure. Political leaders can disseminate more fortified societal 
orientations70. “The ruling elites and many of their followers in each nation (or at 
least in each great power) imagine themselves to be in the centre of humanity as if 
in a fortress, contained and surrounded by all the other nations, yet at the  same time 
cut off from them.” (Elias 2012b [1978]: 24-25). This same process can also run in 
                                                 
69 For example, Christopher Clark (2007: 36) notes in his history of Prussia, whose expansion 
merged into the development of modern German society. “The all destructive fury of the Thirty Years  
War was mythical not in the sense that it bore no relation to reality, but in the sense that it 
established itself within collective memories and became a tool for thinking about the world”.   
 
70 One example is Japan’s Sakoku (closed country) programme pursued by the Tokugawa shogunate 
from 1633 to 1853 (Laver 2011; Itoh 2000).     
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the opposite direction. They can also lower socio-psychological barriers (however 
minutely) by pursuing programs infused by more detached verifiable 
understandings of the society they lead. Lowering socio-psychological barriers 
between peoples, however, requires the transgenerational development of societal 
and self-restraints, and high degrees of discipline throughout the webs of relations.  
 
An exploration of the language representations of transnational outsiders is one 
way to glimpse the overall direction of liberal-democratic societies. From this, we 
can understand the particular combination of societal openness and closure during 
a period of societal history. Political leaders propagate representations in the form 
of gossip. These are often bound to the idealisation of communal norms and 
relationships (Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 122). Forms of gossip encompass the 
elevated praise of established groups, often those connected political leaders 
themselves, and relegated blame towards outsider groups (see Elias and Scotson 
2008 [1965]: 133).  
 
 The Winston Parva study by Elias and Scotson was an investigation of intra -state 
migration, but the same patterns of societal power relations can be found in inter-
state migration experienced by larger liberal-democratic societies. People can 
effortlessly become outsiders through increased forms of human movement across 
the globe, due to wider societal organisational incentives. Global establishments 
from universities, to transnational corporations and state-societies themselves, 
help maintain outsider identifications. These large groupings are dependent on the 
growth of occupational bonds that demand constant movement from one job in one 
state-society/community, to another job in another state-society/community. 
People are often thrust into becoming outsiders, forming new relationships with 
pre-existing established groups with different standards and societal sensibilities 
(Elias and Scotson 2008 [1965]: 182). Stephen Mennell observes, “cheap transport 
and increased mobility over longer distances, have made it still more common 
throughout the world for displaced groups to impinge on older established groups” 




Political leaders’ representations of transnational migration can mobilise shared 
anxieties. More insecure and more secure sections of the established can pursue 
idealised strategies that premise either collective-nationalist or humanist-
egalitarian codes. The insecure established can pursue measures justified by 
attachments to the collective-nationalist code. They may only perceive the positive 
attributes of border protection measures, which they advocate and legislate. 
Whereas the secure established may pursue practices supported by attachments to 
the humanist-egalitarian code that eliminates the need for national borders and 
fosters greater individual mobility. Societal conditioning means that groups are 
unable to recognise the elastic bond that binds them both together within the 
habituated identifications of liberal-democratic populations, with each section 
unwilling to engage with the opposing position. 
 
Political leaders can be resistant to embarrassment after violating a particular 
normative code. They can retreat from one normative code into another normative 
code. In efforts to block the experience of shame and guilt, through the pursuit of 
further measures emboldened by that code. Societal pressures may illicit a degrees 
of greater openness, a mea culpa admission of error, or greater closure and further 
fortified retreats. These recoils only reinforce their involved pursuit of political 
survival, expanding degrees of interpreted danger.  
 
Political leaders’ representations of transnational migration can dominate societal 
orientation, through fears of decline, disorientation and contact. Migrant outsiders 
can be stigmatised with fears of decline, through the appearance of being divergent 
from the customs, symbols, memories and stories that sustain the group charisma 
of established groups. The insecure established may interpret migrant outsiders as 
a threat to their group charisma. They can invoke the survival unit with its reservoir 
of past traumas, and form a powerful, visceral imagery to stigmatise migrant 
outsiders. New arrivals of people are interpreted as a challenge to the dominant 
societal orientations of society. Fears of disorientation sustain praise and blame 
gossip, which crystallises a series of dominant narratives and stories. Finally, 
migrant outsiders can become marked by fears of contact: the belief that their 
presence may morally contaminate the rules and norms of established groups. 
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Insecure sections of the established advocate for newer, stricter norms, and rules, 
and can only perceive the more positive attributes (directed towards themselves),  
while blocking the less desirable unplanned consequences. These cumulative fears 
increase the barriers of social inclusion between established groups, and the 
migrant outsiders.  
 
Political leaders’ representation of transnational migration can steer the direction 
of society. This sets the stage for societal confrontations between more insecure and 
more secure sections of the established. Secure established group could advocate 
societal strategies that lower societal barriers. They can activate images of 
compassion and empathy towards outsiders. Whereas the insecure established 
groups offer societal strategies that raise societal barriers and cultivate collective 
symbols and habituated fears against migrant outsiders. Decline, disorientation and 
contact fears of the insecure established circulate double bind processes and fear-
arousing constellations, which entrap representations of transnational migration. 
These depictions promote societal strategies that perpetuate the exclusion of 
migrant outsiders through repetitive gossip, symbols and appeals to the survival 
unit. Depending on the ratio of secure to insecure, the overall direction of liberal-




I have argued in this chapter that process sociology offers a model and sets of 
vocabulary to conceptualise the shared anxieties of political leaders in liberal-
democratic societies. Process models provide a relational reconstructive model of 
open people that illuminates the development of knowledge processes through the 
blends of involvement and detachment, webs of interdependence and changing 
power ratios. My approach also highlights the interplay of conceptual 
reconstruction and empirical verification to understand tensions and anxieties 
from webs of interdependence, which reveals the socio-structural tensions and 





Process sociology introduces a vocabulary to understand the developme nt of 
societal and self-conscience formations. Power struggles from established outsider 
relations linked to the development of conflicting normative codes circulate guilt, 
shame and embarrassment anxieties. In struggles for status where outsider groups 
can become feared through the infusion of more involved magical-mythical forms 
of thinking.  
 
The vocabulary of process sociology presents a method to understand the language 
representations of transnational migration by political leaders. These 
representations can show the mobilisation of shared anxieties, domination of 
societal orientation, and steer the overall direction of society with degrees of 
inclusive openness and exclusive closure.  
 
The next chapter will demonstrate that an outlook on shared anxieties is further 
enhanced through an explanation of the model and vocabulary of risk sociology. 
Process and risk sociology share a common interest in exploring the effects of 
unplanned unintended consequences of knowledge processes on the development 
















Chapter 2. Shared Anxieties & Risk Sociology 
 
The last chapter introduced a process sociological approach to comprehending 
shared anxieties. This outlook provided a relational reconstructive model 
understanding the conflicting identifications in liberal democratic societies, 
through knowledge processes, webs of interdependence and power relations. 
Process sociology provided a vocabulary to conceptualise shared anxieties through 
processes of societal conscience formation and the power struggles from conflicting 
normative codes. The model and vocabulary of process sociology presented a 
method to understand the language representations of transnational migration 
expressed by political leaders, who mobilise shared anxieties, dominate societal 
orientation, and steer the course of societal change.   
 
My second chapter explains the model of risk sociology, how it complements the  
conceptualisation of shared anxieties initiated by process sociology.  
 
In this chapter, I will argue that the strand of risk sociology developed by Ulrich 
Beck enhances a sociological outlook for understanding shared anxieties. For the 
purpose of this chapter, risk sociology refers to the strand developed by Beck. His 
risk model was refined through discussions across the 1980s, 1990s and early 
2000s. Based on this model, risks are the unplanned outcomes of globalised 
interconnected human relations, which oscillate between safety and catastrophe. 
Interpretations of risks situate the ways in which people relate, situate and 
orientate themselves in societies. The conceptualisation of risk signifies “a peculiar 
state between security and destruction, where the perception of threatening risks 
determines thought and action” (Beck 1999: 135). People build risk narratives to 
legitimise the desires and practices of particular societal groups. These appeals can 
raise the degrees of catastrophic risk consciousness in some circumstances 71, and 
lower the degree of risk consciousness in other circumstances72.  
                                                 
71 For example, there is the risk of harmful pesticide residues in food (Keating 2017).  
72 For example, see justifications by resource extractive industries on the safety/lower risk of 
contamination by coal seam gas exploration (Evershed 2018).   
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I contend that the risk orientations projected by political leaders can reveal the 
blends of socio-structural tensions and competing identifications that affect the 
direction of change in liberal democratic societies.  
 
Shared anxieties develop through the contradictory awareness of people as risks. A 
risk sociology framework can help reconstruct the sociological processes 
embedded in interpretations of transnational migration, which expands 
understandings of the socio-psychological tensions in societies.  
 
At first glance, a sociological synthesis of Elias and Beck appears to be problematic 
because of contrasting accounts of knowledge production and unintended 
consequences.  Elias’s sociological synthesis would note that uncertainty could be 
overcome: awareness of unintended consequences enables more verifiable 
scientificated knowledge of societies.  
 
In reply, Beck would cautiously note that the acceleration of scientific knowledge 
sustained a reductionist model of ‘industrial’ society that dismissed and sustained 
unequal sets of relations with destructive consequences, which are revealed by the 
awareness of the unintended consequences of human actions and knowledges. The 
scientificated model of society has circulated more rather than less suspicions about 
human relations. Beck (1994: 177; 2006: 34-35) avoids the swing to nihilism by 
positioning his conceptualisation of risk as a “theory of ambivalence” that is neither 
purely optimistic nor pessimistic. He argues that his sociological synthesis is “more 
neutral and more complex” than Horkeimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of the 
Enlightenment, because societies can alter relations in different ways through the 
awareness of globalised risks.    
 
The common link between Elias and Beck is their investigation of uncertainty: how 
human groups negotiate the ambiguities of their relations. They place the 
examination of human societal ambiguities at the forefront of sociological research.   
 
Together Elias and Beck offer a sophisticated model of knowledge and 
interdependency and power interconnections to conceptualise shared anxieties.   
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Where process sociology investigates the ambiguous webs of interconnected 
identifications from smaller to larger groups of people. The Beck strand of risk 
sociology explores how contradictory webs of interconnections across larger 
globalised groupings, situates identifications within smaller localised groupings.  
 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section explains the model of risk 
sociology. The second section explains how the vocabulary of risk sociology 
contributes to the study of shared anxieties. The third section shows how the risk 
orientations of transnational migration in the language of political leaders can 
mobilise, dominate and steer the direction of change in liberal democratic societies.  
 
The Models of Risk  
 
The following section illustrates the model of risk sociology. It explains the 
sociological synthesis developed by Beck, which complements the model of process 
sociology. This approach problematizes the reductive conceptual legacies of 
‘industrial’ society and the development of ‘national’ social science.  
 
The risk sociology developed by Beck conceptualises the sociology of knowledge 
shift to the risk society.  Awareness and unawareness of ‘reflexive’ modernisation 
situates perceptions of global interdependencies and global risks. Risk 
consciousness contextualises the forms of power relations in global risk societies. 
The development of global risk societies necessitates a cosmopolitan social science 
that combines conceptualisation with empiricisation. Risk sociology offers a mo del 









Understanding Risk & Reductive Knowledge Processes 
 
Risk has become a ubiquitous term and concept across the societal sciences and 
wider liberal democratic society73. The term first emerged as a means of 
sociological understanding in the 1980s and 1990s in the work of scholars 74 that 
not only included Beck, but also Mary Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky and François 
Ewald. The intention of these scholars was to “wrest the issue of risk away from 
specialists (the risk analysts) and place it on a wider social scientific and public 
agenda” (Scott 2000: 34). These ‘risk analysts’ formed two str ands of risk 
conceptualisation. The first strand emerged from commercialisation processes with 
the development of the insurance industry. Risk was conceptualised as the 
protection of businesses from the uncertainties of trade and transport, for example, 
the insurance of valuable shipping cargos that included people/slaves75 as well as 
commodities (Pearson 1997; Crothers 2011; Spooner 1983). The second strand 
emerged from scientification processes with the expansion of military-techno 
industrial manufacturing, and the need to mitigate unexpected accidents. Risk was 
conceptualised as protection from the possibilities of nuclear accidents from the 
development and deployment nuclear weapons (Sagan 1993), and to manage the 
likelihood of unintentional global atomic conflict (Kissinger 1960; c.f. Bull 197676).    
 
Risk sociology of Beck problematizes the reductive conceptualisations implicit in 
commercialised and scientificated understandings of risk. The distinguishing 
features of the Beck strand of risk scholarship is the synthetic engagement with 
sociological threads from the work of Karl Marx, Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas. 
These underpin a sociology of knowledge processes. This synthetic account of risk 
provides a common ‘classical’ sociological foundation sufficient for amalga mation 
                                                 
73 For an historical overview see Matthias Beck and Beth Kewell’s Risk: A Study of Its Origins, History 
and Politics (2014). For a more thematic account of the different strands of risk scholarship see 
Lupton (2013).  
74For example, see Ewald (1990; 1999). For a synthesised Foucauldian account of risk see Amoore 
(2013).  
75 See “Marine insurance policy, no. 2157, Alexandria Marine Insurance Company, June 21,1809. This 
policy insured the cargo of the Dorchester, consisting of thirty slaves valued at $9,000, traveling 
from Alexandria [Virginia] to New Orleans” (Pearson 1997: 626).  
 
76 Bull (1976: 6) notes the need “to minimize the risk of general nuclear war”.   
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with process sociology. Firstly, in contrast with Marx, societal stratifications and 
power relations from risk consciousness replaces and subsumes class-
consciousness (see Beck 2013b). The production and projection of risks by sections 
of society replaces the production of wealth/capital as markers of societal power 
creating new forms of societal and self-regulation. Secondly, Beck (1999: 139-140) 
rejects Weberian understandings of bureaucratic control and asserts that “Weber 
does not recognise or discuss the concept of ‘risk’” and does not perceive the 
relationship between societal regulations, and the production of risks. He calls his 
conceptualisation of world risk society as the “antithesis” of Weber’s iron cage of 
modernity (Beck 1999: 140, 147). Thirdly, the Habermasian undercurrent of Beck 
shows how risk orientations form part of dialogical learning processes from 
changing forms of societal organisation (Lash and Wynne 1992: 8).   
 
Risk models also problematize the reductive polarisations that underpinned the 
model of the industrial society. These include spatial, communal, gender, vocational 
and environmental distinctions. Spatial inside–outside polarisations encompass the 
development of contained “nation-state societies” whose institutions are delimited 
by territorial boundaries (Beck et. al. 2003: 4; Beck 2007b: 287). There are 
communal polarisations between ‘free’ individuals moulded by societal institutions, 
including gender polarisations that separated male and female roles through 
idealised practices such as the nuclear family (Beck 1992: 104). Vocational 
polarisations distinguish between wage labour and leisure time (Beck 1992: 142). 
Environmental polarisations that comprised an exploitative understanding of 
nature that exists ‘outside’ of society, which enables the displacement of negative 
consequences from exploitative practices ‘inside’ society (Beck et. al . 2003: 4). 
These distinctions sustained the dismissal and blocking of undesirable 
consequences from the pursuit of these ideologies.   
 
Idealised understandings of industrial society stimulated the development of 
‘national’ social science. The model of particular ‘national’ industrial societies 
became a subsuming generalizable paradigm for the broader study of societies 
(Beck 2004: 142; Beck 2007b: 286). Methodologically nationalist approaches 
shaped the work of scholars such as Weber and Talcott Parsons. They channelled 
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the images and impressions of their own nationalised societies, namely 
Prussian/Wilhelmine society and post-World War II American society into their 
larger conceptualisations. These approaches equated the limits of sociological 
research with the static, spatial limits of a particular state-society. Social science 
becomes caught in the “prison error of identity” where “each human being has one 
native country, which he/she cannot choose; he is born into it and it conforms to 
the either/or logic of nations and the associated stereotypes” (Beck 2006:  6, 25, 28; 
c.f. Rosenberg 2016).   
 
Beck identifies and problematizes closed models in social science. In the particular, 
the vocabulary of either/or explanations that exclusively differentiate between 
separate independent categories (Beck 2006: 4-5; Beck 2008; 795). These narrow 
knowledge processes justified power relations such as men over women and 
humanity over nature. For example, environmental polarisations circulated the 
desire for greater degrees of human regulation over the natural environment across 
all areas of human relations (Beck 1999: 76). Techno-economic advancement 
became the standard of judgement that defined the ‘progression’ of all other areas 
of industrial society such as family, gender and vocational relations. This was 
justified through the tactile creation of labour saving devices and observable 
improvements in standards of living (Beck 1992: 201-202; Beck 1994: 10). There 
was the presumption that techno-economic ‘progress’ equated to societal 
‘progress’. 
 
Models from ‘national’ industrial societies are reliant on particular forms of 
reductive knowledge processes. For Beck, the development of global risks resisted 
reduction into controllable and dismissible industrial hazards or accidents. This 
development challenges the idealised models of national industrial society. Hazards 
or accidents are definable and containable into closed localised events (Beck and 
Willms 2004: 115). Globalised risks are the unplanned outcomes of global 
interdependencies, which are irreducible to the models of industrial society. These 
side effects are the unintended consequences of decisions made by areas of societal 
expertise from political groups to large organisations that situate the ways in which 
societal groups are bound together (Beck 1999: 50). “Global risks produce global 
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risk society…..sociology’s view of society as a closed and self-equilibrating system 
full of linear processes, a view most clearly embodied in the work of Talcott Parsons, 
is being historically superseded by through reflexive modernisation” (Beck and 
Willms 2004: 31).  
 
The awareness and unawareness of ‘reflexive’ modernisation emphasises the socio -
psychological experiences of global interdependencies. Some knowledge processes 
can open spaces for greater understanding, stimulating awareness, while also 
blocking other pathways, inspiring unawareness. Beck (1992: 50 n. 1) defines 
modernisation as the knowledge processes that contextualise changes in societal 
organisation, the forms of power and influence, attachments, lifestyle, political 
participation and repression that constitute and reshape understandings of reality, 
and the standards of knowledge.  What processes sociology understands as the 
means of orientation, the rudimentary ways in which people have come to situate 
themselves in societies.  
 
This is a different understanding of reflexive modernisation used in other areas of 
sociology. Kilminster (2011: 91, 101-102) remarks that the notion of modernity 
with its focus on the study of advanced societies remains one of the dominant 
themes and assumptions of 20th century sociology, which has become a personified 
“guilt-cause” to be blamed for unpleasant unplanned societal developments. 
Responses from guilt opened the space for work by sociologists such as Zygmunt 
Bauman (1992; 1997) exploring societal transformations to a post-modernity.  
 
The risk sociology of Beck can also be mistaken for proposing a teleological end -
condition. Particularly, when his work appears alongside the likes of Giddens and 
Lash (1994; 1994). For Giddens (1990; 1994), modernisation and the awareness of 
risk is the means to a more desirable form of societal ordering through the creation 
of dialogical democracy. Giddens reduces modernisation processes into a reified 
state or condition. This reductive understanding fostered the ideology of the Labour 




Giddens and Lash provide a linear account of reflexive modernisation that premises 
a closed circle of ‘aware’ rational experts. Beck is critical of this approach where 
closed circles of expertise presume sets of undisputed power relations, between 
people who are ‘aware’ and those who are ‘unaware’ of the consequences of societal 
practices. For Beck (1999: 125, 130-131) this underestimates the diversification of 
alternative explanations and the effects of unawareness. In his view, Giddens and 
Lash dismiss unawareness as irrelevant to the understanding of reflexive 
modernisation (Beck 1999: 125). This dismissal involves a double construction of 
unawareness. Firstly the rejection of other forms of knowledge, and secondly the 
inability to admit uncertainty (Beck 1999: 131).  
 
Beliefs in ‘expert’ explanations reveal the forms of power relations that dismiss and 
silence any other form of understanding. The singular focus on “progress becomes 
a substitute for questions, a type of consent in advance for goals and consequences 
that go unnamed and unknown” (Beck 1992: 184). The reductive explanations from 
Giddens and Lash show an unawareness of the social, political, ecological and 
individual risks exceeding the limits of societal regulation (Beck 1999: 72-73).  
 
Global Interdependence Risk Approach 
 
The Beck model of risk and reflexive modernisation articulates the effects of 
modernisation/global interdependence processes on individual and collective 
conscience formations. Reflexive modernisation is a much broader term. It includes 
both concepts of reflect and reflex. Reflexive is “tied to the unintended consequences 
of modernization…..alongside reflection (knowledge), Reflexivität in German also 
includes reflex in the sense of the effect or preventive effect of non-knowing” (Beck 
1999: 109).  
 
The reflexive feature of modernisation is the intertwining of planned processes with 
the unplanned developments. The awareness (wissen/knowing) of side effects from 
modernisation processes accompanies degrees of unawareness (nicht-wissen/not 




The emergence of invisible side effects in the form of risks stimulates a range of 
competing explanations.  Risk consciousness “opens up a battle -ground of 
pluralistic knowledge claims. This involves knowledge of the consequences of 
industrial modernisation even on the lowest rungs of the ladder of social 
recognition” (Beck 1999: 120). Known unawareness comprises a more empathetic 
opening towards alternative explanations (Beck 1999: 126). This acknowledges 
that explanations are often incomplete, with the proactive desire to widen and 
deepen those understandings of human societies. In contrast, unknown 
unawareness and the obliviousness of not knowing, becomes an anticipatory 
defence against the moral and economic costs for changes in politics and life style 
(Beck 1999: 121, 127).  
 
Awareness and unawareness of risk becomes a way of managing both the desirable 
and undesirable side effects of global interconnections. People in large societies 
have become engaged in an unseen, often coerced, and at times confusing banal 
experience of interdependence (Beck 2006: 7-10, 48)77. This encompasses the 
development of multiple attachments and the awareness of transnational forms of 
life. Everyday relations with transnational groups are the means through which 
globalised long-term processes become intertwined with localised relations. Beck 
(2006: 73) notes that “the experience of global interdependence and global risks 
alter the social and political character of societies within nation-states”. 
 
Beck evaluates the societal scientific implications and sets of relations from the 
development and practice of risk. In an effort to understand how people and their 
groups are, and have become bound together in the form of risk societies. His 
conceptualisation of risk concentrates on understanding the unintended 
consequences of human regulatory developments within and between societies, 
what process sociology understands as the interplay of planned and unplanned 
societal practices, where “all planned social practices take place within a stream of 
                                                 
77 This parallels Johan Goudsblom’s (1996: 16) remark that “global interdependency has become a 
hard and undeniable fact”: people from Western Europe to Africa and Asia are mutually  
interconnected, by political, military and economic ties shaping the way of life and survival “for all 
of us”.  
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unplanned, aimless, through structured processes, at a variety of interdependent 
levels” (Elias 2007: 115).  
 
In common with process models, risk models emphasise the interdependence of 
human knowledge processes. This avoids the realism – social constructivism divide 
in the social sciences (for example see Rasborg 2012), which emphasises the  
independent separation of subjects and objects.  In contrast to those reductive 
models, risk models stress the interdependence of human lifestyles and knowledge 
development through blends of subject perception and object knowledge of 
invisible side effects or risks (Beck 1992: 55).  
 
Risk models further the strand of the sociology of knowledge associated with the 
scholarship of Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno (1997 [1944]). The 
development of societal and self-regulations with non-human events/nature has 
infused understandings of people relations. This is similar to what process 
sociology calls the triad of basic controls, the uneven development of regulations 
over nature/non-human relations, inter-state – intra-state relations, and personal78 
relations (Elias 2012b [1978]: 151-152; Elias 2007: 106).  
 
Risk consciousness illustrates the shifting power relations of world risk societies. 
For Beck (1999: 16), the power relations of global risk societies include “those who 
produce and profit from risks and the many who are afflicted with the same risks”. 
There is the shift of catastrophic risks and consequences, from higher protective, 
higher wage state-societies, to less protective state-societies, lower wage, with less 
appreciation of individual rights. For example from the distribution of torture 79 
practices, waste and dangerous substances (Beck 2007a: 693). Risks concentrate 
attention towards certain relations, legitimatising degrees of societal and self-
regulation. The ways in which some kinds of risks are accepted, and other kinds of 
risks are dismissed can reveal the forms of power relations that organise societies.   
 
                                                 
78 Mennell (1998: 170) uses the distinction of technological, social and psychological regulations.  
79 See recent discussions of British complicity in the torture of terrorism suspects (Beaumont 2018).    
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“Risk presumes a decision, therefore a decision-maker, and 
produces a radical asymmetry between those who take, 
define the risks and profit from them, and those who are 
assigned to them, who have to suffer the ‘unforeseen side 
effects’ of the decisions of others, perhaps even pay for them 
with their lives, without having had the chance to be involved 
in the decision-making process.”  (Beck 2007a: 692) 
 
Risk orientations steer changes in societal organisation. These interpretations 
galvanise membership in some groups, and stigmatise other groups through claims 
about their limited expertise. Risk orientations can cultivate the perpetuation of 
unequal relations between and within societies. Awareness of some risks can also 
cultivate movements that desire more equal forms of societal organisation. 
 
The contradictions of global risk societies demand the replacement of national 
outlooks with cosmopolitan outlooks to formulate a cosmopolitan societal science. 
For Beck (2008: 794), global interdependence “is as much a reasonable option as it 
is a sentiment” (c.f Linklater 2010). Cosmopolitan societal science investigates 
“actual enforced cosmopolitanisation” to incorporate a “process-orientated 
sociology”, which methodically avoids the reduction of processes to static models 
(Beck 2006: 94; Beck 2007b: 287). This is distinct from the “retrogressive idealism 
of the national perspective” and the normative philosophical ideal of 
cosmopolitanism (Beck 2007b: 287, 290). Cosmopolitan societal science 
supersedes methodological nationalism with methodological cosmopolitanism, 
through synthetic both/and explanations and terms that supplants reductive 
analytic either/or explanations (Beck 2006: 4-5; Beck 2008: 795).  
 
Cosmopolitan societal science amalgamates conceptualisation with empiricisation. 
The development of global risk societies requires an “analytic-empirical approach” 
to global risks, globalised and localised interconnections, and global inequalities 
(Beck 2004: 133). The goal of this programme is to “produce a reasonable picture” 
of societal relations “that people and institutions can use to orient themselves” 




Global risks encompass a range of health, lifestyle, environmental/ecological, 
financial and other human practices. Beck’s earlier work focused on environmental 
ecological risks, but later expanded to broader economic, violence and moral 
struggles from global interdependencies (Beck 1999: 34-35; Beck and Sznaider 
2006: 11). Scott (2000: 35) notes that the immediate contextual background for 
Beck’s Risk Society was the emergence of protests against the construction of a 
nuclear processing plant in Wackersdorf, Bavaria. Scott also mentions the parallels 
with the Dreyfus Affair as inspiration for Emile Durkheim’s work and Prussian 
bureaucracy for Weber. Beck also reflects on the industrial disasters of Villa Parisi, 
Bhopal, and Chernobyl occurring in 1984, and 1986 (Beck 1987; Beck 1992: 43 -44).  
 
The Risk Vocabulary for Shared Anxieties 
 
Risk sociology offers a model and vocabulary for conceptualising shared anxieties 
from globalised interconnections and power relations shaping localised 
identifications. The awareness of the globalised consequences of human decisions 
overtime have disseminated forms of relations that oscillate between safety and 
catastrophe. One example of risk society anxieties is the development of climate 
change risks. Rohloff (2011a: 639) demonstrates the interconnections between 
individual management of risk and the expert management of moral panics. These 
relations form part of the continuum self-controls to societal controls.  
 
The following section explains the vocabulary of risk models, and how these terms 
illuminate an understanding of shared anxieties.  
 
The vocabulary conceptualises the cosmopolitanisation processes of societal 
conscience formation from the everyday experiences of globalised 
interconnections. Interdependency crises circulate cooperation pressures that 
challenge identifications between politico-economic citoyen and techno-economic 
bourgeois sections of liberal democratic societies. There are power struggles 
between conflicting cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitan movements.  
Cooperation pressures mobilise shared anxieties through harmful catastrophic and 
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harmless safe interpretations of risk. Symbolic orientations in the form of 
possibility judgements substantiate particular risk interpretations and define the 
attributes demanded by localised societal institutions through the pursuit of 
avoidance imperatives. The forecast of possible futures opens the space for 
scapegoat, catastrophic and self-critical anticipations for societal change.  
 
Cosmopolitanisation Processes & Interdependency Crises  
 
Liberal democratic societies experience the intended and unintended consequences 
of human interdependencies. Cosmopolitanisation processes contextualise the 
development of contradictory modes of thinking and orientating in liberal 
democratic societies.  Cosmopolitanisation is a “multidimensional process” that 
interconnects globalised and localised relations (Beck 2004: 136; Beck 200 6: 72-
73). The growth of relations within societal groups of ranging sizes cultivates the 
development of particular identifications and forms of cooperation.  
 
Ambiguous experiences of cosmopolitanisation processes situate forms of societal 
conscience formation. The development of transnational relations disruptively 
“transcends the distinctions between aliens and nations, friends and foes, 
foreigners and natives” (Beck 2006: 65-66). Enforced cooperation can generate 
concerns about changes in lifestyle practices that bring about shifts in identification. 
Beck (2006: 23) notes how “the everyday experience of cosmopolitan 
interdependence is not a love affair of everyone with everyone. It arises in a climate 
of heightened global threats, which create an unavoidable pressure to cooperate”.  
 
Cosmopolitanisation processes provoke overlapping ecological, economic, violence 
and moral struggles. These interdependency crises entangle more developed and 
less developed state-societies into a global risk society (Beck 1999: 34-35; Beck and 
Sznaider 2006: 11). Each struggle is influential to the extent that one or all invoke  
societal survival bonds. The four axes circulate cooperation pressures through 
interpretations of transnational risks from overlapping interdependent human 
practices and forms of societal organisation. The struggles encompass the 
expansion of human made decision dependent dangers into globalised risks, which 
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resist isolation, and containment into the reductive conceptualisations of industrial 
society (Beck 2006: 22).   
 
Interdependency crises challenge the habituated identifications within liberal 
democratic populations.  In particular, the contradictory models of divided citizens 
between immobile politico-economic citoyen and mobile techno-economic 
bourgeois identifications (Beck 1992: 183-184). The immobile politico-economic 
citoyen understands societal change from the public fulfilment of democratic rights 
through nationalised parliaments. Politico-economic citoyen identifications 
emphasise attachments towards particular state-societies, which parallels the 
development of protective communal family bonds. In contrast, the mobile techno-
economic bourgeois understands non-democratic societal change by private 
fulfilment of individual rights, with individual identifications towards industry, 
technology and business groups, which correspond to vocational bonds.  
 
There is the power struggle of cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitanisation 
movements within liberal democratic populations.  Each movement utilises the 
language of risk to reveal, and respond to the challenges of the cosmopolitan 
interdependence. There is an awareness that transnational forms of life permeate 
national societies. Cooperation pressures compel the creation of identifications that 
prioritise differing accounts of societal regulation. This prompts the contestation of 
imperatives with different degrees of inclusive open cosmopolitan consciousness 
and exclusive closed national consciousness. 
 
The cosmopolitanisation movement appeals to a more open consciousness. There 
is an understanding of transnational risk that emphasises the need for self -critical 
changes to society.  Cosmopolitan consciousness expands the possibilities for 
creative responses to common, human made risks. Transnational risks are 
opportunities for cooperation to lower the boundaries between peoples.  
 
The European Union is one example of a cosmopolitanisation movement because to 
be European is to hold both a national and non-national forms of identification 
(Beck 2006: 173). For example, events in July 2016 prompted Germany’s Chancellor 
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Angela Merkel (2016) to defend her policy of openness, despite growing anti-
cosmopolitan pressure, referencing both Germany and Europe. There is a more 
constructive understanding of societal diversification. This movement prioritises a 
common humanity that reconciles, balances, and embraces diverse forms 
identification. It recognises the importance of varied national identities, offering a 
more open society that empathises with different opinions and forms of orientation 
(Beck 2006: 77).   
 
In contrast, the anti-cosmopolitanisation movement appeals to a more closed 
consciousness. For the anti-cosmopolitans, transnational risks stimulate 
catastrophic and scapegoated changes to society. Transnational risks are 
justifications for cooperation to raise the boundaries between peoples.  
 
Anti-cosmopolitanisation movements are observable through the support for 
Pauline Hanson in Australia, Nigel Farage in the UK, Donald Trump in the US, and 
Marie Le-Pen in France. The movement is “an attempt to restore national priorities 
and categories by conferring [a] cosmopolitan legitimacy on them” through a 
shallow awareness of cosmopolitanisation processes and transnational relations 
(Beck 2006: 74). This awareness legitimises polarisations between exclusive 
societal groups, often appealing to localised concerns. There is a more destructive 
understanding of societal diversification through the reaffirmation an exclusive 
national consciousness. Anti-cosmopolitans stress the need for a more closed 
society to protect vulnerable provincial identifications but still open to narrow 
forms of techno-economic bourgeois identification.  
 
Power Relations & Symbolic Risk Orientations 
 
Shared anxieties can be mobilised through the entanglement of 
cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitanisation movements. There are socio-
psychological tensions between a national consciousness that emphasises a more 
closed society, intermixed with a cosmopolitan consciousness emphasising a more 
open society. Cosmopolitanised empathies and nationalised empathies “permeate, 
enhance, transform and colour each other” (Beck 2006: 6). Each movement see ks 
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an empathetic resonance within liberal democratic societies. In efforts to define the 
outlooks and orientations that raise and lower, both the physical and sociological 
boundaries between people.   
 
The power matrixes of global risk societies are the ways in which, what is deemed 
uncontrollable can become controllable. Something deemed low risk can be defined 
as harmless and safe. Something deemed a high risk is characterised as being 
harmful and catastrophic. Characterisations of particular risks can legitimise the 
power claims of some societal groups, while delegitimising the claims of others.  
 
Interpretations of what is harmful risk and what is harmless risk contextualise 
societal power relations. There are contestations between each movement over 
more and/or less acceptable interpretations of ecological, economic, violence and 
moral crises. Assertions of risk enables sub-state societal groups to establish and 
legitimise their power claims over other groups. Sub-state groups include the 
participation and input of producers, analysts, profiteers, mass media, scientific and 
legal professions (Beck 1987: 162). Their interpretation and awareness of risk 
facilitates forms of action, as well as blends of unawareness and forms of inaction. 
The ad hoc participation of sub-state groups circumvents the institutional controls 
of state-society such as political parties and parliaments (Beck 1992: 23; Beck 1999: 
39, 140). Each of these groups offers distinct possibilities for influence from the 
interdependencies between them (Beck 1987: 162-163).  
 
Symbolic risk orientations through numbers, statistics, images and wider symbols 
legitimise particular risk interpretations and power claims. Possibility judgements 
(Möglichkeitsurteile) are probabilistic80 projections that can redefine standards of 
responsibility, trust and security (safety monitoring and insurance calculation) 
(Beck 1994: 6). There is the causally implicit assertion of moral standards through 
cultural values and symbols, which becomes a “mathematized morality” (Beck 
1992: 33, 176; Beck 1999: 138, 143). Societal symbols make visible, the side effects 
of cosmopolitanisation processes. In a projection of possible outcomes which may  
                                                 
80 See Amoore (2014).  
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or may not come about.  Symbolic risk orientations become forms of societal 
regulation mapping both present and future directions of societal change.  
 
Societal risk symbols galvanise public consciousness leading to neurotic 
interpretations of societal relations. Perceptions of collective crisis and sickness 
become individual crises and sicknesses creating forms of guilt ascription. Societal 
inequalities are individualised into personal inequalities and psychological 
dispositions (Beck 1992: 100, 136).  
 
Fear management becomes a characteristic of societal institutions, through the 
demand for new rules, norms and standards of behaviour to control and alleviate 
the threat of particular risks. Experiences of societal endangerment emerge from 
“social dependencies of information and knowledge” (Beck 1989: 91). Certain 
societal groups define themselves and legitimise their power claims through the 
elimination of particular risks and accompanying fears.  
 
Risk consciousness emphasises avoidance imperatives that situates the demands of 
societal institutions. “To the extent that risks become the all-embracing background 
for perceiving the world, the alarm they provoke creates an atmosphere of 
powerlessness and paralysis” (Beck 1999: 141).  
 
Liberal democratic populations are caught in risk traps. They become communities 
of danger organised around the consciousness of risk arising from experiences of 
societal endangerment (Beck 1992: 47; Beck 1989: 88). The “handling fear of and 
insecurity becomes an essential cultural qualification, and the cultivation of the 
abilities demanded for it become an essential mission of pedagogical institutions" 
(Beck 1992: 76). Certain interpretations of risk filter through areas of socie tally 
recognised expertise, which include schools, universities, public institutions and 
other sub-state groups. More harmful catastrophic interpretations of a particular 
risk stimulate the pursuit of avoidance imperatives (Beck 1994: 9; Beck 1999: 141). 
These decisions stigmatise and separate that precise object/ societal group defined 
as a risk. The need to regain societal control cultivates societal institutions to 
anticipate and pre-empt a conceivably catastrophic outcome.  
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Risk Orientations & Directions of Societal Change 
 
Risk orientations by collective institutions shift the directions of societal change in 
a combination of three directions. Scapegoat, catastrophic and self -critical visions 
of society. These forecasts cultivate societal orientations around suspicion, alarm or 
acceptance. These forecasts are not mutually exclusive. Societies can change in 
uneven blends of all three, creating tensions. Each direction fashions modes of 
identifications and associations organised around the management of doubt and the 
alleviation of risks. These projections circulate alternate forms of societal 
organisation, “whose world views, norms and certainties are grouped around the 
centre of invisible threats” (Beck 1992: 74).   
 
The first direction of risk societal change is the scapegoat society orientated around 
the allocation of blame. According to Beck (1992: 75) "as the dangers increase along 
with political inaction, the risk society contains an inherent tendency to become a 
scapegoat society: suddenly it is not the hazards, but those who point them out that 
provoke the general uneasiness". Risk classifications stigmatise and circulate doubt 
about certain individuals and groups. These categorisations justify the exercise of 
societal power to exorcise that risk from society as a whole. In the scapegoat society 
certain persons, events and actions become culpable for the pathological effects of 
risk and prompt the allocation of blame. Certain social groups project themselves 
as the protectors of society. They maintain their dominance by dramatising the 
societal harm posed by those stigmatised groups. Pinning blame 81 is a process of 
stigmatisation that re-orientates society away from understanding broader 
cosmopolitanisation processes, and towards the search for fictive, static causes.  
 
The second form of risk societal change orientates around the alarmed panicked 
prevention of a catastrophic society. Beck notes that a catastrophic society is where 
the “the state of emergency threatens to become the normal state…..[with] a 
tendency to a legitimate totalitarianism of hazard prevention, which takes the right 
to prevent the worst and, in an all too familiar manner, creates something even 
                                                 
81 Also see van Benthem van den Bergh’s essay on the attribution of blame (1977).  
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worse" (Beck 1992: 79-80). There is an emphasis on the immediacy of risk, as 
narratives of societal endangerment dominate public discussions through the 
probabilistic projection of potential catastrophic outcomes. An identified risk is 
deemed so grave, its threat so great that it demands preventative measures seeking 
to mitigate and alleviate the attendant dangers. The desire to pre-empt a looming 
catastrophe forms the justification for the normalisation of emergency measures 
that perpetuate the risk traps.   
 
The third form of risk society is the self-critical society structured around the 
acceptance of risks.  For Beck (1992: 176), the self-critical society is the preferable 
vision of a risk society. He notes that “the risk society is potentially also a self-critical 
society. Reference points and presuppositions of critique are always being 
produced there in the form of risks and threats”. This is where the awareness of 
globalised risks cultivates opportunities for new bonds of ecological identification. 
The management of doubt can stimulate more constructive societal cooperation, for 
example, the vitality of Europe is apparent in its ability to “renew itself through 
radical self-criticism and creative destruction” (Beck 1994: 24). There is the need 
for society to embrace ecological issues that facilitate a move towards a “universal 
self-reformation” of fatalistic industrial modernity to ensure a sustainable future 
(Beck 1994: 51-52). Self-critical societal changes are calls for solidarity through the 
mutual desire for a sustainable, cosmopolitan future.   
 
Political Leaders & People Risk Orientations  
 
The following section demonstrates that the vocabulary of risk sociology provides 
a method to understand the language representations of transnational migration 
projected by political leaders. Blends of people risk orientations mobilise shared 






Political Leaders & Risk 
 
Risk orientations projected by political leaders can cultivate the development of 
further socio-psychological fortifications within liberal democratic societies. The 
cosmopolitanisation movement embraces multiple identities, accepting limits to 
societal control and advocating for an open society. This movement interprets 
transnational risks as an opportunity to lower the barriers between peoples. While 
the anti-cosmopolitanisation movement in contrast embraces a singular, 
nationalised consciousness, with a belief in more absolute societal controls, and 
advocates for a closed society. This movement interprets transnational risks as 
threats to vulnerable localised identifications, which justify raising the barriers 
between peoples.  
 
One blend of cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitanisation is the development 
of greater fortifications in state-societies. These societal amalgams practice a 
“democratic authoritarianism”, where openness to global markets paralleled “a 
heightened fear of foreigners, born out of the apprehension of terrorism and 
bristling with the poison of racism” (Beck 2002: 49-50).   
 
Risk orientations of transnational migration can reveal the contrasts between 
cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitianisation movements, providing a 
glimpse into the overall direction of societal change.   
 
People risk orientations challenge the idealised conceptual legacies of industrial 
society. The movement of some people and some capital is deemed safe, while the 
movement of other people and other capital understood as harmful. The movement 
of “people as risks” shows the contradictory identifications within contempo rary 
liberal democratic societies (Heyman 2013: 70). Migration risk disrupts the 
seemingly homogeneous, controllable boundaries of liberal democratic state -
society. Industrial society was a mobile society, where participation in work 
“presupposes mobility and the readiness to be mobile” (Beck 1994: 16). People risk 
orientations ties into the legacies of the highly unequal social relations such as slave 
ownership (Crothers 2011: 626), where the movement of slaves represented 
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financial risks. In the modern context there is also an ambiguity in transnational 
people movements: “migrants embody all the gradations of both/and: they are 
native foreigners or foreign nationals whose social competences are not only 
indispensable but also enrich cultural and public life by making it more colourful, 
contradictory and conflictual” (Beck 2006: 104). 
 
Concerns for people risks also blocks the interconnections with and awareness of 
other risks such as financial and environmental risks. For example, the projection 
and acceptance of the relatively safe financial risks inhabits a grasp of the 
unintended harmful consequences of austerity policies (Beck 2013a). 
Transnational people movements are in fact combinations of globalised risks.   
 
Against this backdrop, people risk orientations projected by political leaders can 
mobilise shared anxieties. The cooperation pressures of independency crises and 
complex interconnectivity encourages the contestation of cosmopolitanisation and 
anti-cosmopolitanisation movements.  
 
The cosmopolitanisation movement is more accepting of migration risks. New 
arrivals are contributors to society, enriching social life, providing new ways for 
creative self-critical transformation. They embrace a cosmopolitan empathy, a 
consciousness open to multiple identifications. This accepts the importance of 
national identifications and extends those bonds in a process of integration that 
adapts the national with the cosmopolitan and cosmopolitan with the national. Beck 
remarks that “cosmopolitanism without provincialism is empty, provincialism 
without cosmopolitanism is blind” (Beck 2006: 7). Migration risk is an opportunity 
for further universalised cooperation to cultivate a sustainable human ecology that 
lowers barriers of exclusion and widens the possibilities o f inclusion. There is a 
recognition that there are limits to the control of migration risk, and this awareness 
is a means to realising more sustainable human societies.  
 
In contrast, where the cosmopolitans see relative harmlessness, the anti-
cosmopolitans see more harmful people risks. The movement of migrants, refugees, 
or asylum seekers are a threat to a singular, localised national consciousness, 
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prompting forecasts of both scapegoat and catastrophic transformations of society. 
This interpretation of harmfulness encompasses the proactive 
demonization/stigmatisation of migration risks, which becomes the fictive cause 
for a range of social concerns. Transnational people movements are interpreted as 
an ecologically destructive practice, a threat to economic livelihoods, social 
cohesion and introducing the threat societal violence. The presence of migration 
risk invokes the creation and perpetuation of preventative measures through new 
laws and norms aimed at raising barriers between oldcomers and newcomers as 
noted by Elias in the Winston Pava example. These barriers are aimed at protecting 
a vulnerable provincial identity, in a closed society that resists attempts to integrate 
newcomers with oldcomers, and rejects appeals to universal obligations. The 
raising of barriers is idealised, but in reality, fruitless. Beck (2006: 117) emphasises 
that global risks such as finance, the environment and terrorism are indifferent to 
the walls put up by ethnic populists.  
 
There are power struggle over migration issues in liberal democratic populations. 
Political leaders harness particular interpretations of migration risk to legitimise 
their actions. ‘Guilt feelings’ become an area for political struggle. Different societal 
groups cultivate empathetic attachments and identifications from 
cosmopolitanisation and anti-cosmopolitanisation movements, to circulate and 
perpetuate standards of acceptance and rejection.  
 
Political leaders’ risk orientations can dominate societal orientation. The 
interpretation struggles of harmful/harmless migration risk become crucial for 
practicing societal power. Political leaders channel the views of mass media, 
pedagogical institutions and other subpolitical groupings to legitimise their 
interpretations of safety and/or catastrophe. There are abstract reductive 
distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrants, which justify relative 
interpretations of harmlessness and harmfulness.   
 
Political leaders problematize migration, using symbolic figures such as numbers of 
boat arrivals, deaths at sea and overall calculations of migrant intake however 
specified. Numbers, statistics, images and symbols, highlight the urgency for action 
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and need/lack thereof to assert control over certain kinds of people movement. The 
movement of people is quantified through a mathematised morality that dictates 
the necessity for greater or lesser forms of social regulation, for example by the 
tightening of visa requirements, greater powers for law enforcement agencies, 
additional border controls and offshore detention. These stimulate simultaneous 
forms of inclusive societal openness and exclusive societal closure through the 
creation of both physical and socio-psychological boundaries. Leaders imply that 
only they have the solution, only they can be trusted with the responsibilities of 
power and their opponents cannot. 
 
The migration risk orientations projected by political leaders can influence the 
direction of societal change. Migration risk becomes localised, as people become 
aware of the presence of globalised people risks in ‘their neighbourhoods’.  This 
becomes a personalised experience through images and symbols projected by 
political leaders and the mass media. These stimulate a public consciousness 
around specific interpretations of secure and catastrophic migration risk.  
 
Liberal democratic populations can become entrapped by avoidance imperatives 
that empower and/or discourage relations between themselves and people 
identified as migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. They are torn or divided 
between competing socio-moral responsibilities. Cosmopolitanisation and anti-
cosmopolitanisation movements represent the contemporary development of 
contradictory forms of identification between the mobile techno -economic 
bourgeois and immobile politico-economic citoyen. Commitments to these 
movements generate societal expectations of what ought to occur when confronted 




In this chapter, I have argued that risk sociology further develops a sociological 
outlook for understanding the shared anxieties of political leaders initiated by 
process sociology. Risk models understand the contradictory development of global 
interdependencies and global risks through the awareness and unawar eness of 
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‘reflexive’ modernisation. The development of global risk societies and the power 
relations of risk consciousness demands a cosmopolitan societal science that 
replaces national models and the reductive conceptual legacies of industrial society.  
 
Risk sociology offers a vocabulary to conceptualise cosmopolitanisation processes 
from the everyday experience of globalised interdependence and interdependency 
crises. The power struggles from diverging cosmopolitanisation and anti-
cosmopolitan movements mobilise shared anxieties from the interpretation 
struggles and possibility judgements between harmful catastrophic and harmless 
safe interpretations of risks. These movements parallel the duality of nation -state 
normative codes highlighted by Elias. The management of fears bound to risk 
orientations becomes a desired feature of societal institutions.  
 
The vocabulary of risk sociology provides a method to understand the language 
representations of transnational migration by political leaders. People risk 
orientations can demonstrate the mobilisation of shared anxieties, the domination 
of societal orientation, which help steer the course of societal change.   
 
The next four chapters will empirically demonstrate the synthesis of process and 
risk sociology through a sociological model for shared anxieties. These chapters will 
evaluate the migration language of British and Australian Prime Ministers from 
2001 to 2017 by combining the models and vocabularies of process and risk 
sociology. The chapters will trace the fortified societal orientations in Britain and 
Australia, revealing the tensions in liberal-democratic societies discussed by both 











Chapter 3.                                                                                               
An Investigation into the Major Public Migration 
Speeches by Tony Blair (2001-2007) and              
Gordon Brown (2007-2010) 
 
The last two chapters outlined a process and risk sociological approach to 
understanding shared anxieties. These outlooks provided complementary models 
to understand the development of knowledge processes, interdependence and 
power relations. Process and risk sociology provided a vocabulary to conceptualise 
shared anxieties through cosmopolitanised interdependent webs of relations 
moulding societal formations within liberal-democratic societies. Interpretations of 
interdependency crises arouse power struggles between conflicting cosmopolitan 
humanist-egalitarian and anti-cosmopolitan collective-nationalist nation-state 
normative codes. The oscillations between harmful catastrophic and harmless safe 
risk orientations propagates societal fears held by sections of established groups, 
situating relations with outsider groups.  The models and vocabularies of process 
and risk sociology offer a method to grasp the language representations of 
transnational migration circulated by political leaders, who attempt to mobilise 
shared anxieties, dominate societal orientation and steer the avenues of societal 
change. 
 
A sociological model for shared anxieties offers a more sophisticated framework to 
understand the socio-psychological tensions that bind liberal-democratic societies. 
By investigating the migration representations of political leaders in Britain and 
Australia, my study expands comprehensions about societal tensions through a 
model of interdependence and power relations nexuses. These empirical examples 
can help refine and extend the vocabularies of process and risk sociology.  Together 
Chapters 3 and 4 help investigate whether the same societal processes found in the 
language of British Prime Ministers were also present in Australian leaders 
explored in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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My third chapter evaluates the migration language of British Prime Ministers Tony 
Blair (2001-2007) and Gordon Brown (2007-2010). The aim of this chapter is to 
reconstruct the societal processes that shaped British society during this period, 
using the vocabularies of process and risk sociology. Blair and Brown encompassed 
a period of British history from 2001 to 2010 under a Labour government. Their 
speeches, interviews and press conferences set the tone for the kinds of policies, 
practices and societal expectations that moulded relations within British society.  
 
The chapter is the first demonstration of the process reconstructive method 
proposed in Chapters 1 and 2 to understand shared anxieties. I have reconstructed 
the specific blend of socio-psychological tensions present within British society 
during this period. These tensions encompassed the synergies binding 
decolonialisation, Europeanisation and commodification processes, with 
cosmopolitanisation–de-cosmopolitanisation pressures that swayed the 
criminalisation, objectification and stigmatisation of transnational people 
movements.    
 
In this chapter, I will argue that the migration language of Prime Ministers Blair and 
Brown propagated greater socio-psychological fortifications within British society. 
Blair and Brown propagated more harmful catastrophic interpretations of 
transnational migration. At first, these harmful representations focused on asylum 
seeker movement. Over the course of this period, increasingly harmful negative 
representations of European migration distorted relations with the European 
Union (EU). Together, these depictions helped restrict the modes of thinking and 
narrowed the means of societal orientation in British society. Blair and Brown 
raised the barriers to societal inclusion and widened forms of societal exclusion.  
 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section explains the mobilisation of 
shared anxieties and the development of more reductive modes of thinking in 
British society.  The second section explains the domination of societal orientations, 




Mobilisation of Shared Anxieties by Blair & Brown 
 
The following section illustrates the development of reductive modes of thinking in 
Britain, through the conceptual terms developed in Chapters 1 and 2. It explains the 
mobilisation of shared anxieties embedded in the language of Blair and Brown. 
Ambiguous interpretations of transnational migration infused the societal 
conscience formations of British society. Blair and Brown channelled the 
understandings of established groups in Britain to commodify the movement of 
outsider groups. There were conflicting attachments to the humanist-egalitarian 
normative code and collective-nationalist that trapped depictions of migrant 
outsiders. The former stressed the idealised tolerance of a Britain that is open and 
appreciative to the movement of people. There is greater evidence of a shift towards 
the latter, a more collective-nationalist code that appealed to a closed consciousness 
idealising “British values” and the commitment to controlling borders. 
Commodification processes intermixed with more nationalised appeals and 
cultivated more involved fantasy based understandings of transnational movement.  
Transnational people movement became a risk to more insecure sections of 
established groups within Britain. 
 
Decolonialisation & Europeanisation Processes  
 
Societal experiences of decolonialisation and Europeanisation processes affected 
the conscience formations of established groups in Britain during this period.  
Awareness of wider webs of interdependence and belief in the higher power ratio 
of British society is evidenced in the language of Blair and Brown.     
 
Decolonialisation processes and accompanying people movements have sustained 
the belief that Britain remained a powerful participant in broader international 
society. Relative openness to people movement kindled lingering identifications 
with a powerful Britain at the centre of a global empire. Post-imperial migration 
from the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent contributed to a style of 
multiculturalism that incorporated notions racial equality (Koopmans and Statham 
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1999: 693; Hansen 2000). Hansen remarks (2000: 20, 26) that from the 1960s 
onwards, there was a bipartisan consensus82 that made “good race relations” 
dependant on regulating numbers of migrant arrivals. He noted that the UK shifted 
from an imperial orientated openness to people movement designed to cling onto 
the vestiges of empire to “one of the strictest migration policies in the Western 
world” by the 2000s.  
 
Public hostility to migration, sustained by appeals to uniquely ‘British values’ has 
been aided by a strong executive and weak parliament eager to satisfy popular 
demands, with more liberal openness channelled into developing anti-
discrimination legislation (Hansen 2000; Ashcroft and Bevir 2018: 6-7). Enoch 
Powell’s (MacArthur ed. 1999: 383-392) infamous rivers of blood speech connected 
post-imperial migration with fears about communal violence and reduced access to 
public services. The speech also drew implicit forecasts of societal collapse through 
the idealised symbolic association between the British and Roman empires. This 
symbolic connection between Britain and Rome perpetuated a mythical 
understanding of collective supremacy that resonated within more nationalised 
sections of established groups in British society.   
 
Resistance to Europeanisation processes fed into hostilities toward European 
migration. From the 2000’s onwards, British interpretations of transnational 
people movement became Europeanised, and “illustrative of European 
interdependencies”, where “Britain shares substantive policy preferences in key 
areas of migration and asylum policy with other EU member states and is tied to 
them by interdependencies generated by Schengen” (Geddes 2005: 738, 740; Beck 
and Grande 2007). These webs of interdependence encompassed the four 
freedoms:  free movement of people (in the form of the Schengen area of passport 
free travel), capital, goods and services within the EU first set out in the 1957 Treaty 
of Rome. The domestication of labour movement within the EU was interdependent 
with the externalisation of territorial boundaries beyond Europe and the 
management of non-EU movement. British resistance to non-EU movement merged 
                                                 
82 Hansen (2000: 128-129) cites Home Secretary Frank Soskice as the figure who first bound 
immigration restrictions with anti-discrimination procedures.  
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with resistance to EU labour movement. Opposition to the Europeanised control of 
external borders blended with opposition to the Europeanisation of domestic law 
that integrated the “positive rights” of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) to ameliorate the weak constitutional protections for immigrants in Britain 
(Ette and Gerdes 2007: 103-104, 111).   
 
Commodification & Established Outsider Relations 
 
Blair and Brown channelled the attitudes of various established groups  with higher 
power ratios in British society. These groups were bound by beliefs in the 
commodification of societal relations through movements of people and financial 
capital. Their language displayed evidence of more globalised ultra-rich established 
groups and more localised established groups.  
 
On the one hand, they represented more mobile techno-economic bourgeois 
identifications, connected to an ultra-rich globalised establishment that held a 
relatively strong power ratio in British society. Their status resides in the 
accumulation and continued facilitation of the movement of financial capital within 
and beyond Britain. These groups value the movement of capital, which is distilled 
into phases like ‘the economy’ and commitments to ‘economic growth’. On the other 
hand, Blair and Brown also represented more immobile politico-economic 
citoyen/citizen identifications. Their status is bound to a localised establishment 
through the containment of financial capital for the assistance of ‘citizens’.   
 
Blair and Brown demonstrated ambiguous understandings of the movement of 
people in relation to the movement of capital. Speeches to audiences such as the 
Confederation of British Industry (27.04.2004; 29.11.2005; 24.01.2007; 
26.11.2007; 05.09.2008; 23.11.2009) revealed the forms of people movement that 
were more or less attractive for established groups in British society, as shown the 





“the movement of people and labour into and out of the UK 
is, and always has been, absolutely essential to our 
economy.…… And the economic contribution of visitors 
and migrants is nothing new. At crucial points over the past 
century and beyond we have relied on migrants to supply 
essential capital to our economy and plug the labour gaps 
when no others could be found……As we approach 1  May83, 
there are similar scare stories about the movement of 
workers from Eastern Europe……..There are half a million 
vacancies in our job market and our strong and growing 
economy needs migration to fill these vacancies.” 
(27.04.2004) 
 
“The world is more mobile than ever before. Capital moves 
freely across national boundaries. Information is transmitted 
digitally, in an instant. Trade growth. We now have large-
scale movement of people around the world , with 30 
million non-EU foreign nationals passing through the UK 
every year. But the open world brings with it new problems 
too. Identity theft for financial gain, illegal immigration and 
illegal working have all increased. 1 in 4 criminals use false 
identities. Some terrorist suspects have as many as 50 
assumed identities. Indeed this has been part of the training 
at Al Qaeda camps” (06.11.2006). 
 
“a balanced approach to migration allows businesses to 
benefit from the specific skills that economic migrants can 
bring to our country and improves the responsiveness of our 
labour market to fluctuating demand.”  (05.09.2008) 
 
                                                 
83 The date refers to the 2004 enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 member states.  
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The accounts above illustrated how forms of movements were actively promoted 
by techno-economic bourgeoisie identifications, as well as discouraged by politico-
economic citoyen identifications. Account 27.04.2004 discussed the economically 
historic contributions of migrants to “our strong and growing economy”. The freer 
movement of people accompanies the freer movement of capital “across national 
boundaries”. This enabled businesses in Britain to benefit from the skills of 
“economic migrants” (06.11.2006; 05.09.2008). These three accounts verbalised 
attachments towards a neoliberal ideology, a system of beliefs that prioritis ed the 
movement of capital as the fundamental social value.  
 
Blair and Brown linked economic development to the movement of people into 
Britain, with the aim of maintaining Britain’s status as a highly ‘advanced’ state -
society. Contributions to the economy formed an important way of orienting 
society, directing the participation of all members, loosening behaviour deemed 
‘economic’ and restraining non-economic behaviour. The accounts depicted a 
Britain that is open to the movement of capital, but also vulnerable to “new 
problems” with potentially harmful side effects from the transnational movement 
of people. Accounts 27.04.2004 and 06.11.2006 noted the development of “scare 
stories” about the labour movement from Eastern Europe84, and concerns over 
transnational violence from “criminals” and “terrorist suspects”. Capital 
movements were exclusively beneficial, but people movements were potentially 
detrimental to British society.   
 
Blair and Brown commodified migrant outsiders into harmless benefits and 
harmful costs to British society. This process shows conflicting understandings of 
human interdependencies. Migrant outsiders are harmless benefits to the economy 
and labour markets (06.11.2006). But they were also associated with presumably 
harmful practices such as illegal working, criminal activity and terrorism 
(06.11.2006). Portrayals of migrant outsiders were highly ambiguous, depending 
on whether they were categorised as refugees, asylum seekers and economic 
migrants, but also as tourists, students and visitors.  
                                                 
84 Growing concerns over Europeanised people movement is an ongoing theme that will be further 




The distinguishing feature of all of these categorisations is the relatively low power 
resources of these groups. In the following accounts, migrant outsiders became 
representations of harmful and harmless side effects of human interdependencies.  
 
“Interdependence is obliterating the distinction between 
foreign and domestic policy. It was the British economy that 
felt the aftermath of 11 September. Our cities who take in 
refugees from the 13 million now streaming across the 
world from famine, disease or conflict.” (01.10.2002) 
 
“you have got globalisation which is pushing waves of 
people, you know crossing frontiers across the world, most 
of those people we want in our countries because they are 
students, visitors, tourists, people who come to work for 
good reason. As globalisation takes effect, then what 
happens is the challenges of the system become immense.” 
(06.06.2006) 
 
“But as people are ever more mobile, it also becomes ever 
more important to develop a new approach to managed 
migration. This should be founded on an affirmation of 
Britishness in a covenant that has as its heart the rights and 
obligations of modern citizenship. And it should set 
immigration within a clearer framework of social 
responsibility that makes sure migration benefits us as 
much socially and culturally as it does economically.” 
(20.02.2008) 
 
 Each of the accounts above verbalised harmful and harmless understandings of 
migrant outsiders. There are “waves of people” such as students, visitors and 
tourists who are more desired by established groups in Britain due to their 
perceived harmlessness and societal utility (06.06.2006). There are cooperation 
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pressures binding established groups with migrant outsiders such as refugees that 
are fleeing famine, disease and conflict (01.10.2002). Personal pronouns through 
terms such as “our” and “us”, show the weighting of reciprocal relations in favour of 
established groups (01.10.2002; 20.02.2008). Migrant outsiders were required to 
affirm their “Britishness” and attachments to the collective of British state -society 
to ensure that “migration benefits us” and are deemed to be more harmful because 
of pressures on “our cities” and broader societal “system” (01.10.2002; 06.06.2006; 
20.02.2008). They became more of a burden and less of a benefit to the established 
in British society. 
 
Tensions over Normative Codes in the Language of Blair and Brown 
 
Ambiguous representations of migrant outsiders showed evidence of power 
struggles between cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and de-
cosmopolitanised collective-nationalist normative codes. Blair and Brown 
maintained idealised attachments to both codes, yet the balance was never uniform. 
Their articulations of humanist-egalitarian tolerance though never completely 
abandoned, became increasingly overshadowed by collective-nationalist 
propagations of ‘British values’, the national interest, and border controls.  
 
Blair and Brown channelled idealised commitments to the humanist-egalitarian 
normative code through affirmations of societal tolerance. They repeatedly clung 
onto to identifications towards a Britain that is a “tolerant country” (20.06.2002; 
27.04.2004; 06.05.2005; 12.05.2005; 27.06.2005; 08.12.2006; 20.02.2008). These 
affirmations corresponded to identifications towards a more open Britain that 
should be more accepting of transnational people movement. There were appeals 
to common human obligations towards migrant outsiders, such as providing refuge 
to people fleeing persecution as enshrined in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights. The following accounts expressed commitments to a more open 
consciousness that channelled adherence to the humanist-egalitarian normative 




“I think most people in this country are tolerant and they 
know it is right to give a haven to people genuinely fleeing 
persecution. They know that we need, and indeed should 
value, migrants who add to our economic well-being. I think 
it is not that people are anti-immigrant or anti-asylum seeker, 
but I think they are anti-disorder, they are anti a system that 
doesn't appear to have proper rules to it.” (20.06.2002) 
 
“We all have responsibilities: Government to put in place the 
policies and rules that make migration work for Britain; 
migrant communities to recognise the obligations that come 
with the privilege of living and working in Britain; the media 
in giving as much attention to the benefits of migration and 
successes of diversity as to the dangers and fears; local 
authorities and community groups in working for integration 
and cohesion on the ground. And ordinary decent British 
people - including generations of migrants themselves - to 
keep faith in our traditions of tolerance and our historic 
record of becoming stronger and richer as a result of 
migration and diversity.” (27.04.2004) 
 
“On the contrary, we know migration has been good for 
Britain. We acknowledge the extraordinary contribution 
migrants from all faiths and races have made. We are a nation 
comfortable with the open world of today. London is perhaps 
the most popular capital city in the world today partly 
because it is hospitable to so many different nationalities, 
mixing, working, conversing with each other. But we protect 
this attitude by defending it. Our tolerance is part of what 
makes Britain, Britain. So conform to it; or don't come 




In the accounts above, Blair demonstrated commitments to the humanist-
egalitarian code. He expressed an openness to the movement of migrant outsiders 
into Britain. There was the idealisation of collective tolerance towards migrant 
outsiders that expressed the unquestionable virtuousness of  established sections in 
British society. People in Britain are “tolerant” of migrant outsiders who are 
“genuinely fleeing persecution” and those that provide economic contributions to 
society (20.06.2002). For Blair, migration was sign of societal vitality, which made 
Britain successful because of the societal contributions of people from multiple 
nationalities, faiths and racial backgrounds (27.04.2004; 08.12.2006). He 
reinforced the societal ideal of a tolerant, developed Britain. The direction of 
reciprocal relations veered towards a more romanticised grasp of societal 
tolerance, in the form of sentimental representations of “ordinary decent British 
people” (27.04.2004). There are caveats to the ideal of societal tolerance, however, 
through the criteria of genuine persecution, economic behaviour and conformity to 
the rules set by established groups.  
 
Commitments to societal tolerance shifted in favour of greater devotion to the 
collective-nationalist normative code. There was a detectable shift to a more closed 
consciousness, which emphasised obedience to ‘British values’ characteristic of 
politico-economic citoyen identifications.  The term British values are as ambiguous 
as the notion of Britain itself. This vagueness enabled Blair and Brown and their 
party-government establishment to provide a definition that suited their own 
involved short-term preferences at the time, particularly, the desire to maintain 
their place in the balance of societal power.  
 
The requirement to accept British values was an enforced subscription to particular 
accounts of British history and corresponding societal conscience formations. 
These narratives were crafted overtime by the groups that make up the ‘British 
establishment’: urban bourgeois and rural aristocratic elites, wo rking from a largely 
English metropole85. The commitment to upholding British values was 
interdependent with long-standing historical power struggles within and beyond 
                                                 
85 Immigration remains subject to the Westminster Parliament in London and is not part of 1997 
devolution reforms in Scotland and Wales.  
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British society. Narrow attachments to British values limited broader societal 
reflection on the extent to which these ideals are also shared by both migrant 
outsiders, and people in other large societal groupings, such as societies in Europe.  
 
The move towards a more nationalised consciousness emphasising the uniqueness 
of the territorialised nation-state of Britain was epitomised in the following 
accounts.  
 
“we are very proud of the British way of life, and we're 
proud of the fact that we treat people fairly, that we welcome 
in people who are fleeing persecution. But I'm sorry, people 
can't come here and abuse our good nature and our 
tolerance……but if people want to come here as refugees 
fleeing persecution, or as people seeking a different or better 
way of life, they come here and they play by our rules and our 
way of life. If they don't then they are going to have to go 
because they are threatening people in our country and that's 
not right either. The way to protect our way of life is to 
respond very clearly to that clear view of the British people, 
that yes we have responded to the 7th July86 attacks by saying 
that we want to keep our country together, and to respect all 
out communities” (05.08.2005) 
 
“in future the aspiring citizen should know and subscribe to a 
clear statement of British values, proceeding toward a 
citizenship explicitly founded not just on what they receive 
from our society but what they owe to it…..let me 
acknowledge today the many hard working men and women 
who have come to Britain in recent years and have made a 
huge contribution to our country and to our prosperity by 
adding flexibility to our labour market, helping make a 
                                                 
86 Referring to the attacks in London that year, see paragraph on terrorism in Section Two.   
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success of our businesses, working hard and paying taxes, and 
in some cases by supporting our most essential public 
services including the NHS. We must - and will - continue to 
ensure that we attract the skilled workers from overseas that 
our businesses need. And we will at all times maintain our 
tradition of giving refuge to those fleeing persecution - and of 
tackling racism and discrimination. But we must also set a 
policy that serves the British national interest --- that 
acknowledges that what we need economically, what 
strengthens our society and our communities, must come 
first.” (20.02.2008) 
 
“Immigration is not an issue for fringe parties nor a taboo 
subject - it is a question to be dealt with at the heart of our 
politics; a question about what it means to be British - about 
what are the values we hold dear, the responsibilities we 
expect of those coming into our country; about how we secure 
the skills we need to compete in the global economy; about 
how, out of diversity, we preserve and strengthen the 
richness of our communities………….In a fast moving world it 
is vital for cohesion that all people in Britain explicitly sign up 
to the direct responsibilities that come from being part of a 
community. So, in the interests of fairness, a condition for 
entry to our home, our British family, must be that you will 
commit to maintaining all that is best about the country we 
love. British values are not an add-on for us - an option, or 
an extra to take or leave. Those who wish to come to our 
country must embrace them wholeheartedly and proudly, as 
we do.” (12.11.2009) 
 
In the accounts above from Blair and Brown, the ideal of tolerance became 
conditional on the fulfilment of a nationalised commitment to upholding the “British 
way of life”. The humanist-egalitarian emphasis on societal tolerance became 
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conditional on the adherence to a more collective-nationalist normative code and 
attachments towards the nation-state of Britain. The struggle between these 
normative codes and effects on the development of national we-identifications in 
British society stretches back as far as the 19 th century (Elias 2013 [1989]: 177-
181). In the 05.08.2005 account, Blair articulated a demand that “our” good and 
nature our tolerance” cannot be abused. Migrant outsiders must adhere to the rules 
and “way of life” of the established groups in Britain, regardless of whether they are 
refugees, or people motivated by varying reasons to enter Britain. Bundled groups 
of more harmful migrant outsiders became commodified harms, required to leave 
Britain if suspected of breaking the rules of the established, “because they are 
threatening people in our country”.  
 
Brown expressed more explicit accounts of conditional tolerance, where the 
techno-economic bourgeoisie recognition of migrant outsider contributions to 
businesses and the NHS87 swung towards more politico-economic citoyen 
identifications (20.02.2008). This development culminated in the 12.11.2009 
account, where he dictated the conditions for acceptance into Britain. Migrant 
outsiders must explicitly embrace “British values” to preserve the qualities and 
affirmations of established groups in Britain.   
 
Control over Borders & Societal Fortification 
 
The language of Blair and Brown fortified British society, through the propagation 
of suspicions about migrant outsiders. Their commitments to the control and 
protection of borders are evidence of these societal apprehensions (06.04.2004; 
14.12.2007; 17.06.2008). They became more reliant on the proliferation of national 
symbols for their hold the balance of societal power. Blair and Brown’s attachments 
towards the humanist-egalitarian code did not sufficiently restrain and counter 
concerns about transnational people movements.  
 
                                                 
87 The National Health Service, broader fears about healthcare are explained later in the chapter.  
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References to the border symbolised national vulnerabilities to globalised people 
movements and associated harmful consequences.  Blair expressed the following 
phrase: “we can and should take all the measures necessary to control immigratio n 
in the UK” (27.04.2004). The statement cultivated greater contemplation of more 
coercive practices to regulate the movement of migrant outsiders. It opened the 
space for contemplation over whether those measures included, for example the 
sanctioned use of violence, or measures short of violence such as detention and 
deportation (see Schuster 2003: 511; Malloch and Stanley 2005; Gibney 2008). The 
statement forms part of a consistent demands for the protection of borders shown 
by the following accounts:   
 
“Secondly, in relation to issues to do with asylum and 
immigration, gives us a greater opportunity to take the 
action that we need, not just in our own countries but also 
the European Union, to try and make sure that we doubt those 
asylum claims that are not genuine asylum claims, and also 
that we can return people to their countries of origin should 
their claims fail in an easier manner……..what we want is a 
Europe of Nations, not a federal super state, and that issues to 
do with taxation, foreign policy, defence policy, our own 
British borders will remain the prerogative of our 
national government and national Parliament.” 
(20.06.2003) 
 
“The best that you can do is to take every single action you 
can to try and secure your own borders, to try for example 
to make sure that the entry from France into this country, and 
across the Channel into this country, is as closely monitored 
and watched as possible…..Now as a result of the border 
controls that we have introduced, as a result of the closure 
of places like Sangatte88, as a result of the changes in the law 
                                                 
88 The Sangatte reception centre in Calais, for more extensive account see Schuster 2003.  
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we have made it far more difficult for people to come into this 
country, as well as come into it and claim asylum.” 
(01.04.2004) 
 
“So this is the system we have introduced which gives us the 
ability to secure the skills we need and to secure our borders 
against those who are not welcome here. And I believe the 
responsible way to debate migration – and I believe this is 
what many companies want to see – is to debate how we can 
use this system over the coming years to continue to control 
migration fairly, to reduce the overall need for migration, 
while continuing to attract the key people who will make the 
biggest contribution to the growth of our economy. The 
debate just isn’t about who will open all the floodgates and 
who will shut all doors. Neither of these are responsible 
options. It’s actually about the flexibility to access the skilled 
workers we need when we need them; and to exclude the rest. 
It’s about control.”  (31.03.2010) 
 
For Blair and Brown, protection of borders from more harmful migrant outsiders 
symbolised societal vulnerabilities through reinforced attachments to the 
collective-national normative code. In the 20.06.2003 account, Blair discussed “the 
action that we need” across both Britain and the EU with resistance to sharing 
reciprocal function of taxation, foreign and defence policy and border controls. 
Depictions of migrant outsiders intertwined with the continuing development of 
Britain’s terse relationship with EU. The 20.06.2003 account highlighted a pattern 
that became more pronounced across this phase of British society culminating in 
transformative events such as the 2016 EU Referendum.  The 01.04.2004 account 
noted increasing the barriers to the movement of people through enhanced border 
controls in France and “a tough approach” that included greater coercive 
surveillance. In the 31.03.2010 account, Brown linked the imperative to secure 
borders to the need to reduce societal dependencies on the movement of people, 
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while maintaining degrees of limited tolerance to migrant outsiders who provide 
large economic contributions to British society.   
 
People Risks & Societal Concerns  
 
Blair and Brown became reliant on the support of more insecure sections of 
established groupings in British society. Migrant outsiders became characterised as 
risks in ways that show the interdependencies of globalised movements and 
localised power struggles. 
 
Insecure sections of the established are more sensitive about their status, and more 
prone to understanding the movement of migrant outsiders as an encroachment on 
“our way of life” (see account 05.08.2005 mentioned earlier). Migrant outsiders are 
more than just isolated individuals, but communities in the making that can tilt the 
balance between established and outsider groups in some local communities, urban 
and rural. Insecure localised established groupings are more inclined to embrace 
harmful depictions of migrant outsiders. They are notable for the constant 
repetition of the possessive pronoun ‘our’: “our borders”, for example appealed to 
collective-nationalist attachments, which manufactured an objectified symbol that 
demanded protection. These attachments perpetuated a cycle of societal 
expectations set by Blair and Brown over who could better protect the border. The 
question of who can protect ‘our border’ reduced the space of societal thinking and 
attempted to arouse greater attachments towards party-political establishment 
represented by Blair and Brown.   
 
Societal expectations for the maintenance of borders set the scene for greater 
concerns and suspicions of migrant outsiders, in particular, when the perception 
arose that the Blair could not protect the border. For example, during the period of 
August/September 2001, there was fervent tabloid media coverage of asylum 
seeker movements surrounding the Eurotunnel and Sangatte reception centre, 




Commodified migrant outsiders became a more harmful cost and less of a harmless 
benefit to British society. Blair and Brown circulated greater fantasy infused 
depictions of migrant outsiders. In the following accounts, Blair and Brown aroused 
societal vulnerabilities, and relied upon the support of more insecure sections of 
established.  
 
“the worry from our point of view as policy makers is you 
will send a signal right across the system that Britain is again 
open for business on asylum claims that are not genuine. 
Now I have said that we will look into this very, very carefully, 
this country is a tolerant country and I wouldn't want it on 
my conscience, apart from anything else, of sending people 
back to torture89 and abuse and so on……And we are 
worried, having really battened down the hatches on the 
asylum system and managed to get real progress so that the 
claims are now a quarter of what they were three years ago, 
we are worried about re-opening this” (27.06.2005).  
 
“If the main effect of immigration on your life is to make it 
easier to find a plumber, or when you see doctors and nurses 
from overseas in your local hospital, you are likely to think 
more about the benefits of migration than the possible 
costs. But if you’re living in a town which hasn’t seen much 
migration before, you may worry about whether 
immigration will undermine wages and the job prospects 
of your children - and whether they will be able to get housing 
anywhere near you. And everyone wants to be assured that 
newcomers will accept the responsibilities as well as the 
rights that come with living here - they’ll accept the 
responsibilities to obey the law, to speak English, to make a 
contribution (12.11.2009). 
                                                 
89 In this period, the British government was engaged in the practice of “sending people back to 




“immigration understandably and legitimately generates 
strong feelings right across our communities. I know how 
people worry that immigration might be changing their 
neighbourhoods. They would worry if immigration was 
putting pressure on schools, hospitals and housing; and they 
question whether immigration might undermine their wages 
or might harm the job prospects of their children. They 
question whether migrants are getting ahead of them in the 
queue for housing; or sometimes they ask us whether the 
nature of our communities is changing at a pace that’s simply 
too rapid. And I know people think it’s unfair when it feels as 
though some can take advantage of the freedoms and 
opportunities we offer in Britain without making a fair 
contribution or playing by the rules. So do I.” (31.03.2010)  
 
In the accounts above, Blair and Brown appealed to insecure sections of the 
established through harmful depictions of migrant outsiders. Blair articulated a 
storm analogy through the phase “battened down the hatches”, which likened 
asylum seekers to an uncontrollable natural event that must be resisted 
(27.06.2005). He also expressed the humanist egalitarian code that Britain is “a 
tolerant country”, yet shifted to the avoidance of being “open for business on asylum 
claims that are not genuine” (27.06.2005).  
 
In account 12.11.2009, Brown depicted migrant outsiders as harmless ‘benefits’ in 
form of plumbers, doctors and nurses, as well as a harmful ‘costs’ that reduced 
wages and job prospects in some local communities. He raised degrees of suspicion 
over people who are not reasonably contributing and obeying the rules of the 
established becoming a ‘cost’ to established groups in British society (31.03.2010) .
  
The transnational movements of people were interpreted as more harmful 
catastrophic risks. Early in this period, Blair called for the introduction of new 
legislation that matches “the risk we face” (04.10.2001). One of those risks was the 
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deportation of people who abuse “our asylum procedures”. The practice of 
deportation also regulated people suspected of terrorism. Insecure established 
politico-economic citoyen concerns over communal violence and suspicions of 
dishonest asylum seekers were bound to techno-economic bourgeois identifications 
with “economic confidence”. Concerns of over communal violence and economic 
contributions were amalgamated into depictions of migrant outsiders. Further 
accounts highlighted that successful membership in the EU enabled the regulation 
of “terrorism, crime and illegal immigration”, and would not be “put at risk” 
(29.03.2004).  There was the reduction of relations with the EU into the three poles 
of terrorism, crime and immigration regulation.  Over the course of this phase of 
British society, more catastrophic risk narratives of migrant outsiders narrowed the 
means of societal orientation.      
 
Dissemination of Fortified Orientations by Blair & Brown 
 
The following section demonstrates the growth of narrow societal orientations that 
fortified British society. Depictions of economic migrant outsiders shifted towards 
more harmful risk orientations. These depictions dominated societal orientations, 
criminalised other groups of migrant outsiders such as asylum seekers, and shaped 
understandings of Europeanised movement. The objectification of migrant 
outsiders legitimised the criminalisation of transnational movement. Widening 
circles of disassociation strengthened a highly suspicious risk narrative that 
justified the greater exclusion of migrant outsiders. Blair and Brown propagated 
constellations of fears about migrant outsiders, which intermingled concerns about 
healthcare, welfare, economy, crime and communal violence. In parallel with the 
use of aquatic metaphors, these fears stigmatised migrant outsiders and 
mythologised the protective capacities of Blair and Brown. Fear constellations 
about migrant outsiders circulated greater socio-psychological fortifications that 





Distinctions between Skilled and Unskilled Movement 
 
Characterisations of ‘economic migrants’ swung between harmless safe and more 
harmful catastrophic risk orientations. The term ‘economic migrants’ demonstrated 
forms of association and disassociation. Brown remarked that industrious, “highly 
skilled migrants” who provided economic contributions to British society were 
more desired (12.11.2009; 20.02.2008; 31.03.2010). He reflected the beliefs of an 
insecure localised politico-economic citoyen establishment, the belief that Britain 
should attract only the most skilled forms of labour. He also illustrated an 
unawareness of Britain’s long-standing reliance on ‘unskilled’ migrant labour in 
areas such as agriculture (Collins 1976). The belief in ‘high skilled migrants’ raised 
the barriers for acceptance and identification.  
 
Depictions of economic migrants came to be part of widening circles of 
disassociation, characterisations that swung to more harmful catastrophic risk 
orientations in the following three accounts.  
 
“it is a problem all over the European Union, indeed I would 
go further and say all over the world at the moment. And what 
is happening is that as part of globalisation you are getting 
these vast numbers of both economic migrants and 
genuine refugees who perfectly naturally want to search for 
a better life, but that then ends up as a major problem for the 
host country that takes them in.” (24.10.2005).  
 
“we were one of the first, if not the only large country that 
when the new countries came into the European Union, like 
Slovakia, we opened our labour markets as well as our 
borders. And indeed I think we were saying there are 35,000 
Slovaks working in the UK at the moment, and 2,000 Slovaks 
studying in the UK, and it is an interesting example of the 
future, this. When we first took the decision to open our 
markets to those people from central and Eastern Europe, 
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many people worried that it would be bad for our economy. 
Actually it has been positive for our economy, because new 
people coming in have contributed dynamism and 
enterprise and actually hard work to our economy.” 
(10.03.2006). 
 
“Where the rules allow us to limit migration within the EU, 
we will also use them where appropriate --- as we have 
imposed restrictions on migrants from Romania and 
Bulgaria, in particular their access to our labour market. 
And we will make sure that where EU citizens do come to 
Britain they are exercising not an open-ended right but their 
treaty right which is a right to work --- we are able to remove 
EU citizens if they come here but are not employed after 
three months or are not studying or self-sufficient. I believe 
that European Member States should work together to ensure 
EU migration works to the benefit of all and that EU migrants 
contribute fully to our society. The British Government will 
review access to benefits for EU migrants, and what more 
can be done to disincentivise and punish criminality.” 
(20.02.2008).   
 
Blair framed economic migrants and “genuine” refugees as a threat to society 
coming in “vast numbers” becoming a “problem” for established groups in Britain 
(24.10.2005). The movement of economic migrants was less acceptable than more 
genuine refugee movement90.  Economic migrants are more acceptable when they 
come from places like Slovakia91 (though expanding to Central and Eastern Europe). 
                                                 
90 In another account, Blair remarked that “economic migrants should come in through a proper 
immigration process” (30.09.2003).  
 
The notion of refugees as stigmatised economic migrants can be traced to the phrase 
“Wirtschaftsemigranten” describing Jews fleeing German society controlled by Nazi Party in the 
1930s (Loescher 1996: 17).  
 
91The account has the title ‘Meeting with Students in Bratislava (10 March 2006)' see Appendix.    
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These more desired economic migrants were a “positive for our economy” because 
of their personable qualities of vitality and industriousness (10.03.2006).  
 
In account 20.02.2008, Brown highlighted the change to more catastroph ic risk 
orientations, regarding migrant outsiders from the EU, in particular people from 
newly acceded members from Eastern Europe. This is where EU migrants 
(particularly those from Romania and Bulgaria) were accepted so long as they fulfil 
their “treaty right” under the Lisbon Treaty. Should they become unemployed, fall 
out of education, and/or engage in criminal activity, they are recategorised as 
catastrophic risks and can be deported.   
 
Criminalisation of Movement by Blair and Brown 
 
Blair and Brown criminalised92 migrant outsiders and cultivated more coercive, 
stringent societal regulations. Criminalisation93 processes were expressed through 
high degrees of alertness to the harms inflicted by migrant outsiders to established 
groupings. Wacquant (1999: 219) remarks that the “criminalisation of immigrants” 
inspires targeted groups to develop clandestine ways of escaping state regulation, 
which in turn attracts greater attention from law enforcement. These regulations 
reproduce double bind processes in relations between insecure sections of 
established groups and migrant outsiders.  
 
The criminalisation of movement sustained narratives of insecurity and legitimised 
the shift to a more closed consciousness unpinned by the collective-nationalist code.  
Remarks by Brown emphasised “a continued commitment to strong borders and 
the rigorous enforcement of the laws against illegal immigration” (12.11.2009). 
Blair and Brown circulated perceptions that the costs of accepting migrant 
outsiders outweighed the benefits.  
                                                 
92 Legal scholar Juliet Stumpf uses the term “crimmigration” (2006), an understanding used in 
criminology literature see Brouwer et. al. 2017.  
The historical precedent is the criminalisation of Roma communities (Feischmidt et. al.; Joskowicz 
2016).   
     
93 There is also the counter movement of decriminalisation, behaviour once seen to be harmful and 




The incessant repetition that people entering Britain from overseas have abused 
standards of migration regulation propagated imageries of abuse. This perpetuated 
an ongoing moral panic surrounding perceived ‘abusive’ asylum seekers (Young 
2003; Welch and Schuster 2005). Representations of globalised and localised 
system abuse were a consistent theme for British leaders (04.10.2001; 22.05.2003; 
30.07.2003; 02.12.2003; 06.04.2004; 05.08.2005; 06.11.2006). Blair stated this 
directly when he noted that “the asylum system is a system in Britain as in other 
parts of the world that has been subject to general and widespread abuse” 
(06.04.2004). The imagery of abuse sustained collective-nationalist attachments to 
border controls; suspicion of abuse justified additional measures such as legislative 
changes and the creation of further institutions, such as the UK Border Agency. 
From 2001 to 2010, there were 253 new immigration acts passed, a remarkable 
figure given that only 82 new immigration acts passed from 1991 to 2000, an 
increase of 309% (for a list of the key immigration acts see Mulvey 2010: 461 -462).  
 
The criminalisation of migrant outsiders sustained attachments to the collective -
nationalist normative code. Societal understandings of harmless legal moveme nt 
narrowed and harmful illegal movement widened.  The notion of “illegal 
immigration” circulated more harmful depictions of asylum seekers and some types 
of economic migrants (both EU and non-EU) (17.12.2001; 23.11.2001; 19.02.2002; 
20.06.2002; 28.03.2003; 23.06.2003; 24.11.2003; 27.04.2004; 06.04.2004; 
08.11.2004; 25.10.2004; 29.03.2004; 01.04.2004;  13.07.2004; 10.05.2004; 
29.03.2004; 26.10.2005a; 26.10.2005b; 27.10.2005; 20.12.2005; 25.11.2005; 
08.06.2006; 16.06.2006; 03.10.2006; 23.06.2006; 06.11.2006; 07.12.2007; 
17.12.2007;  25.07.2007;  22.10.2007;  01.04.2008;  17.06.2008; 20.02.2008; 
12.11.2009; 19.03.2010). Many of these mentions of illegal immigration were in the 
context of EU Council meetings. This shrunk understandings of EU relations to 






Numbers, Points and IDs 
 
The objectification of migrant outsiders into quantifiable numerical symbols 
legitimised the criminalisation of their movement. Less numbers of people 
movement was more desired than greater numbers of people movement. This ratio 
is the opposite of preferences towards the movement of capital, where greater 
financial capital flows are more desired, and lesser capital flows are unde sired. The 
numeric symbolic objectification of people has developed into an important feature 
of liberal-democratic societies. It has not only enabled the identification and 
provision of public services, but also became a tool for established groups to iso late 
outsider groups and enforce societal regulations. People became easier to regulate 
when they are ‘depersonalised’ into numeric symbols, a process starkly conveyed 
in the statements by British leaders.   
 
At first, the objectification of migrant outsiders focused on numbers of asylum 
seekers. Mulvey (2010: 445) remarks that “government framing of asylum as a 
numerical crisis and threat, aided by the media, not only contributed to that crisis 
but also implied the solution, a reduction in numbers94”. Over the course of this 
period of British society, the focus on asylum numbers expanded to other forms of 
transnational movement that included Europeanised movement. For example in the 
following accounts: 
 
“The numbers have fallen now by more than 45% since we 
passed the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act last year, 
with 4,500 applications in March compared with almost 
9,000 in October last year. So we remain fully on track to 
meet our pledge to cut applications by half by September. 
The figures also show, incidentally, that we are removing 
record numbers of those whose claims do not succeed, 
deciding more appeals, and reducing the number waiting for 
an initial decision. However we are by no means complacent 
                                                 
94 The ‘solution’ of numbers reduction proposed by the Conservative Party opposition became a 
totalising obsession for Cameron and May in the next phase of British society see Chapter 4.    
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about what we have achieved already. That is why I also 
welcome the Home Secretary's announcement this morning 
that we will draw up further legislation to continue to bear 
down on the abuse of the system.” (22.05.2003; 30.07.2003; 
02.12.2003) 
 
“10 years they would say well actually there have been and I 
think the real issue is the gap between what people now 
expect from the system and what they are seeing, so for 
example if you take immigration and asylum, as a result of the 
reforms that have been made, we used to only remove one in 
five failed asylum claimants. We now for the last year, 2006, 
for the first time in the Immigration Department's history 
have got a tipping point where we are removing more people 
than we are taking in, in unfounded claims.” (24.01.2007; 
16.01.2007; 14.03.2006) 
 
“Some people talk as if net inward migration is rising. In fact, 
it is falling – down from 237,000 in 2007, to 163,000 in 2008, 
to provisional figures of 147,000 last year. Some people talk 
as if all immigrants stay here forever. In fact, most come for 
short periods and then return to their own country. And last 
year alone, over 100,000 Eastern Europeans left Britain to 
go home.  Our new points system is radically changing the 
way we are dealing with immigration from outside the 
European Union. The essence of it is to refuse entry to people 
who cannot contribute to the economy in the way we need – 
and to clearly delineate those skills that we cannot 
immediately generate in our own country.” (26.03.2010)  
 
Each of the accounts above revealed the objectification of asylum seekers, which 
supported the development of more catastrophic risk orientations. This assisted the 
desire for coercive practices to reduce and remove asylum seekers, and expanded 
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into the need for more regulations of other migrant outsiders such as people 
movement from Europe. In the 22.05.2003 account, Blair spoke of the reduction 
from 9,000 to 4,500 asylum applicants. The 14.03.2006 and 24.01.2007 accounts 
discussed the removal of failed asylum seekers (people whose application was not 
accepted). Blair’s government reached the “tipping point” with a greater number of 
deportations95 than acceptances. Deterministic phrases such as “tipping point” 
propagated more fantasy based societal expectations about the protection of 
borders linked to numbers of overall people movement. Blair and Brown validated 
their imagery of abuse through the numerical symbolism of asylum numbers. They 
also directed public support towards their party-government establishment using 
collective-nationalist appeals to protect British state-society from the harmfulness 
of abusive asylum seeker movement.   
 
The net of presumed abuse not only included the movement of asylum seekers but 
also the movement of Eastern Europeans. There was a shift from numbers of 
harmful asylum seekers to numbers of net migration96. In account 26.03.2010, 
Brown blurred the distinction between the EU and non-EU movement. The shift 
towards net migration became an edict to reduce the overall movement of people 
into Britain. This is at odds with the initial if shallow recognition that some types of 
people movement contribute to the economy.  
 
Towards the end of this phase, there was the introduction of a points-based 
immigration system. It was an attempt to balance the need by techno -economic 
bourgeois sections of established groups desiring greater labour movement with 
concerns of politico-economic citoyen sections. Brown remarked that if “you have 
points that will allow you to get in if you have got a skill to offer, but if that is not the 
case then we have the right to say as a country that if you don’t have a contribution 
to make then we do not need to take you” (11.12.2008). The balance usually swung 
in favour of politico-economic citoyen identifications and attachments to the 
collective-nationalist code.  
                                                 
95 Also see (20.06.2002). 
96 Net migration is the difference between movement into an area (immigration) and movement out 




Blair and Brown enlisted other parts of society to implement the more coercive 
measures against migrant outsiders. These professions included the judiciary, 
where Blair remarked that “we have also got to make sure frankly that we get the 
right court decisions that allow us to deport people who are failed asylum seekers” 
(14.03.2006). He gave an authoritarian edict that called for the judiciary to become 
more subservient to his government by facilitating the demand to deport “failed 
asylum seekers”. Increasing the deportation of rejected asylum seekers was a 
celebrated achievement for Blair’s Labour government (Gibney 2008). In account 
14.03.2006, Blair undermined the status and relative independence of the judiciary 
by requesting “the right court decisions”. This presumed that the ‘wrong’ decisions 
were those that favoured asylum seekers who successfully appealed their 
deportation. The ‘right decisions’ favoured attachments towards the collective -
nationalist code, and weakened connections to the humanist-egalitarian normative 
code.  In addition to the judiciary, the same coercive strategies were also applied to 
health professionals (29.11.2004) and airline staff (14.12.2007).  
 
The criminalisation of migrant outsiders justified the proposal for identity (ID) 
cards97 in Britain. In liberal-democratic societies, the possession of identity 
documents in the form of written, printed, or electronic matter such as passports 98 
and social security numbers confirms the relative harmlessness of the document 
holder. The presumed destruction of or failure to hold such documents confirms 
interpretations of harmfulness.  Blair noted the need “to tackle the problem of 
asylum seekers who deliberately destroy or dispose of documents in order to make 
fraudulent claims and prevent removal, which is unacceptable” (22.05.2003).  
 
The requirement for identity documents has been argued as an unrealistic 
expectation placed on asylum seekers fleeing societies where acquiring ‘valid’ 
travel documents risks imprisonment and/or death (see Maley 2016: 80 -81).  
Regardless, the burden of proof falls on the migrant outsiders to satisfy the criteria 
                                                 
97 Discussions are ID cards are not unique during this phase of British society and were introduced 
during the First and Second World Wars then dismantled (see Agar 2001).  For a broader analysis 
see Lyon (2007; 2001) 
98 For example see Torpey’s history of the passport (2000).  
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of established groups for confirming their relative harmlessness to the society they 
enter. In the following accounts, the case for ID cards formed part of broader efforts 
to stigmatise migrant outsiders with particular societal fears.   
 
“I am simply suggesting that it is an important addition in 
the fight against terrorism. But there is a third reason which 
I wanted to emphasise today, terrorism and security is not the 
only reason for having identity cards, they will also have a big 
impact in relation to illegal working and illegal 
immigration, they will also have an impact in the access of 
public services where at the moment, although the rules are 
in place to enforce entitlement to use for example the NHS 
free, it is difficult for people who are the frontline 
professionals to enforce those requirements without a proper 
means of assessing identity.”  (29.11.2004) 
 
“the only thing I would say to people is don't tell me I have got 
to try and tackle these problems of identifying illegal 
immigrants, people coming into our country for organised 
crime purposes, or people trafficking, fraud on the National 
Health Service, fraud on the benefits system, and then 
when the overwhelming evidence is the best way of giving 
yourself the best chance, not perfect, but the best chance of 
dealing with it is an identity system” (06.06.2006) 
 
“To ensure that we protect our borders and detect possible 
terrorist suspects, members of the new UK border agency will 
have the power, from January next year, to detain people not 
just on suspicion of immigration offences or for customs 
crime but for other criminal activity, including terrorism. 
Powers will also be given to airline liaison officers to cancel 




The accounts above displayed the persistent stigmatisation of migrant outsiders 
through the infusion of broader societal fears. In accounts 29.11.2004 and 
06.11.2006, Blair discussed how a “national identity system” not only controls 
illegal immigration but also other societal harms such as illegal labour, organised 
crime, people smuggling, healthcare fraud, welfare fraud and terrorism/communal 
violence. ID cards became a totalised ‘solution’ to societal concerns including but 
not limited to migration. He expressed efforts to limit access/”entitlement” to public 
healthcare to members outside established groups, presuming insufficient societal 
resources (29.11.2004).  
 
In account 14.12.2007, Brown highlighted measures to prevent ‘illegal immigrants’ 
impinging on the privileges of established groups. These more coercive methods 
included the creation of the UK Border Agency, a new institutionalised regulatory  
body with powers of detention and removal and the enlistment of “airline liaison 
officers” (14.12.2007; see Malloch and Stanely 2005). The collective -nationalist 
protection of borders became a totalising pursuit of societal safety, which 
legitimised the authority of British leaders. The suspicion of abusing immigration 
procedures became justification for the detention and removal of migrant outsiders 
associated with harmful practices from criminal activity to terrorism. Broader 
societal concerns around terrorism, crime, health and welfare were bundled with 
concerns over migrants.  
 
Fear Constellations & Stigmatisation of Migrant Outsiders 
 
Migrant outsiders were stigmatised with broader societal fears, which widened 
circles of disassociation with established groups in British society. Blair and Brown 
disseminated risk narratives that justified the exclusion of migrant outsiders 
through fear constellations around five major areas:  healthcare, welfare, economy, 
crime and communal violence. They bundled these fears in the same sentence and 
the same breath99 (see account 29.03.2004 previously which speaks of “terrorism, 
                                                 
99 Speech is a physiological practice interdependent with the societal practice of speaking. Speech 
projects a flow of words before the speaker has to inhale air into the lungs to maintain 
communication with someone and/or a group of people.   
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crime and illegal immigration” cf. 01.07.2005; 23.06.2005). These fears were the 
foundations for the stigmatisation of the migrant outsiders, and a perceived 
challenge to societal dominations enjoyed by the established groups in British 
society. Insecure sections of established group were offered reasons to reject the 
movement of migrant outsiders into British society.  
 
Fears about healthcare and the movement of people came from the provision of a 
comprehensive public health service in Britain: the National Health Service (NHS). 
Fears about public healthcare are concerns bound to personal and societal survival. 
The NHS forms a crucial focal point of British identification it is a reservoir of 
collective-nationalist forms of group charisma sustained by both personal and 
collective memories. Its uniqueness as a ‘national’ societal institution is contrasted 
with healthcare in other liberal-democratic societies, built on and the history of its 
emergence at the end of the Second World War100. Established groups in Britain are 
apparently highly sensitive to notions that migrant outsiders could defile or abuse 
this collective national institution, as seen in the following account.  
 
“Health care, the NHS for example people who are wrongly 
accessing non-emergency services in the NHS that we will 
have a secure way of checking up on that and of course that is 
a major problem for us as a country, but it is one example of 
where this whole business is changing.  You see the important 
thing is really this. I wouldn't be proposing this identity card 
scheme or the identity database were it not for the fact that 
biometric technology gives you a far more secure way of 
checking on people, were it not for the fact that in today's 
world where people are migrating across frontiers 
identity abuse is an even bigger problem” (06.11.2006)  
 
In the account above, migrant outsiders were entangled with concerns over the 
healthcare system, and meant that they were blamed for any perceived 
                                                 




insufficiencies.  Insecurity about the capacity of the NHS leads to questions of scarce 
societal resources and the creation of another justification on which to reject 
migrant outsiders who could use it undeservedly. This reductive thinking and 
orientating again represents migrants as stigmatised fantastical symbols of malign 
intent. 
 
Fears about welfare and the movement of people were linked to the idea that the 
migrant outsiders become an additional burden to the collective societal resources 
for established communities. There were distinctions made between ‘deserving’ 
refugees and the ‘undeserving’ asylum seekers (Sales 2002). In liberal-democratic 
societies, fears over welfare can refer to monetary apprehensions bound to 
dependencies on the government establishments for financial assistance.  
 
“We are putting in place tighter rules to restrict migrants' 
access to benefits and social housing. Migrants will not be 
able to access social housing unless they are here legally and 
are working. No-one will be able to come to the UK from 
anywhere in the enlarged EU simply to claim benefits or 
housing. There will be no support for the economically 
inactive.” (27.04.2004) 
 
In the account above, the term ‘benefits’ describes government assistance in the 
form of monetary payments, which are the property of the established, a gift to 
those deemed ‘worthy’, with Dickensian echoes of the well deserving poor. Migrant 
outsiders were feared as burdens to society (see the earlier 20.02.2008 that 
mentions access to welfare for EU migrants, plus more general mentions 
22.07.2004; 06.06.2006), and compete with insecure sections of the established for 
limited sources of government assistance. Established groups include people who 
are more or less ‘well off’101 in British society. Insecure sections of the established 
who are relative outsiders within the UK are more alert and sensitive to the notion 
that migrant outsiders might have access to ‘special privileges’ and other societal 
                                                 
101 See Mols and Jetten (2017). 
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entitlements. They therefore insisted that there is the need for greater moral 
regulation to raise the standards governing entitlements over who is entitled to 
government assistance, with the migrant outsiders becoming convenient 
scapegoats for the concerns of the insecure established.  This harmful association 
inhibited broader societal reflection on the processes that lead to people requiring 
government assistance in the first place.  
 
Fears about the economy reflected the neoliberal economistic orientation of British 
society. Relations with migrant outsiders were defined by sets of ‘valued’ skills and 
vocations, while other skills were deemed threatening to established groups. The 
interpretation of greater vocational threat is particularly salient for insecure 
sections of the established. These groups are already sensitive to encroachments on 
vocational identifications due to societal pressures such as the de-industrialisation 
of certain areas and the increased neoliberal fluidity of labour. The 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis further aroused economic and vocational concerns. Mentions of 
“illegal working” (20.02.2008; 17.06.2008; 12.11.2009) gave insecure sections of 
the established reasons to stigmatise migrant outsiders. They became a conduit for 
fears about the economy and corresponding concerns about lower development 
and the decline of British society.   
 
Fears about societal crime associated with the movement of people have also 
become rampant in established groups. The group charisma of ‘our laws’ was 
accompanied by the stigmatisation of practices deemed to be criminal.  Migrant 
outsiders were understood as a carrier of deviant behaviour that includes organised 
crime (20.12.2005; 06.06.2006; 17.12.2007), fraud (30.09.2003; 22.05.2003; 
06.06.2006), and human trafficking (23.06.2005). Fears about organised crime 
linked migrant outsiders to a threatening parallel organisation that defies 
established institutions. The links to fraud simulated fears that some migrant 
outsiders are engaged in attempts to deceive established authorities and the link 
between human trafficking and migrant outsiders recalls the shado w of human 
slavery. The presence of human traffickers in Britain aroused fears about the 
kidnapping of people outside of Britain and the destabilisation established 




Fears about globalised violence and the movement of people was where the migrant 
outsiders became harbingers of communal violence. This coincided with the rise of 
transnational terrorism, which in itself challenges the nation state’s domination of 
violence.  Blair advocated ways to secure Britain from harmful communal ‘terrorist’ 
violence. Britain directly experienced an occurrence of terrorist violence with the 
July 7 2005 bombings, the first since IRA’s campaigns of the early 1990s 102, and in 
the context of high degrees of social insecurity from events such as Septe mber 11 
and July 7, migrant outsiders became the embodiment of fears of a sudden, 
unexpected violent death. 
 
The language of transnational migration was entangled with the language of the 
‘war on terror’. Migration and terrorism often appeared in the same sentence, for 
example in phrases such as “how we give greater security in the era of global 
terrorism and mass migration” (26.10.2005b; 26.10.2005a; 27.10.2005). Blair drew 
attention to globalised events in Africa where “mass migration and terrorism and 
conflict that could be exported beyond the boundaries of Africa to our countries” 
(26.06.2006). He commodified societal vulnerabilities to violence into objects 
exportable via the movement of migrant outsiders to communities in Britain. The 
term “mass migration” reiterated and reinforced patterns of “anonymous masses” 
found in visual images of asylum seekers (see Bleiker et. al. 2013: 413). The 
following accounts highlighted how fears about unexpected violent death in the 
form of transnational terrorism suffused depictions of migrant outsiders.  
 
“Here in this country and in other nations round the world, 
laws will be changed, not to deny basic liberties but to prevent 
their abuse and protect the most basic liberty of all: freedom 
from terror. New extradition laws will be introduced; new 
rules to ensure asylum is not a front for terrorist entry. 
This country is proud of its tradition in giving asylum to 
those fleeing tyranny. We will always do so. But we have a 
                                                 
102 Though in March 2001 there was car bomb explosion outside the BBC’s headquarters attributed 
to republican splinter group the Real IRA.    
111 
 
duty to protect the system from abuse.” (02.10.2001; 
04.10.2001) 
 
“in the areas that Europe can cooperate together, we are 
setting clear rules that allow us to be more effective in 
ensuring, for example, those claiming asylum are genuine 
asylum seekers. I also believe that we found today's 
discussion very useful on how we make sure  that those 
coming into our country are free from any suspicion of 
terrorism or, if they are suspicious as potential terrorists, we 
are able to deal with them” (13.07.2004) 
 
“This is a new and more mobile world and so we have to step 
up the protection of our borders against terrorism and 
illegal immigration. And it means we must take a tough 
approach to who gets to come to our country and who gets 
to stay. Tightening our points-based immigration system 
ensures that those who have the skills that can help Britain 
will be welcomed, and those who do not, will be refused.” 
(29.09.2009) 
 
In each of the accounts above, migrant outsiders became carriers of communal 
violence. In account 02.10.2001, Blair expressed limited appeals to the humanist-
egalitarian normative code through mentions of “giving asylum to those fleeing 
tyranny”. His focus swung to understandings that asylum seekers have abused the 
migration regulations of established groups in Britain. The continuation of that 
exploitation results in a ‘Trojan horse’ of people movement that brought terrorist 
violence and implicitly death to British communities. For Blair , suspicion of 
terrorism is sufficient justification for additional societal controls to distinguish 
harmless “genuine” asylum seekers from harmful presumably  violent asylum 




In account 29.09.2009, Brown articulated the consistent swing to the collective -
nationalist normative code through the “protection of our borders against terrorism 
and illegal immigration”. The possibility of transmitting terrorist violence into 
Britain stigmatised migrant outsiders, creating a brutalised image and turning them 
to scapegoats to be blamed for an occurrence of communal violence. These 
stigmatisations obscured violence in other areas such as domestic vio lence within 
British families and state-society transnational violence, such as the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq and military involvement in Afghanistan from 2001.   
 
Blair’s language mythologised migrant outsiders. They became the personification 
of more insecure collective fantasies, which developed into a figure of blame and a 
fictive cause of healthcare, welfare, the economy, crime and communal violence 
fears. The mythologisation of migration narrowed the space of societal reflection 
and increased the distance between the established of Britain and migrant 
outsiders through widening circles of disassociation.  
 
The tendency of Blair to use ‘aquatic’ metaphors narrowed the space for more 
detached reflections on the five fears related to healthcare, welfare, the economy, 
crime and communal violence, and widened depictions of the migrant outsiders as 
a threatening presence. Water themes are a common pattern in studies of migration 
vocabularies (see El Refaie 2001: 359).  Metaphorical uses by Blair included 
“waves”, “flood”, “streaming”, “battened down the hatches”/storm and “big waves 
of migration” (01.10.2002; 27.06.2005; 27.03.2006; 06.06.2006; 03.10.2006; 
30.05.2007). These emphasised the existence of an onrushing, uncontrollable force, 
which aroused personal horror and visceral imaginings of drowning:  a 
society/collective that is on the verge of sinking unless there are changes in 
behaviour. In societies with Judeo-Christian influences like Britain, the term flood 
can also denote a punishment from a supernatural deity.  Terms such as ‘flood’ 
conjured mythical imaginings of onrushing migrant outsiders that justified greater 
societal regulations and guided societal attachments towards the British leaders 




Island Fortifications in Britain?  
 
The development of more hostile relations with the EU illustrated the growth of 
greater socio-psychological fortification processes. Harmful catastrophic depictions 
of migrant outsiders by Blair and Brown propagated more antagonistic relations 
between British society and the EU.  
 
In brief moments, Blair and Brown showed more humanist-egalitarian 
interpretations of Europeanised migration, as the following account demonstrates:   
 
“Perhaps we should also acknowledge, as a matter of fact, that 
migration within the European Union is a two way street. 
Around 1 million citizens of other EU countries are now living 
and working in Britain – but there are also around 1 million 
Britons living and working in the rest of the EU, making the 
most of the opportunities and new horizons that EU 
membership brings……first detailed analysis of the 
contribution to our economy of the eastern Europeans who 
came to Britain in the last few years – showing that in every 
year their net contribution was positive – and that even 
after 5 years here they are over 50 per cent less likely than 
British people to receive benefits or tax credits and over 40 
per cent less likely to live in social housing. They pay 5 per 
cent more than their share of tax, and account for a third less 
than their share of the costs of public services.” (31.03.2010) 
 
The excerpt highlighted the improvements to both British and European societies 
brought about by the reciprocal Europeanised movement of people (see also 
27.04.2004; 10.03.2006). The tone of these justifications was always defensive. 
Blair and Brown were constantly defending their openness to Europeanised 
movement, while simultaneously committing to greater societal controls that 





Consistent appeals to the collective-nationalist code reinforced by the demand to 
protect borders generated identifications exclusive of Britain’s broader 
membership in the EU. Blair and Brown cultivated ignorance of the growing 
interdependencies between Britain and Europe, for example, in the 20.02.2008 
account, the phrase “EU migrant” displayed identifications towards a Britain that is 
separate from the EU. EU migrants became separate category of people movement 
subject to more coercive established regulations, even though under EU rules, the 
movement of people from the new acceded Eastern European member states is not 
illegal and there are accounts that actively expressed the need for the movement of 
people from EU members into Britain (see 10.03.2006). There are growing 
antagonisms towards Britain’s membership of the EU and growing nationalised 
attachments to British state-society. 
 
Blair and Brown’s unswerving attachments to the collective-nationalist code 
circulated a more closed consciousness that exacerbated long-standing 
antagonisms towards Europe, and mirrored the attitudes of United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) (see Ford and Goodwin 2014). UKIP “sought to ‘put an 
end to mass immigration’, linking opposition to immigration and EU membersh ip 
as nationalist concerns” (John and Margretts 2009: 501).   
 
The Blair and Brown period shows a power struggle within Britain on the question 
of whether it should separate from the EU. This occurred at a time when other 
members of the EU were lowering barriers to the movement of people and 
abolishing internal border checks through the Schengen Protocol that was part of 
the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. This commitment built on the 1985 Schengen 
Agreement that guaranteed the free movement of people within Euro pe.  
 
Commitment to Schengen saw the development of more equal sets of power 
relations among continental European members. This change was strongly resisted 
in Britain, as established groups sought to maintain their strongly nationalised 
collective superiority and group charisma against European neighbours. They 
resisted measures perceived as diluting their regulations over societal orientation, 
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particularly nationalised system of border checks vis-a-vis Europe. Britain 
maintained internal controls choosing to opt-out of the Schengen Area, and 
preserved the system of border checks with Europe and extending them into France 
via the 2003 Le Touquet Treaty, even as it paid lip service to continued 
commitments to the free movement of people within the EU. The tension between 
inclusive societal openness to Europeanised movement and exclusive societal 
closure was a visible in the following accounts from 2004:  
 
“On 1 May the EU will enlarge from 15 to 25 members. It will 
be the biggest ever increase in Europe's size. It will reunify 
Europe after the travails of Communist dictatorship in 
Eastern and Central Europe. It is an historic event, one this 
British Government and the one before us have championed. 
Whatever the problems it poses, and we see that in the 
anxiety over prospective immigration, let us be in no 
doubt: the prospect of EU membership, together with the 
courage of the Governments concerned, is the primary reason 
why those countries have been able to reform their 
economies and politics so radically and so beneficially. Such 
change has been in the interests of all of Europe. I say 
unhesitatingly that enlargement is right for Europe and for 
Britain and we should support it.”  (20.04.2004) 
 
“keeps our ability to opt out of measures affecting our 
laws on asylum and immigration and extends that so that 
we cannot be obliged to cooperate on criminal law 
procedures where we do not want to do so……Among the 
many myths about the constitution that have been published 
over the last few months have been accusations that we 
would……..lose control of our borders….The new Europe of 
450 million people is a success for Britain…..All that is what 
the opponents of this Treaty would put in jeopardy for the 
sake, not of any real British interest, but of a narrow 
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nationalism which no British government has ever espoused 
or should ever espouse if it has the true interests of the British 
people at heart.” (21.06.2004) 
 
“there are issues to do with European-wide immigration and 
asylum where we need proper controls in Europe. So this, as 
I say, gives us the best of both worlds……Britain insisted, 
because we are an island nation, we insisted that we would 
retain complete control over our own borders, and would 
only participate in European-wide action where we chose to 
do so, in other words stronger than an opt-out, an opt-in, we 
have to opt-in. However, in the areas where we have decided 
to opt-in, for example returning failed asylum seekers to 
other parts of Europe…….do we still retain the ability to 
decide our own border controls and the ability to decide 
absolutely, unequivocally, the sovereign right of this country, 
whether we take part in measures or not. And the answer to 
that is yes, we retain that absolutely, without any qualification 
at all.” (25.10.2004)  
 
The above accounts propagated circles of disassociation between Britain and 
Europe, through control over borders and the opt-outs from Schengen. Account 
21.06.2004 paradoxically critiqued “narrow nationalism” yet advocated a 
collective-nationalist preference for ‘our’ laws. There was an appeal to collective-
nationalist attachments that emphasised the exclusivity of British laws in 
opposition to the EU. These appeals drew on fantasy based identifications that saw 
Britain literally as an island:  “we are an island nation” (25.10.2004). The phrase 
that invoked collective memories of a past superiority that separated Britain from 
Europe, and sustained resistance to EU integration, the vision of ‘ever closer union’, 
for example in Blair’s remark that “what we want is a Europe of Nations, not a 




The emphasis on opt-outs widened circles of disassociation between Britain and the 
EU. This reduced relations with the EU to narrow cooperation on “terrorism, illegal 
immigration and organised crime” (17.12.2007; 28.11.2002), as well as more 
coercive measures on control of movement such as returning failed asylum seekers 
(25.10.2004) and the removal of non-economically active EU citizens (20.02.2008). 
The constant justification of Britain’s opt-outs to Schengen reflected the beliefs of 
established groups in Britain, who continued to cling onto to symbols 103, beliefs and 
accounts of recent history that defined them as superior to their European 
neighbours.   
 
Depictions of EU migrants became entrapped in the same fear-arousing 
constellations as other groups of migrant outsiders. Blair and Brown attempted to 
make a distinction between people movements within the EU (accepted, friendly), 
and people movements external to the EU (threatening). The criminalisation of 
migrant outsiders and objectified focus on asylum numbers blurred this distinction.  
Europeanised movement became more stigmatised, through the switch to numbers 
of net migration, and were further exacerbated by Britain’s collective -nationalist 
commitment to nationalised border control, including over European borders 
(20.02.2008; 26.03.2010).  The desire to get the “best of both worlds” (25.10.2004) 
swung in favour of more immobile citoyen identifications that was reinforced by 
fears associated with the movement of migrant outsiders. This shift set the scene 
for resistance to EU migrants to become resistance to the EU project as a whole.  
 
The restriction of relations with the EU to bilateral areas of cooperation on crime, 
terrorism and illegal immigration cultivated a consistent ignorance of broader 
supranational changes to diplomatic practices within in the EU. Daddow (2011) has 
remarked that Blair and Brown were never fully committed to the notion of ‘ever 
closer union’ as understood in Europe itself . Blair and Brown failed to recognise 
development of the EU’s “late sovereign diplomacy” where nationalised 
attachments are integrated into broader Europeanised attachments to the 
supranational institutions of the EU (Adler-Nissen 2009).  The following accounts 
                                                 
103 Blair and Brown resisted joining the Euro, refusing to relinquish the monopolisation over forms 
of transferable currency. 
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demonstrated reductive relations with the EU through harmful depictions of 
migrant outsiders and to resistance the wider EU project in the form of the EU 
Commission.   
 
“But we should stand up for the Commission. It plays an 
essential role. Along with the Court of Justice, it is the best 
guarantee of equality in the Union, ensuring that small 
countries or new Member States are not treated as second 
class members. And on enlargement, economic 
modernisation and CAP reform, the Commission has been a 
strong progressive force…….This will not, of course, affect the 
agreement Britain secured at Amsterdam in 1997 on our 
border controls. But it will mean integrated and effective 
action on issues to do with organised crime, drug dealing, 
asylum and immigration that affect all of Europe, cause 
huge distress and difficulty and cannot seriously be tackled 
by nations alone.” (28.11.2002) 
 
“Now we have made sure that we protect through the 
protocol we negotiated in Amsterdam completely Britain's 
borders. That is secure. But there are areas in relation to 
asylum and home affairs policy where we may well want to 
move forward on a common European basis and where it is 
in our interests to have qualified majority voting. ……..The 
changes that might justify a Referendum, for example if we 
were yielding up control of British foreign policy or 
defence policy - that was to become Commission, not inter-
governmental, it was to be done in Brussels and not in Britain 
- that would be a fundamental constitutional change, but I 
don't think there is any prospect of that being the case. I think 
we will win that argument within Europe…….Now on the 
asylum question, yes we do need to make sure that we are 
doing more on removals as well. And I would just point out 
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the fact that we are removing more failed asylum seekers 
than any other country in Europe, and what is more we are 
removing many more than we were several years ago. 
However, the absolute key to this, believe me, is bringing 
down the numbers of people who come in to claim 
asylum.”(22.05.2003) 
 
“I never thought the people in Europe necessarily want 
Europe to do less, sometimes they want Europe to do 
more.  Illegal immigration is a very clear example of that. 
What they don't want is Europe, and in particular the 
European Commission, to be interfering unnecessarily in 
bits of their lives that they say look this is something we 
can regulate. And I think what is different, and extremely 
refreshing if I may say so, about this Commission and this 
Commission President, is that they are focusing on where the 
European Commission can add value to the European project, 
and that is what it should be.”  (27.10.2005) 
 
Each of the accounts above expressed more reductive comprehensions of relations 
with EU institutions, particularly the EU Commission. In account 28.11.2002, Blair 
voiced support for the EU Commission as “strong progressive force” that preserved 
more equal relations between EU members. Humanist-egalitarian support for the 
EU Commission shifted in favour of collective-nationalist assertions (28.11.2002; 
22.05.2003). In account 22.05.2003, he floated the idea of a “Referendum” should 
the EU Commission assume foreign and defence policy functions. This reflected 
views from insecure sections of Britain’s party-government establishments that 
were sensitised to Britain’s reduced status in international society; they were highly 
suspicious of any policy that shifted powers from Britain to Brussels. Collective -
nationalist attachments aroused greater suspicions and resistances to EU 
institutions. In the 27.10.2005 account, Blair condemned the EU Commission for 
needless intrusions into people’s lives .  He only embraced the EU for coercive 
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cooperation against “illegal immigration”. Disassociations towards transnational 




This chapter has evaluated the migration language of British Prime Ministers Tony 
Blair and Gordon Brown from 2001 to 2010. I reconstructed the societal processes 
that shaped modes of thinking and orientation in British society through an 
investigation of their speeches, interviews and press conferences. 
 
I have argued that the language of Blair and Brown showed the development of 
greater socio-psychological fortifications. They verbalised more harmful 
interpretations of transnational migration. These depictions mobilised shared 
anxieties through the development of more reductive modes of thinking.  
Commodified understandings of migrant outsiders were intertwined with appeals 
to the collective-nationalist normative code. Transnational people movements 
became risks to established groups in Britain.  
 
There was the development of more harmful risk orientations that sought to 
dominate understandings of economic migrants, asylum seekers and Europeanised 
movement.  The criminalisation of migrant outsiders sustained the perpetuation 
risk narratives through the objectification of migrant outsiders and the 
development of fear-arousing constellations. Fears about healthcare, welfare, 
economy, crime and communal violence widened circles of disassociation, which 
stigmatised migrant outsiders and expanded forms of societal exclusion. British 
society was steered towards raising the barriers to societal inclusion, a process that 
was infused with more hostile understandings of the EU.  
 
The next chapter will illustrate the deepening of socio-psychological fortifications 
in British society. The migration language of Blair and Brown set the tone for 
harmful depictions of migrant outsiders and the wider deterioration of relations 
with the EU. Their successors David Cameron and Theresa May consolidated and 
extended these societal developments.  
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Chapter 4.                                                                                    
An Investigation into the Major Public Migration 
Speeches by David Cameron (2010-2016) and    
Theresa May (2016- 2017) 
 
The last chapter evaluated the migration language of British Prime Ministers Tony 
Blair and Gordon Brown, in the period between 2001 and 2010. This evaluation 
utilised a process and risk sociological approach developed in Chapters 1 and 2, to 
understand the development of shared anxieties, and reconstructed the societal 
processes that fortified British society. The language of Blair and Brown mobilised 
shared anxieties, through the commodification of relations between established 
groups and migrant outsiders. Their language circulated conflicting appeals to 
humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist normative codes. Attachments to 
the collective-nationalist normative code, cultivated more harmful catastrophic 
propagations of migrant outsiders, who were framed as risks to established groups 
in British society. The language of Blair and Brown dominated societal orientations 
through the criminalisation and objectification of migrant outsiders.  These 
processes contributed to fear constellations and widening circles of disassociation, 
which disseminated more hostile relations with the EU.   
 
My fourth chapter evaluates the migration language of British Prime Ministers 
David Cameron (2010-2016), and Theresa May (2016-2017). The sociological 
model for shared anxieties helps to grasp the continued blends of socio-
psychological tensions during the period of British history from 2010 to 2017. The 
vocabulary of process and risk sociology with formulations of independence and 
power relations nexuses facilitates efforts to reconstruct the societal processes that 
shaped British society during this period, using material from Prime Ministerial 
speeches, interviews and press conferences. The statements of Cameron and May 
set the scene for the policies, practices and societal expectations that framed 




Early in this period in British history, the Conservative Party represented by 
Cameron and May were in coalition with the Liberal-Democrats. From the evidence 
in Cameron and May’s speeches, the Liberal-Democrats did not exert a detectable 
moderating influence that has been claimed by leader Nick Clegg (2015), who 
argued that they “bring a heart to a Conservative Government”104. Clegg (2014) 
criticised Labour for the “obliterated trust in our immigration system”, and the 
Conservatives for having “quietly ditched their commitment to reduce net 
migration to tens of thousands105”. The Conservative Liberal Democrat Coalition 
government did not temper the harmful catastrophic representations of 
transnational movement into Britain, the change from Cameron to May showed no 
detectable shift of direction towards more inclusive societal openness.  
 
I argue that the migration language of Prime Ministers Cameron and May 
consolidated societal fortifications in British society. Similar sets of socio-
psychological tensions reconstructed from language of Blair and Brown continued 
into the vocabulary of Cameron and May. These processes included the 
commodification of societal relations and tensions between cosmopolitanised 
humanist-egalitarian and de-cosmopolitanised collective-nationalist normative 
codes, which framed the criminalisation and objectification of migrant outsiders.  
 
The language of British Labour and Conservative party leaders showed similar 
articulations and propagations of shared anxieties in British society. It might be 
expected that there would be more distinctive disparities between the leaders from 
the major political parties. The language of Cameron and May showed greater 
fixations on societal welfare and relations with Europe. These preoccupations were 
more characteristic of established groups that support the Conservative party with 
blends of imperial aristocratic-bourgeois identifications.  
 
The majority of the statements in this chapter are from Cameron, although May as 
Home Secretary was part of the same party government establishment. The change 
                                                 
104 This was spoken a day before the 2015 General Election when it appeared that neither Labour 
nor the Conservative would win a majority in the House of Commons (see Grice 2015).  
105 This remark is misleading. The Conservative Party and the Prime Ministers in this phrase were 
obsessed with reducing numbers of net migration, see discussions later in this chapter.   
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to May, though marked by fewer public statements, saw no significant alterations 
of societal processes.  
 
Cameron and May propagated more harmful catastrophic depictions of 
transnational migration that distorted comprehensions of European migration and 
contributed to the disorientation of British society from broader European society. 
The continued development of greater socio-psychological fortifications reduced 
the modes of thinking and narrowed the means of societal orientation. The language 
of Cameron and May raised the barriers to societal inclusion and widened forms of 
societal exclusion.  
 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section explains how the migration 
language of Cameron and May mobilised shared anxieties and fortified modes of 
thinking in British society. The second section explains how they dominated of 
societal orientations, and fortified British society.  
 
Shared Anxieties & Fortified Thinking by Cameron & May    
 
The following section illustrates the continuation of reductive modes of thinkin g in 
British society. Interpretations of ongoing interdependency crises portrayed by 
political leaders shaped societal conscience formations in Britain. Depictions of the 
wider financial crisis merged with concerns about communal violence, and 
amalgamated into representations the broader migration crisis. There was a more 
frenzied tension between the mobile techno-economic bourgeois and the immobile 
politico-economic citoyen identifications within the party-government 
establishment, represented by Cameron and May. This tension shaped commodified 
depictions of migrant outsiders. The balance between humanist-egalitarian and 
collective-nationalist normative codes swung to a more closed consciousness with 
consistent appeals to the collective-nationalist normative code and the protection 
of borders. Cameron and May became more reliant on insecure sections of the 
established and incited more fantasy-based understandings of migrant outsiders to 
reinforce their place in the balance of societal power.  Migrant outsiders became 
viewed as risks to established sections of British society.  
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Interdependency Pressures & Societal Conscience Formation  
 
Ongoing interpretations of global economic and communal violence concerns are 
evidence of how awareness of wider global interconnections affected the power 
relations within British society during this period.  Economic concerns included the 
management of the Eurozone crisis as well as the ongoing repercussions of the 
Global Financial Crisis106. Communal violence concerns included the repercussions 
of the Arab Spring107, Libyan Civil War108  (and subsequent Western Intervention), 
and the Syrian Civil War109.  
 
Cameron and May cultivated societal conscience formations around the awareness 
of interdependency pressures/risk shocks110 to maintain the authority of their 
party-government establishment. Globalised economic concerns and implicit 
apprehensions over transnational communal violence merged with concerns over 
transnational people movement in the following accounts.  
 
“We are living in perilous economic times. Turn on the TV 
news and you see the return of a crisis111 that never really 
went away. Greece on the brink; the survival of the Euro in 
question. Faced with this, I have a clear task: to keep Britain 
safe…… First, we must continue to get to grips with the 
deficit and build recovery at home. Let’s be clear about what 
we inherited: an economy built on the worst deficit since the 
                                                 
106 See Beck and Grande’s (2007: 164) discussion of global financial risks. They remark that “the 
experience of interdependence and the realisation of self-endangerment combine to generate the 
perception that no country can evade and immunise itself from these civilisationally generated 
dangers”. 
107 See for example Anderson (2011).  
108 See for example Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014); Bellamy and Williams (2011).  
109 See for example Carpenter (2013).  
110 See Beck and Grande (2007: 163). It is arguable that lengthening chains of interdependenc e 
increase the likelihood for interconnected peoples to feel the reverberations of these same shocks 
(cf. McLuhan 2001 [1964]: 4-5, 26). 
111 This refers to the ongoing the Eurozone sovereign and banking crisis and the effects of greater 
independencies through the movement of financial capital between states and banks (see Mody and 
Sandri 2012), reverberating from the 2007 global financial crisis. These interconnections extend 
further as Hanson and Gordon (2014: 1218) note the overlapping self-reinforcing combination of 
three crises challenging the EU: financial, institutional and demographic, the latter relates to the low 
birth rates and aging populations in Southern Europe requiring forms of immigration.   
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Second World War: the most leveraged banks; the most 
indebted households; one of the biggest housing booms; and 
unsustainable levels of public spending and 
immigration.” (17.05.2012) 
 
“it is people embracing globalisation so enthusiastically that 
they actually lose sight of the national interest……Well this 
approach – largely pursued under the last government – it 
didn’t feel too good for ordinary people and, frankly, it didn’t 
do too much for our competitiveness either. We saw mass, 
uncontrolled immigration changing communities in a way 
people didn’t feel comfortable with, putting huge pressure 
on public services. We saw large bureaucracies112 like the EU 
having a huge impact on our way of life in a way that no one 
voted for, while at the same time burdening our businesses 
with red tape and regulation. We saw, fundamentally, a 
political class too easily seduced by the rewards of 
globalisation, and not alert enough to the risks.” (10.06.2013)  
 
“We will also continue to work together in tackling the 
migration crisis in the Mediterranean113. Italy has become 
the main arrival point for illegal migration into Europe, with 
over 180,000 people arriving in 2016. But this is not just a 
problem for Italy, it is a problem for us all. And we need to 
work together to find better solutions to the huge 
population movements we are seeing, so refugees don’t 
have to risk their lives on dangerous journeys and so we 
control the unmanageable economic migration that is 
                                                 
112 US President Donald Trump made a similar remark during speech in Poland noting, “the steady  
creep of government bureaucracy that drains the vitality and wealth of the people” (CNN 2017).  
113 This refers to the ongoing spurts of migration into Europe via the Mediterranean. By the end of 
2015, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reported that over a million refugees and 
irregular migrants had arrived in Europe (IOM 2015).   
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neither working for migrants nor for our own populations.”  
(09.02.2017) 
 
In each of these accounts Cameron and May emphasised interconnections between 
economic crises with the transnational movement of people. In accounts 
17.05.2012 and 09.02.2017, Cameron and May broadcasted apprehensions about a 
renewed economic crisis in the Eurozone that were interwoven with concerns 
about people movement. For Cameron, transnational migration was an undue 
burden on communities “at a time when public finances are already under severe 
strain as a consequence of the financial crisis” (10.11.2015). May referenced the 
Mediterranean migration crisis, which developed through the movement of 
“refugees” fleeing violence. The implicit assumption was that people who flee 
communal violence may also bring communal violence and other harmful side 
effects/’problems’ to the places that they seek refuge.   
 
Increased Commodification of Relations   
 
Cameron and May represented the continuation of established bourgeois societal 
groupings that held a strong power ratio, and influenced the balance of power in 
British society. These groupings valued the movement of financial capital through 
mobile techno-economic bourgeois identifications. Cameron and May 
communicated techno-economic bourgeois identifications such as the salience of 
work, the creation of jobs and a consistent reverence of ‘the economy’ in the 
following accounts.  
 
“Yes, some immigration is a good thing.  It is right that we 
should attract the brightest and the best114 to Britain.  We 
genuinely need foreign investors and influencers to come 
here.  In the same way that many people take advantage of 
opportunities to work and study and live overseas, many of 
                                                 
114 The term “brightest and the best” has its origins in a hymn (often used as a Christmas carol) of 
the same name written by Anglican Bishop Reginald Heber in 1811 to be sung at Epiphany a 
Christian festival on the 6th of January.    
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our own communities here have been enriched by the 
contribution of generations of migrants.  Our schools and 
universities have some of the best teachers, researchers and 
students from all over the world and we should be proud of 
that.  Our hospitals are full of talented doctors and nurses 
caring for the sick and vulnerable.  Our high streets are home 
to influencers who are not just adding to the local economy 
but playing a vital part in local life.  And yes, Britain will 
always be open to those who are seeking asylum from 
persecution.  That says something very important about the 
kind of country we are and we should be proud of that too.”  
(10.10.2011a) 
 
“So, let me put this very simply: we are rolling out the red 
carpet to those whose hard work and investment will create 
new British jobs, because we are in a global race for our 
economic future. And the right sort of immigration is not 
just good for Britain – it is, I would argue, essential. But we 
can’t allow immigration to be a substitute for training our 
own workforce and giving them incentives to work. Our 
immigration policy can’t be a sort of add-on to our economic 
strategy; it’s got to be a fundamental part of it.” (25.05.2013) 
 
“Yes, the United Kingdom will be a fully independent, 
sovereign country, free to make our own decisions on a whole 
host of different issues such as how we choose to control 
immigration. But we still want to trade freely – in goods and 
services – with Europe. And the UK will continue to face 
similar challenges to our European neighbours. We will 
continue to share the same values. And so I want a mature, co-





The accounts above showed an increased commitment to the techno -economic 
bourgeois value of economic growth and competiveness. Immigration was valued 
so long as it financially enriches the established of Britain, although, there was slight 
recognition of the contribution of migrant outsiders to schools, universities and 
hospitals as well as an openness to asylum seekers (10.10.2011a). 
 
In accounts 10.10.2011a and 25.05.2013, Cameron assumed that more financially 
wealthy migrants brought more acceptable sets of societal values, such as the 
commitment to ‘hard work’. He signified this desire through the phrase “brightest 
and the best” people with pre-existing high rank and status (10.10.2011a). People 
with high levels of financial capital are more valued, and more societally attractive 
compared with people with less financial capital. The abovementioned “red carpet” 
for financial investors become known as ‘golden visas’, where those with £2m in UK 
bonds or shares could remain indefinitely in the UK (Pegg 2017). Home Office 
guidance for Tier 1 Investor Visas outlines the same practice (2017 [2014]).  
 
Accounts 25.05.2013 and 21.10.2016 showed a severe swing to immobile politico -
economic citoyen identifications. Migration was accepted for the creation of “British 
jobs”, to train “[our] own workforce” (25.05.2013). In account 21.10.2016, May 
tried to unpick the EU’s four freedoms. She voiced acceptance of capital, goods and 
services movements but the rejection of people movement. ‘Freedom’ for Britain 
involved greater constraints on people movement.     
 
The quotes also show more conflictual interdependencies between techno-
economic bourgeois and politico-economic citoyen identifications. The techno-
economic bourgeois identification focused on debt and deficit, reflecting concerns 
about the reduction of public capital spending. This was linked to alleged excesses 
of immigration and to lessen the power of large bureaucracies such as the EU whose 
regulations inhibited “our businesses” (17.05.2012; 10.06.2013). The politico-
economic citoyen identification concentrated on the more catastrophic “risks” of 
globalisation, where mass immigration was blamed for the communal discomfort of 
“our own populations” and the pressurisation of public services (17.05.2012; 




Cameron and May commodified migrant outsiders into harmless and harmful side 
effects. Migrant outsiders were depicted as investors, influencers, teachers, 
researchers, doctors, nurses, students, asylum seekers, refugees and economic 
migrants. They held relatively weaker societal power resources. In the following 
accounts, migrant outsiders were characterised as commodified harms to British 
society, as people who were putting pressure on public services, the cause/blame 
for changing socio-cultural fabrics and a threat to societal cohesion.  
 
“But excessive immigration brings pressures, real 
pressures on our communities up and down the country.  
Pressures on schools, housing and healthcare and societal 
pressures too.  When large numbers of people arrive in new 
neighbourhoods, perhaps not all able to speak the same 
language as those who live there, perhaps not always 
wanting to integrate, perhaps seeking simply to take 
advantage of our NHS, paid for by our taxpayers, there is a 
discomfort and tension in some of our communities.  And 
crucially, while it is crude and wrong to say that immigrants 
come to Britain to take all our jobs, there’s no doubt that 
badly controlled immigration has compounded the 
failure of our welfare system and effectively allowed 
governments and employers to carry on with the waste of 
people stuck on welfare when they should be working.  And 
there is also the concern that relatively uncontrolled 
immigration can hurt the low paid and the low skilled while 
the better off reap many of the benefits.  So I think it’s 
absolutely right to address all of these concerns, because if 
people don’t feel that mainstream political parties 
understand these issues they will turn instead to those who 





“So we can make an impact on European migration, and we 
need to. I think part of our problem has been, because our 
economy is now growing much faster than other European 
economies, many people are coming from Europe to work in 
Britain, because their economies aren’t creating jobs where 
our economy is creating jobs. So I think deal with the 
welfare tourism and we’ll deal with some of the problem of 
EU migration.” (30.07.2014) 
 
“We’re ambitious for Britain to become the global go-to place 
for scientists, innovators and tech investors. We will continue 
to welcome the brightest and the best – but can only do so 
by bringing immigration down to sustainable levels overall so 
we maintain public faith in the system.” (21.11.2016) 
 
Each of these accounts verbalised a consciousness of harmful side effects brought 
by the movement of migrant outsiders. Cameron and May harmful images of 
outsiders who exploit institutions such as schools, housing, healthcare, and the 
economy (10.10.2011b; 30.07.2014). They cultivated strong suspicions about the 
presence of migrant outsiders in local communities. Migrant outsiders were 
stigmatised by negative presumptions about their capacities to integrate 
(10.10.2011; 21.11.2016). The repeated use of the possessive pronoun “our”: “our 
NHS”, “our taxpayers”, “our economy” became a form of disassociation, which 
limited the ways in which migrants could integrate into British society.  
 
Normative Code Tensions Under Cameron and May 
 
The commodification of migrant outsiders interconnected with power struggles 
between cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and de-cosmopolitanised 
collective-nationalist normative codes within the language of British leaders.  
Cameron and May idealised both codes. Selective attachments to the humanist-
egalitarian code in the form of compassion towards refugees did not moderate 
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wider, more prolonged fluctuations to the collective-nationalist normative code, 
which came to dominate societal orientations.   
 
Attachments to the humanist-egalitarian code were expressed as an idealised belief 
in collective tolerance towards refugees.  Britain is a tolerant society that should 
show compassion to refugees (10.10.2011a; 04.09.2015; 08.10.2014). There are 
appeals that embrace diverse forms of societal identifications in degrees of 
inclusiveness, which romanticised Britain as “one of the most open and 
cosmopolitan countries on the face of the earth. People from all over the world 
can find a community of their own right here in Britain” (10.11.2015).  
 
Cameron and May used selective depictions of refugees to project an idealised 
image of Britain as open, tolerant society that accepted transnational people 
movements.   In response to the ongoing Mediterranean migration crisis, they noted 
obligations to assist refugee outsiders, stating that Britain would accept refugees 
directly; “we have our programme of resettling people direct from the refugee 
camps” (18.03.2016; 26.06.2015; 04.09.2015; 22.01.2016; 09.02.2017). Britain’ s 
approach in fact bypassed collective European cooperation on the migration crisis, 
stating that “the UK has been clear that we will not take part in any relocation 
scheme to move migrants who have already arrived across member states” 
(26.06.2015). Britain’s leaders continued to voice their commitment to refugees 
through the humanist-egalitarian code, but also resisted Europeanised 
collaboration and promoted greater ‘distance’ from Europe, in the following 
accounts:     
 
“Britain has a moral responsibility to help refugees as we 
have done throughout our history. We are already are 
providing sanctuary and we will continue to do so. As the 
second largest bilateral donor to the crisis, we have provided 
over £900 million in aid to help those affected in Syria and the 
region…..No European country has done more than Britain 
in this regard. Were it not for that massive aid, the numbers 
making the perilous journey to Europe today would be even 
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higher. Now we have already accepted around 5,000 Syrians 
and have introduced a specific resettlement scheme, 
alongside those we already have, to help those Syrian 
refugees particularly at risk…..we will accept thousands more 
under these existing schemes and we keep them under 
review.” (04.09.2015) 
 
“Britain is an open and tolerant country. We will always 
want immigration, especially high-skilled immigration, we 
will always want immigration from Europe, and we will 
always welcome individual migrants as friends. But the 
message from the public before and during the referendum 
campaign was clear: Brexit must mean control of the 
number of people who come to Britain from Europe. And 
that is what we will deliver.”  (17.01.2017) 
 
“Immigration benefits Britain, but it needs to be controlled, it 
needs to be fair, and it needs to be centred around our 
national interest. That is what I want. And I want to tell you 
today why I care so passionately about getting this right, and 
getting the whole debate on immigration right in our country. 
When I think about what makes me proud to be British, yes, 
it’s our history, our values, our creativity, our compassion. 
But there is something else too. I am extremely proud that 
together we have built a successful, multi racial democracy. 
A country where, in 1 or 2 generations, people can come with 
nothing, and rise as high as their talent allows.”  (28.11.2014) 
 
Each of the accounts above articulated an idealised belief in the humanist-
egalitarian code through relative openness to refugee outsiders. In accounts 
04.09.2015 and 28.11.2014, Cameron stressed Britain’s responsibility to assist 
refugees. He gave a selective account of British history that fostered memories of 
past tolerance, which had facilitated the creation of a multi-racial democracy. 
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British leaders also propagated idealised identifications to a Britain that is superior 
to Europe. In accounts 17.01.2017 and 04.09.2015, May and Cameron distanced 
Britain from Europe, by speaking of an exclusive British kind of openness, 
friendship and tolerance. This shifted to an expression of control over  the 
movement of people from Europe. The implication was that Britain is more tolerant, 
more efficient than Europe in the management of the migration crisis. The 
acceptance of refugees was justified by a position of nationalised strength, “the 
national interest” (28.11.2014; 10.11.2015). There is also a widened distinction 
from Europe, paralleled by a narrowed definition of openness: “we must help 
ensure that refugees claim asylum in the first safe country they reach”, countries 
that are not Britain (20.09.2016), and more specifically asylum to children and 
families (09.02.2017).     
 
Cameron and May maintained shallow appeals to the humanist-egalitarian code to 
satisfy some sections of established groups like the Bishop of Dover (Sehmer 2015),  
while propagating collective-nationalist identifications incommensurable with any 
broader forms of attachment, which included links to Europe. 
 
May infamously remarked that “if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a 
citizen of nowhere. You don’t understand what the very word ‘citizenship’ means” 
(05.10.2016). The remark had chilling echoes of the “rootless Jew” from 19 th 
century anti-Semitic vocabulary and Josef Stalin’s nationalist purge of Jewish 
intellectuals and others associated with foreign influences during the late 1940s. 
These outsiders of Soviet society were stigmatised as “rootless cosmopolitans” 
(bezrodnye kosmopolity) (Adler 2016; Azadovskii and Egorov 2002: 74).  
 
Fortified Modes of Thinking & Border Protection 
 
In the Cameron-May era, suspicions of migrant outsiders again fortified British 
society. The Prime Ministers circulated bellicose projections of nationalised 
strength through border protection vocabulary (10.10.2011; 20.09.2016). This 
underpinned images of a vulnerable Britain that required strong borders to protect 
against mythologised fears of the “wave of migrants” crossing the Channel from 
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Calais (26.06.2015). Cameron and May aroused more insecure sections of 
established groups to believe that increased border controls would lead to more 
secure, and less vulnerable orientations within Britain. They remarked on the need 
for “stronger borders” (27.05.2016); to “strengthen those borders” (07.01.2016); 
on “a strong country with control over our borders and over our laws” (09.03.2017) 
as well as in the following accounts. 
 
“The third issue is migration and the pressures of 
immigration and migration in Europe. Let me be clear again 
Britain is not in the Schengen Area. We’re not going to be 
joining the Schengen Area. We have, by and large, proper and 
sustainable borders and I want us to have proper and 
sustainable border controls…..We want controlled migration 
in Europe and we want controlled migration, above all, in 
Britain.” (24.06.2011) 
 
“A Britain that everyone is proud to call home. A place where 
reward follows effort; where if you put in, you get out. But it 
also means a country that is strong in the world – in control 
of its own destiny…and yes – that includes controlling 
immigration. To me, this is about working on all fronts. It’s 
about getting our own people fit to work. Fixing welfare – so 
a life on the dole is not an option. Fixing education – so we 
turn out young people with skills to do the jobs we are 
creating. And yes – we need controlled borders and an 
immigration system that puts the British people first. That’s 
why we’ve capped economic migration from outside the 
EU…shut down 700 bogus colleges – that were basically visa 
factories…kicked out people who don’t belong here, like 
Abu Qatada…and let’s hear it for the woman who made  it 
happen: our crime-busting Home Secretary, Theresa May. But 
we know the bigger issue today is migration from within 




“A future that sees us take back control of the things that 
matter to us – things like our national borders and 
immigration policy, and the way we decide and interpret our 
own laws – so that we are able to shape a better, more 
prosperous future for the working men and women of 
Britain.” (26.01.2017) 
 
In the accounts above, Cameron and May equated open borders to societal 
vulnerabilities. They consistently defended and expressed nationalised 
attachments to the Schengen opt-out (24.06.2011; 12.12.2011; 09.05.2013; 
25.10.2013; 12.11.2015; 07.01.2016). Each of the accounts stressed commitments 
to the collective nationalist normative code, with a noticeable shift from 
“sustainable borders” in 2011, to “strong borders” in 2016/17 (27.05.2016; 
07.01.2016; 09.03.2017).  
 
For Cameron and May, control over migration through border regulations became 
a key pillar of a nationalised strength and source of their legitimacy, which 
separated British society from wider European societies.  
 
In account 26.01.2017, May noted the phrase “take back control”. This was a word 
for word repeat of the main slogan from the Leave campaign from the 2016 EU 
Referendum (see Cummings 2017). The slogan is notable for its appeal to more 
insecure sections of the established. It propagated ignorance that Britain already 
had control of its borders through the Schengen opt-out and the Le Touquet 
agreement with France. May’s distortion in account 26.01.2017 cannot be isolated 
to singular events in 2016/17. In 2011, Cameron used the phrase “reclaim our 
borders”, which even then misleadingly assumed that regulations over national 







People Risks & Societal Vulnerabilities   
 
Cameron and May became heavily reliant on the support of insecure sections of 
established groups for their continued hold the balance of societal power.  This 
reliance is evidence of the way in which awareness of larger globalised webs of 
interdependencies affect smaller localised interdependencies. Risk 
characterisations migrant outsiders became enmeshed in localised power 
struggles.   
 
Insecure sections of established groups (partial outsiders themselves) of British 
society were people who already held pre-existing concerns about schools, housing, 
healthcare, the economy and welfare. They were sensitive to any encroachment into 
these areas. The language of Cameron and May concentrated their concerns against 
migrant outsiders.  
 
Cameron set one outsider group (insecure sections of established groups) against 
another outsider group (migrant outsiders). His form of societal ‘divide and 
conquer’ perpetuated a cycle of societal expectations around the protection of 
borders.  He used popularised appeals that. “It’s wrong to let our own people do 
nothing, with no purpose in their life, dependent on benefits. It’s wrong that we 
open our doors and communities to such rapid levels of immigration they can’t 
manage” (04.03.2014).  
 
Cameron tried to secure his leadership by blaming his coalition partners, his 
predecessors (the Labour Party of Blair and Brown) and the EU. He blamed the 
Liberal Democrats for so called ‘moderate’ positions (Cutts and Russell 2015: 82, 
83). This was exemplified by the remark that “I have been in a coalition government 
with a group of people who are not knowingly enthusiastic about controlling 
immigration.” (28.11.2014). Control over migration also became a way to blame his 
predecessors, for their “lack [of] control” of people coming to Britain.  His speeches 
incited insecure members of the established to develop ‘high fantasy content’ 





“I think we have a very good coalition policy on immigration, 
which we are delivering and it is tough immigration control 
and it includes a cap on immigration that we’re delivering and 
I’m very positive about what we’re doing…..It’s an issue that I 
would like to see drop off the political agenda because I think 
when the public see proper immigration control in place 
they will stop worrying about that issue and they will turn 
their concerns to other issues and we can get back to the 
situation frankly that we had in the 1980s where it wasn’t an 
issue, it wasn’t a front-ranked political issue because 
immigration was at a reasonable level.” (21.06.2011) 
 
“People have understandably become frustrated, and it 
boils down to 1 word: control115. People want government to 
have control over the number of people coming here, and the 
circumstances in which they come116, both from around the 
world and from within the European Union. They want 
control over who has the right to receive benefits and what 
is expected of them in return. They want to know that foreign 
criminals can be excluded, or if already here, removed. And 
they want us to manage carefully the pressure on our 
schools, on our hospitals, and on our housing. If we are to 
maintain this successful, open, meritocratic democracy that 
we treasure, we have to maintain faith in the government’s 
ability to control the rate at which people come to our 
country. And yet, in recent years, it has become clear that 
successive governments lack control. People want grip. I get 
that. I completely agree with that, and to respond to this view 
                                                 
115 The phrase “take back control” became the defining slogan of the Leave campaign for the 2016 
EU Referendum (see Cummings 2017).   
116 This mirrored almost exactly the words of Australian Prime Minister John Howard: “we will 
decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come” (28.10.2001), and will 
be further discussed in Chapter 5.   
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with complacency is both wrong and dangerous.”  
(28.11.2014) 
 
“And of course the concerns about immigration and about 
welfare, which are really the number one concern for the 
British people, who want to see this properly and sensibly 
addressed in the European context. And I’m confident we can 
achieve these things. I’ve always said, if I was to achieve none 
of these things then I rule nothing out, and I meant what I said 
by that. But I expect and hope and believe that Europe can 
show the flexibility that when one of the larger countries, a 
big contributor, a major European player has some 
problems and issues, that those issues can be properly 
addressed. And I’m confident that they can.”  (29.05.2015)  
 
The accounts above showed more extravagant fantasies of the movement of people, 
in appeals to more fantastical imaginings of absolute societal control. Cameron 
verbalised broader public concerns, then channelled these vulnerabilities into 
depictions migrant outsiders, through negative terms such as worry, frustration, 
and concern.  The 21.06.2011 account aroused fantastical desires to turn the clock 
back to an earlier stage in the development of British society. By the mentioning the 
1980s, there is the mythologization of a time where the Conservatives held political 
office in Britain. Cameron cultivated an ignorance of interdependencies and the 
events that contributed to the current stage of development. His appeal to nostalgia, 
expressed a longing for a past that no longer exists (if it did at all). In convictions 
that British society can be returned to a pure naturalised condition, blocking any 
consideration of the repercussions of such efforts117.  
 
Cameron expressed personal leadership vulnerabilities and those of his wider 
political party. Greater controls over people movement became a means of 
maintaining the societal status of the Conservative Party in government. As well as 
                                                 
117 The EU referendum campaign and ongoing aftermath is an example of this form of thinking.  
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sustaining Cameron’s leadership of the Conservative party and his Prime 
Ministership. The 28.11.2014 account noted the desire to “maintain faith” in the 
capacity of the government, in the demand for adherence to the collective 
nationalist normative code and politico-economic citoyen identification.  
 
Migrant outsiders were interpreted as more harmful catastrophic risks. This 
understanding moved British society away from more detached reflections on how 
migrant outsiders came to risk their own lives, having made dangerous 
transnational crossings in the first place (09.02.2017). Risks of movement go both 
ways, the migrant outsider’s desire to move coalesced with harmful established 
group interpretations of that movement. Cameron highlighted “the risk is again of 
a failed pariah state [Libya] festering on Europe’s southern border118, threatening 
our security, pushing people across the Mediterranean and creating a more 
dangerous and uncertain world for Britain and for all our allies” (11.03.2011). In 
the 11.03.2011 account, Cameron spoke of a hostile Southern European border due 
to a conflict that became the Libyan Civil War. There is an amalgamation of 
interconnected risk narratives about violent societal disintegration and large-scale 
people movement. This became part of the justification for NATO intervention and 
fed into misgivings about Europe and the abilities of the EU to protect its borders 
(12.11.2015). What emerged were more harmful catastrophic risk narratives of 






                                                 
118 Since the 2011 Western intervention, Libya has become the failed state that Cameron warned 
against, achieving exactly what he tried to avoid. A Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee report 
published in September 2016 notes bluntly that.  
“By the summer of 2011, the limited intervention to protect civilians had drifted into an opportunist 
policy of regime change. That policy was not underpinned by a strategy to support and shape post-
Gaddafi Libya. The result was political and economic collapse,  inter-militia  and  inter-tribal  warfare,   
humanitarian  and  migrant  crises,  widespread   human rights violations, the spread of Gaddafi  




Expansion of Fortified Orientations by Cameron & May 
 
The following section illustrates the continued expansion of narrow societal 
orientations in British society. The migration language of the Cameron and May 
fortified British society. Harmful catastrophic depictions of ‘economic migrants’ 
expanded to the criminalisation of other groups of migrant outsiders such as asylum 
seekers and Europeanised movement. These harmful risk orientations dominated 
societal orientation. The criminalisation of migrant outsiders were interdependent 
with more masculinised orientations of toughness and the objectified reduction of 
net migration. Widening circles of disassociation propagated more suspicious risk 
narratives that legitimised the exclusion of migrant outsiders. Fears about 
healthcare, education, welfare dependency, marriage, terrorism, and Europe 
disseminated fear constellations that mythologised migrant outsiders and the 
abilities of Cameron and May themselves. This intensified a broader power str uggle 
with the EU and cultivated greater socio-psychological fortifications. Harmful 
understandings of EU migrants and concerns about nationalised laws became a 
battleground for Britain’s increasing estrangement with Europe.  
 
Harmless and Harmful Economic Movement 
 
Classifications of ‘economic migrants’ oscillated between harmless safe and more 
harmful catastrophic risk orientations. Harmless safe economic migrants were 
described as “investors” 10.10.2011a; 21.11.2016). These were accepted with the 
presumption that greater financial capital equated to greater safety. High financial 
thresholds for acceptance into British society raised the barriers to societal 
inclusion.  Hansen (2014: 200) notes that British immigration policy under New 
Labour consisted of two pillars: an openness towards economic migration together 
with restrictions on asylum seekers. The Conservative Party led by Cameron, 
“knocked one of these pillars out” (the first pillar) in efforts to fundamentally reduce 
economic migration, even if the economic benefits were recognised. However, it is 
arguable that the first pillar was not completely ‘knocked out’.  It simply shifted 
towards lesser acceptance of economic migrants with less presumed wealth and 
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greater potential for harm to British society. Cameron and May embraced higher 
skilled economic movement and rejected lower skilled movement (see 10.10.2011; 
17.01.2017), as shown in the following accounts.  
 
“And as part of that package, I can announce today that we will 
create a new Entrepreneur Visa119. These Entrepreneur Visas 
will mean that if you have a great business idea, and you 
receive serious investment from a leading investor, you are 
welcome to set up your business in our country. So as we act to 
bring net migration to Britain down to the tens of 
thousands, I want this message to be heard loud and clear the 
whole world over: In every classroom or laboratory where a 
bright idea is born, every boardroom where a business case is 
put together, if you’ve got an idea, if you want to create jobs, 
and if you have the ambition to build a world beating company 
here in the UK, We want you; we’ll make it easy for you; we’ll 
put out the red carpet for you. With our new Entrepreneur 
Visa we want the whole world to know that Britain wants to 
become the home of enterprise and the land of opportunity.” 
(04.11.2010) 
 
“For those economic migrants seeking a better life, we will 
continue to work to break the link between getting on a boat 
and getting settlement in Europe, discouraging those who do 
not have a genuine claim from embarking on these perilous and 
sometimes lethal journeys. For those genuine refugees fleeing 
civil war, we will act with compassion and continue to provide 
sanctuary.” (04.09.2015).  
 
                                                 
119 This type of visa was recently promoted by Nicole Meyer to Chinese investors, sister to White 




“In doing so, we should be clear that there is nothing wrong 
with the desire to migrate for a better life. And also that 
controlled, legal, safe, economic migration brings benefits 
to our economies. But countries have to be able to exercise 
control over their borders. The failure to do so erodes 
public confidence, fuels international crime, damages 
economies and reduces the resources for those who 
genuinely need protection and whose rights under the 
Refugee Convention should always be fulfilled…..Second, we 
need to improve the ways we distinguish between refugees 
fleeing persecution and economic migrants. I believe we 
must ensure the existing convention and protocol are 
properly applied to provide protection to refugees and reduce 
the incentives for economic migrants to use illegal routes. 
This in turn will help us target support for those refugees who 
need it most and retain the support of our populations for 
doing so.” (20.09.2016) 
 
The accounts above showed limited acceptance of economic migrant outsiders. In 
the 04.11.2010 account, Cameron assumed only high net worth individuals have the 
capacity for innovation and job creation. He channelled the attitudes of an insecure 
localised politico-economic citoyen establishment, which dismissed the capacities 
of migrant outsiders with lesser net financial worth. Cameron also blocked an 
appreciation of how immigrant entrepreneurs have positively contribute d to the 
socio-cultural landscapes of localised communities, for example, through 
countering the deterioration of some urban environments and increasing access to 
healthy foods120 (Barrett et. al 2002; Schuch and Wang 2015; Khojasteh and Raja 
2016). 
 
Harmless safe depictions of acceptable rich economic migrants swung to more 
harmful catastrophic risk orientations. In account 04.09.2015, Cameron expressed 
                                                 
120 There is also the implicit positive long term effects on community health easing pressure on 
public health systems. 
143 
 
limited compassion towards even ‘genuine’ refugees. The prefix ‘genuine’ divided 
refugees between those that are honest and dishonest. Cameron’s linkage of 
economic migrants and boats clouded understandings that refugees also use the 
same medium of transport. 
 
In account 20.09.2016, May articulated both harmless economic movement that is 
“controlled, legal, safe, economic migration” and harmful economic movement with 
the need to “reduce the incentives for economic migrants to use illegal routes”. 
Harmful economic migrants were blamed for the diminishing societal resources 
that could be devoted to refugees and fulfil obligations to the Refugee Convention. 
For May, control over borders equated greater societal safety from harmful criminal 
and economic movement (20.09.2016).  
 
Criminalisation Process Invoked by Cameron and May 
 
The language of Cameron and May criminalised the movement of migrant outsiders. 
They helped sustain harmful risk orientations that framed the movement of migrant 
outsiders as a threat to societal cohesion. From 2011 to the end of 2016, there were 
143 separate pieces of new immigration legislation. Out of these, the two major 
pieces were the Immigration Act 2014 and the Immigration Act 2016. These made 
access to healthcare, bank accounts, driving licences, the ability to work, and even 
marriage conditional on a person’s immigration status (see also 28.11.2014). The 
acts introduced measures such as monetary fees and surcharges for immigration 
applicants (for non-EU citizens) to access services like the NHS. There were also 
penalties to other members of the established including landlords , who provide 
residential leases to people who do not have permission to remain in the UK. The 
wide scope of these regulations paralleled broader societal fears about these same 
areas.  
 
Stricter regulations further isolated current migrant outsiders living in Britain, and 
narrowed both current and future societal opportunities. Cameron and May gave 
consistent articulations of what became known as the “hostile enviro nment” 
immigration policy, which has more recently entangled people who moved to UK as 
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children121 in the 1950’s and the 1960s (Consterdine 2018; Warren 2018; 
Gentleman 2018). They circulated relations that reduced the minimal societal 
orientations required to live in British society and promoted a more precarious 
tight rope that at any time could result in the arrest, detention, and expulsion of 
migrant outsiders. In the following accounts, the criminalisation of ‘illegal’ migrant 
outsiders legitimised the pursuit of stricter societal regulations: 
 
“We’ve also got to do much better on the final group I want to 
talk about today, which is illegal immigration.  We’ve got to be 
much better at finding these people and getting them out 
of our country.  We’ve already made some big changes, 
telling credit reference agencies about illegal immigrants so 
they can’t get easy access to credit.  We’ve ensured the UK 
Border Agency and HMRC work more closely together to 
come down hard on rogue businesses which use illegal labour 
to evade tax and minimum wage laws, and we’re creating 
biometric residence permits which are just like a biometric 
passport to give employers much greater certainty over who 
they’re employing and their right to be in the country. A 
targeted campaign this summer has seen more than 600 
operations and over 550 arrests.  I want everyone in the 
country to help with this, including by reporting suspected 
illegal immigrants to our Border Agency through the 
Crimestoppers phone line or the Border Agency website.  
Together I do believe we can reclaim our borders and send 
illegal immigrants home.  (10.10.2011) 
 
“That starts with making Britain a less attractive place to 
come and work illegally. The truth is it has been too easy to 
work illegally and employ illegal workers here. So we’ll take a 
radical step – we’ll make illegal working a criminal offence in 
                                                 
121 The Windrush generation, taking the name from the arrival of the ship Empire Windrush on 22nd 
of June 1948, which carried 492 migrants from Britain’s Caribbean colonies.       
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its own right. That means wages paid to illegal migrants will 
be seized as proceeds of crime and more businesses will be 
told when their workers’ visas expire, so if you’re involved in 
illegal working – employer or employee – you’re breaking the 
law.” (21.05.2015) 
 
“The EU’s collective approach in the Eastern Mediterranean 
has delivered a significant reduction in the numbers arriving 
on that route. It shows that returning illegal economic 
migrants to where they come from does have a deterrent 
effect and helps to break the business model of the people 
smugglers and traffickers.” (28.07.2016) 
 
Each of the accounts, articulated by Cameron and May propagated suspicious risk 
orientations in British society, through the criminalisation of migrant outsiders. 
These interpretations emboldened members of the established to be less trustful of 
migrant outsiders. Migrant outsiders were criminalised through the perceived 
inadequacies of current societal regulations (10.10.2011; 21.05.2015). In the 
21.05.2015 account, Cameron coerced employers to become government enforcers 
against the criminal threat of “illegal migrants”, or face societal sanction themselves. 
These articulations narrowed circles of association and increased circles of 
disassociation with migrant outsiders. Cameron called for a purge of illegal 
migrants from Britain that reasserted the domination of established groups 
(10.10.2011). He reaffirmed collective-nationalist attachments to “reclaim our 
borders” and falsely assumed that border regulations had been lost. Migrant 
outsiders were trapped within “the prison of error of identity”, where illegal 
immigrants should be expelled and ‘sent home’ (see Beck 2006: 25; c.f. Rosenberg 
2016). In 28.07.2016 account, May praised the deterrent effects of turning back 
“illegal economic migrants” in efforts to combat deviant behaviour such as people 





Masculine Vulnerabilities Propagated by Cameron 
 
Cameron cultivated masculinised orientations to justify harsher measures against 
migrant outsiders. He constantly repeated a desire for a “tough system” 
(19.02.2015), “one that doesn’t just sound tough, but is tough” (10.10.2011), 
because “it is too easy to be an illegal migrant in Britain” (25.05.2013).  
 
Cameron sought to sound and act ‘tough’ using bellicose language to satisfy other 
sections of the established groups. He expressed what Poynting and Donaldson 
(2005) have called the hegemonic masculinity122 of the ruling class: the set of beliefs 
that emphasised attachments towards masculine qualities of strength, toughness 
and shamefulness towards expressions of more feminine qualities of warmth and 
caring. This form of relations emerged from the particular societal dynamic of elite 
boarding schools123 and certain university colleges. It is described by George Orwell 
(2000)124 as “the pattern of school life — a continuous triumph of the strong over 
the weak. Virtue consisted in winning: it consisted in being bigger, stronger, 
handsomer, richer, more popular, more elegant, more unscrupulous than other 
people — in dominating them”. The following accounts showed how Cameron 
cultivated more masculinised orientations.  
 
“there are some people who come here and they are not 
planning to work hard, they are planning to take advantage 
of the system……. We’ve got to make sure that the housing 
system, that we are not handing over houses to people who 
don’t have a right to be here; that the health system, we are 
                                                 
122 Masculinised beliefs are not limited to leaders from Britain and the Commonwealth.  Dean (1998: 
29) notes that US President “John F.Kennedy’s career was premised on an “ideology of masculinity”; 
he used this ideology to justify his claim to presidential power. Employing culturally resonant images  
derived from America’s republican heritage, Kennedy constructed an aristocratic persona 
embodying the virtues of the stoic warrior-intellectual”. 
123 Cameron attended the prestigious Eton College 
124 This is taken from the essay Such, Such Were the Joys, the full passage is worth citing in full. “That 
was the pattern of school life — a continuous triumph of the strong over the weak. Virtue consisted 
in winning: it consisted in being bigger, stronger, handsomer, richer, more popular, more elegant,  
more unscrupulous than other people — in dominating them, bullying them, making them suffer 
pain, making them look foolish, getting the better of them in every way. Life was hierarchical and 
whatever happened was right. There were the strong, who deserved to win and always did win, and 
there were the weak, who deserved to lose and always did lose, everlastingly.” (Orwell 2000)  
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not giving health treatments to people who don’t have the 
right to be here; that we’re not giving legal aid to people that 
don’t have the right to be here. So this government has an 
immigration policy that is for every single department to act 
– on housing, on health, on education, on legal aid – so that 
we are no longer a soft touch. We are doing that, we’ve got 
a big immigration bill going through parliament and I’m 
confident that by the end of this government, you’ll be able to 
look back and say, ‘There may not have sorted out the whole 
problem, but they’ve got a much tougher approach on 
immigration that’s fair and that backs people who want to 
work hard and get on’”. (23.07.2013) 
 
“tougher controls, tougher policing of illegal migrants, 
make sure that – one of the things I said yesterday: if you’re 
here illegally, you shouldn’t be able to get a bank account, you 
shouldn’t be able to get a driving licence, you shouldn’t be 
able to get a council house, you shouldn’t be able to use the 
health service without paying, all of these things. We need 
not just a strong border control, we need to make sure our 
country is there for our own people and for people who have 
a right to come here, not for people who have no right to be 
here and who come illegally.” (30.07.2014)  
 
“we need to create the toughest possible system for dealing 
with abuse of free movement. That includes tougher and 
longer re-entry bans for fraudsters and people who collude in 
sham marriages. It means addressing the fact that it is easier 
for an EU citizen to bring a non-EU spouse to Britain than it is 
for a British citizen to do the same. It means stronger powers 
to deport criminals and stop them coming back, as well as 
preventing entry in the first place. And it means addressing 
ECJ judgments that have widened the scope of free 
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movement in a way that has made it more difficult to tackle 
this kind of abuse. But ultimately, if we are going to reduce the 
numbers coming here we need action that gives greater 
control of migration from the EU.” (10.11.2015) 
 
Each of the accounts above demonstrated masculinised depictions of relations 
between established groups and migrant outsiders. There was also a shift to 
promoting crueller, more insensitive forms of depicting migrants. In accounts 
23.07.2013 and 30.07.2014, Cameron discussed the intolerable presence of migrant 
outsiders: people that do not hold the same attitudes to ‘hard work’ and are plotting 
to exploit the goodwill and institutions of the established. The accounts expressed 
commodified understandings regarding the goodness of the established taxpayer, 
who contributed to societal goods such as the facilitation of everyday financial 
transactions, transport, societal housing, and healthcare. This characterisation was 
contrasted with the desire to deny the ‘illegal’ migrant outsider fr om accessing any 
of these functions, perpetuating their exclusion from British society. 
 
The constant repetition of bellicose language circulated suspicious risk narratives 
that limited access to public services by migrant outsiders.  This suspicion expanded 
into understandings of EU migration and the perceived abuse of Europeanised 
regulations on free movement. Cameron verbalised British perceptions of 
inferiority that EU citizens are more privileged than British citizens should they 
have a non-EU spouse (10.11.2015). He widened the perceived gap between 
European and British identifications, which became two mutually exclusive 
categories, Britain or Europe. The perceived abuse of Europeanised freer 
movement merged into a wider suspicion of supranational EU institutions, such as 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). European institutions like the ECJ became 
threats to the power of Cameron and his party-government establishment, and 






Net Migration Target & Migrant Outsider Objectification 
 
The focus on net migration objectified migrant outsiders. In the now infamous 
pledge to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands and to cap all forms of 
immigration into Britain (21.06.2011; 10.10.2011; 28.11.2014). Net migration 125 
entrapped almost every form human movement into and out of the UK, through the 
reductive dictum that less net migration is good, more net migration is bad.  
 
For Cameron and May126, the numerical symbolism of the net migration target 
circulated unrealistic expectations on their capacity to regulate the movement of 
migrant outsiders. Their language circulated double bind processes that entrapped 
themselves and their party-government establishment.  
 
The net migration pledge became an objectified expression of assertive societal 
regulation that validated the harmfulness of migrant outsiders and provided the 
illusion that these harms could be prevented. They staked their reputation on the 
fulfilment of a fantastical goal. If they abandoned the pledge, the embarrassment 
would threaten their place in the balance of societal power. This demonstrated the 
influence of tabloid newspapers such as the Daily Mail and UKIP, which the  
advocated for the continuation of the pledge (Travis 2017). If they fulfilled the 
pledge, it would crash the economy (Travis 2017). The following accounts showed 
the more harmful objectification of migrant outsiders through the focus on numbers 
of net migration.    
 
“Look, I basically agree with you. There are some benefits 
from being a country that can welcome people who want to 
come here and work hard, but I think over the last decade 
we’ve had an immigration policy that’s been completely lax. 
                                                 
125 It is conceivable that the focus on net migration could cultivate more constructive understandings  
of migrant outsiders, through broader awareness of the kinds of interdependent links shaping 
societal relations within and beyond British society. 
126 During the 2017 election campaign May was reported to say that Brexit will help achieve the net 




I mean the figures are actually quite frightening. If you look at 
the period between the year 2000, the year 2010, we basically 
were having net migration into the UK – that’s the difference 
between the number of people going to live in Spain or 
somewhere else and the number coming in – net migration of 
200,000 a year.….We’ve still got more to do. The number of 
that net migration figure, that 200,000, we’ve got it down by 
over a third, but I want to see it come down faster. And we are 
going to keep taking all the actions necessary so that we 
make sure that’s the case.” (23.07.2013) 
 
“So if we have proper immigration control, a proper skills and 
education policy, and welfare reform so that work pays, I 
believe we’ll see levels of migration fall, we’ll see net 
migration come back to the 10s of thousands, where it was 
in the 1980s, which also the benefit of immigration not being 
an issue in public life, which I would very much like that to be 
the case again.” (27.01.2014) 
 
“Today, net migration into Britain is running at 330,000 a 
year. That means adding as many as 3.5 million people to our 
population across a decade. And that’s what the concern is 
about. It’s not a concern about race, or colour, or creed. It’s a 
concern about numbers and pressure. And it’s the British 
people’s number one concern. And I don’t think for one 
minute they’re being unreasonable having this concern, 
indeed I share this concern because the pressure on public 
services, the pressure on communities has been too great.  
Now, of course, we need to do more to control migration from 
outside the European Union, and we’re doing that. But we do 
need to look at the situation within the European Union. Now 
I want to be clear: I support the idea of free movement. Many 
British people take advantage of free movement to go and live 
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and work in other European countries. But I think where this 
has gone wrong is that the interaction of our welfare system 
with free movement has actually set up very large pressures 
on our country, and that is what needs to change.” 
(21.01.2016) 
 
The objectified expressions of net migration disseminated imageries of abuse: the 
belief that migrant outsiders had abused established institutions. The 23.07.2013 
account balanced a limited openness to people who “can work hard”, yet 
predominantly spoke of the “frightening” scale of migration. These figures that 
justified a crusade to take “all actions necessary” to reduce numbers. Cameron 
cultivated more fearful understandings of migrant outsiders, whose presence was 
connected to deficiencies in welfare and education policy (23.07.2013; 27.01.2014). 
Net migration and the desire to return British society to the idealised conditions of 
the 1980s seemed to be a particular obsession for Cameron (27.01.2014). Control 
of numbers enhanced the power claims of the Cameron and May (who was Home 
Secretary under Cameron). (21.01.2016). Cameron and May framed the practice of 
net migration reduction as the only way to protect Britain and its beleaguered 
public services from threatening migrant outsiders. This measure sustained 
attachments to the collective-nationalist normative code and commitments to 
greater border protection regulations.  
 
The language of Cameron and May facilitated a vortex of catastrophic risk 
orientations that came to stigmatise many forms of transnational movement into 
Britain. This also encompassed the movement of people from Europe, setting the 
scene for an almost inevitable confrontation with the EU. The focus on the net 
migration127 target became a fetish that twisted interpretations of European 
migrants. Fears over Europe came to the forefront amid the range of broader 
societal fears associated with migrant outsiders.   
 
                                                 
127 As noted in the following remark. “But our action to cut migration from outside the EU has not 
been enough to meet our target of cutting the overall numbers to the tens of thousands. The figures  
yesterday demonstrate that again. As we’ve reduced the numbers coming to the UK from outside the 
European Union, the numbers from inside the European Union have risen.” (28.11.2014) 
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Continuation of Fear Constellations 
 
Migrant outsiders were stigmatised and scapegoated through connections with 
distinct yet often overlapping sets of societal fears. These fears were linked to areas 
that included healthcare, education, welfare dependency, family, terrorism and 
Europe. Cameron and May sustained a risk narrative marked by suspicion that 
justified the exclusion of migrant outsiders. For British leaders, migrant outsiders 
were convenient socio-political scapegoats for the anger, frustration and concerns 
of the insecure established about these six areas. Constant repetition of this web of 
fears left little room any alternative, less suspicious forms of thinking about 
transnational movement.   
 
Fears about healthcare and the movement of people were aroused by strong 
attachments to the NHS. People living in highly developed societies that have a form 
of universal health care like the NHS in Britain, develop degrees of attachment, 
dependence, and orientation around such collective institutions. There are 
corresponding feelings of distress should the perception arise that the NHS is, and 
could be, harmed. Cameron manipulated powerful emotional attachments to the 
NHS. He incited suspicions that migrant outsiders were harming a ‘national’ societal 
institution with accentuated appeals to the collective-nationalist normative code, 
for example in repetitive descriptions of pressures on hospitals (see account 
10.10.2011b; 28.11.2014; 09.12.2015). In the following account, he also cultivated 
an imagery of abuse through the notion of ‘health tourists’.    
 
“Our National Health Service, our NHS, is one of this country’s 
greatest assets. And it’s right that when people come here 
legitimately, they should be able to use it. But we should be 
clear. What we have is a free national health service, not a 
free international health service. So, let me put it very 
simply: we’re going to get much better at proper reciprocal 
charging. Wherever we can claim back the cost of NHS care, 
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we will. If someone visiting the UK from another EEA128 
country uses our NHS, then it is right that they or their 
government pay for it. British taxpayers should support 
British families and those who contribute to our economy. 
And for migrants from outside the EEA, we want to introduce 
stricter charging or a requirement for private health 
insurance to cover the costs of NHS care.” (25.05.2013)  
 
In the account above, Cameron channelled collective-nationalist attachments to the 
NHS that saw non-EU migrants and EU migrants as a financial burdens to 
established groups in British society, which their own governments should pay for. 
He accentuated insecurities about the NHS, in the context of broader events such as 
the junior doctors strike of 2016 (Horton 2017) as well as ongoing funding cuts and 
efficiency savings (see BMA 2016). Doctors and nurses were enlisted to become 
immigration control agents129. These measures twisted traditional societal 
reflections about the ongoing contribution of migrants to the development of the 
NHS (see Bivins 2015; Trewby 2017; O’Dowd 2017).  Fears over the fu ture of the 
NHS became fears about migrant outsiders, who became scapegoats for any 
perceived shortfalls.    
 
Fears about the movement of people also affected education systems in two ways. 
The first fear about education was an unquantified belief that the  movement of 
people pressurised primary and secondary schools (10.10.2011b; 28.11.2014; 
09.12.2015; 17.01.2017). Cameron spoke about primary schools “where [a] dozen 
of languages are spoken, with only a small minority speaking English as their first 
language130” (28.11.2014), as though British children would bear negative 
                                                 
128 European Economic Area   
129The BMA (2016: 11) has noted that “the option of further extending charges for overseas visitors 
and migrants who use the NHS, which is expected to save £500 million per year by 2017/18.40 The 
BMA is concerned that these changes could end up generating more costs than savings. Not only  is 
it likely to cause confusion among patients, it will also require GPs and hospital doctors to spend 
more time on the paperwork and bureaucracy needed to regulate charges. Most importantly, no 
patient with a serious health need should be deterred from seeing a doctor, especially if their 
condition poses a public health risk”.   
130 To my recollection, Cameron has never visited a primary school in Wales that are bilingual in 
Welsh and English.  
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consequence from the sounds of languages other than English. For Cameron, those 
‘other languages’ confirmed a lack of adherence to established group prioritisation 
of English as the primary mode of communication and as the means of societal 
integration. 
 
The second fear involved the targeting of so-called “bogus colleges131” (10.10.2011; 
25.05.2013). It was a belief in widespread abuses within the tertiary education 
sector: “we put in place some restrictions so that students can come, but they must 
be genuine students to genuine universities. We’ve closed down dozens of bogus 
colleges” (05.04.2016). The fear of non-genuine students in British universities was 
further expressed in the following account:    
 
“let’s keep hold of the good and positive immigration , 
people like yourself coming here, studying in university, 
wanting to work afterwards in a graduate job.  Let’s keep that, 
but we must deal with the illegal immigration and with the 
bogus colleges which has brought forward the 
problem……we must try and keep control of what had 
become a very large industry of really almost quite illegal 
immigration, people coming over supposedly to study but 
actually to go into different parts of the labour market.  So I 
think we can get this right, I really do, and I profoundly 
believe we can get the numbers to a place where people 
have much more confidence in the system than they do 
now.” (24.03.2011). 
 
The account above placed suspicion on every international student studying in the 
UK (including the author himself) and reinforced collective-nationalist attachments 
to established tertiary education institutions. The references to “good and positive 
immigration” exemplified the habituated legacy of imperial colonisation processes, 
                                                 
131 Noting the targeting of bogus colleges, Partos and Bale (2015: 174) remark that. “Nowhere is the 
mismatch between the Conservatives’ appreciation of the potential economic benefits of the influx 
of highly skilled, highly educated individuals, on the one hand, and their desire to respond to worries  
about numbers more generally, on the other, so glaring”. 
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where elite members of colonised peoples could experience and, ideally, become 
‘civilised’ in the metropole. This positive understanding was clouded by the 
presumption that migrant outsiders were deceiving established education 
institutions and threatening a vulnerable labour market. It stigmatised migrant 
outsiders who have moved to Britain for education purposes, through the link to 
economic vulnerabilities. The focus on bogus colleges showed how education fears 
were subsumed within the objectified reduction of many forms of human 
movement into Britain.  In 2012, London Metropolitan University was banned 132 
from accepting non-EU international students due the fact that a small minority of 
international students lacked adequate documentation (Meikle and Malik 2012). 
This extreme sanction prompted in the creation of a specific functionary within 
universities: the Compliance Officer133 whose role was to ensure the adherence to 
regulations prescribed by a government establishment highly suspicious of migrant 
outsiders.   
 
Fears about welfare dependency and the movement of people were linked to the 
notion that migrant outsiders were burdens on scarce societal resources.  Cameron 
manipulated attachments towards the distribution of welfare benef its134. The 
consistent obsession over welfare135 by Cameron’s party-government 
establishment turned a more humanitarian provision of assistance to others, into a 
collective-nationalist question of scarce societal resources. He increased the 
eligibility criteria for welfare benefits. This disciplined insecure sections of 
established groups, who are partial outsiders in the eyes of his party-government 
establishment due their dependence on social welfare. He also directed the 
discontent of insecure sections of the established onto harmful depictions of 
                                                 
132 There is a ‘sword of Damocles’ hanging over every university in Britain: “We will revoke licences 
from colleges and businesses which fail to do enough to prevent large numbers of migrants that they  
sponsor overstaying their visas.” (28.11.2014) 
133 A University of Bath job advert from 2014 notes that purpose of the role is to ensure that the 
university  
“maintains its status as a Highly Trusted Sponsor under Tier 4 of the Home Office’s Points Based 
System (PBS). The post-holder’s responsibility will be to ensure the University’s adherence to Home 
Office requirements and internal policies for the attendance monitoring of current students. S/he 
will also be expected to support a range of Home Office related work across other areas of the 
University, as directed by their line-manager.” (HR 2014).  
134 This is what Andersen and Bjørklund have called “welfare state chauvinism” in their study of the 
far-right Progress parties in Denmark and Norway (1990: 212).  
135 See Slater’s account of the “myth of “Broken Britain” (2014) 
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migrant outsiders, (28.11.2014; 29.05.2015 see also 10.10.2011; 30.07.2014; 
04.03.2014). Cameron stigmatised insecure sections of the established that were 
dependant on welfare and endowed them with undesirable qualities such as 
laziness and greediness, behaviour that closely resembled that of children with the 
same power disparities. His attempt to coerce insecure sections of the established 
‘into work’ was enhanced by predatory depictions of migrant outsiders, as in the 
following account:   
 
“And to get people back to work, we’ve also introduced a 
much tougher approach to immigration. Those who are 
starry-eyed about the benefits of globalisation refuse to see 
the link between uncontrolled immigration and mass 
welfare dependency. But when you had a welfare system 
that effectively allowed large numbers of British people to 
choose not to work136, and an immigration system that 
encouraged people from across the world to come here to 
work, the results were predictable.”  (10.06.2013) 
 
The account above bound fears about welfare dependence to harmful 
understandings of migrant outsiders. These depictions relied on what Slater (2014: 
964) called the myth of a “Broken Britain” and mythologisation  of societal 
catastrophe that “manufactured ignorance” of any alternative forms of welfare 
reform in Britain. He highlights the influence of the think tank Centre for Societal 
Justice (CSJ) founded by Conservative MP and former leader Ian Duncan Smith. The  
CSJ cultivated a reductive understanding of British society through references to 
“behavioural filters of family breakdown, out-of-wedlock, childbirth, worklessness, 
dependency, anti-societal behaviour, personal responsibility, addiction, and 
teenage pregnancies”. Insecure members of the established that were dependant, 
or may have been denied access to government assistance were persuaded to direct 
                                                 
136 This is a reference to workfare, a form of welfare reform implemented in the US inspired by the 
work of scholar Lawrence Mead, who according to Standing was enlisted as soon as the 
Conservatives took power (Standing 2010:143 cited in Slater 2014: 958).  Mead’s work shows the 
persistence of a highly strict, austere form of thinking that can be traced back to English Puritans  
from the voyage of the Mayflower.   
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their frustrations onto fictitious portrayals of migrant outsiders, some of whom 
were transformed into benefit tourists preying on scarce societal resources of both 
work and welfare (20.10.2013; 13.12.2013; 27.02.2014; 27.06.2014; 30.07.2014). 
Stigmatised insecure sections of the established became stigmatisers themselves as 
Cameron emphasised established fears over welfare dependency, with migrant 
outsiders the convenient scapegoats.  
 
Fears about family/household with the movement of people were also linked with 
concerns about the practice of forced marriages. The development of marriage as a 
societal institution formed part of the broader moulding of affects in what has 
become known as the household137 with demarcated spaces for familial and sexual 
relations between men and women (see Elias 2012a [1939]: 178-181). Evolving 
understandings of marriage illustrate the ongoing spurts and counter spurts of 
intersectional gender, colonial138, race and class power relations. The conduct of 
forced marriage has connotations of unsuppressed violence and clashes with the 
desire for more equal power relations between men and women in societies like 
Britain. The term ‘forced’ undermines the values embedded in the term ‘marriage’, 
as a more freely chosen bond between two people motivated by forms of love 139.  
 
Forced marriage became an exemplar of harmful behaviour committed by migra nt 
outsiders. This reinforced broader efforts to restrict family migration that trapped 
both EU and non-EU movement (see Sirriyeh 2015; account 10.11.2015 mentioned 
earlier). Cameron’s language verbalised doubts about the marriages between 
migrant outsiders by dismissing those believed to be engaged in “sham marriages” 
(28.11.2014; 10.11.2015; 19.02.2016; 23.02.2016). Cameron bound established 
fears about the societally valued institution of marriage, onto suspicious 
impressions of migrant outsiders, as in following account.  
 
                                                 
137 See Owens (2015) for a discussion of oikonomia the language of household governance.  
138 See Turner (2015).  
139 Marriage practices can include more than just feelings of romantic love, but also the desire for a 
“better life” and societal advancement, see Beck-Gernsheim (2011) who notes the shift towards  
more instrumentalised understandings of marriage.   
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“We’re also consulting on how to tackle abuse of the system 
to make sure that family migrants who come here are in a 
genuine relationship with their partner…….Now, of course 
the most grotesque example of a relationship that isn’t 
genuine is a forced marriage, which is of course completely 
different from an arranged marriage where both partners 
consent, or a sham marriage where the aim is to circumvent 
immigration control or make a financial gain. Forced 
marriage is little more than slavery….Now those involved 
in this area – voluntary bodies and others – do warn that if 
you go straight to criminalisation of the whole edifice you 
could actually get less people coming forward because they 
don’t want to shop their parents effectively…...So we’re saying 
here we’re going to criminalise anyone who breaches a forced 
marriages order……..so we make forced marriages 
something that simply doesn’t exist in the UK – and it 
shouldn’t.  In a civilised country in the 21st century, it’s a 
completely unacceptable practice.” (10.10.2011) 
 
The account above defended the criminalisation of forced marriage citing the 
humanist-egalitarian code through humanitarian desires to emancipate people 
from a practice “little more than slavery”140. These attachments swung to collective-
nationalist attachments. Cameron idealised Britain as a “civilised country in the 
21st century” that resisted harmful migrant outsiders engaged forced marriages 
through harsh societal sanctions. The criminal stigmatisation of forced marriage  
can further marginalise of already ostracised ethnic communities 141, obscuring the 
fact that the practice effects a broad range of societal groups (Chantler et. al. 2017: 
599), as well as overlooking the power relations that unpin this coercive practice. It  
can also ignore the more active forms of resistance from women fleeing forced 
marriages and citing their resistance as part of their asylum claim (Honkala 2017: 
181). Cameron helped maintain a suspicious risk narrative about migrant outsiders 
                                                 
140 See Linklater (2017: 251-264) on longstanding campaigns against the slave trade. 
141 For example South Asian communities experiencing the projection of fears such as terrorism.  
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and the movement of their families through fears that those bounds are formed 
under false pretences.    
 
Apprehensions about globalised violence and the movement of people interwove 
concerns over communal violence and the presence of migrant outsiders. Many 
members of British society have become accustomed to the absence of violence in 
their everyday lives, and react with shock and distress when made aware of 
unexpected extreme violence within and beyond Britain. More insecure members 
of British society seem highly attuned to incidences of transnational violence and 
prone to transferring violence fears into migrant fears. This has emerged in 
unexpected places for example in the case of Faizah Shaheen detained on a 
commercial aircraft for reading the book Syria Speaks: Art and Culture from the 
Frontline142 a collection work by over fifty Syrian artists and writers (Cain 2016).  
There were six notable occurrences of terrorist violence in Britain during this 
phase. Four examples of jihadist violence in London and Manchester (BBC 2014; 
Guardian Staff 2017; Ross 2017; Parveen 2017) and far -right violence with the 
murder of Labour MP Jo Cox and the case of mosque bomber Pavlo Lapsuyn (Cobain 
and Taylor 2016; BBC 2013). In all these incidents, the perpetrators were relative 
“outsiders” in relations with established groups in the UK (Dunning 2016: 41). 
Portrayals of migrant outsiders were easily entangled with the awareness of 
transitional violence, as in the following accounts: 
 
“when a country like Somalia fractures and breaks, that 
affects us not just in the region, not just the terrorism 
threatened on our streets or the flows of mass 
immigration” (10.06.2013).   
 
“Just as we need the United Nations to modernise to meet the 
challenges of terrorism in the 21st Century, so we also need 
to adapt if we are to fashion a truly global response to the 
                                                 
142 The cover image was probably the trigger. It was a poster by the artists collective Alshaab alsori 
aref tarekh, depicting a covered face wielding a slingshot followed by Islamic calligraphy (see Halasa 
et. al.  2014). 
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mass movements of people across the world and the 
implications this brings for security and human rights.” 
(20.09.2016) 
 
In both of these accounts, references to terrorism and migration co -exist in the same 
sentence. This connotation raised the possibility that migrant outsiders are 
harbingers of transnational violence. In account 10.06.2013, Cameron’s reference 
to “our streets” is particularly visceral, coming a month after the murder of Fusilier 
Lee Rigby who was hacked to death on the streets of Woolwich, south London.  
Whether directly or indirectly the possibility of violence is related to allusions of 
“mass immigration”. In account 20.09.2016, May reinforced the objectification of 
migrant outsiders. It became conceivable that reductions in migration equated to 
reductions in terrorism, which would prevent more ‘violence on the streets’. What 
emerged was a brutalised image of migrant outsiders, who become scapegoats in 
the aftermath of violence.  
 
Depictions of European migrants became infused with fears about a weak and 
fragile Europe.  There were continuing references to nationalised fantasies of 
Britain as an island143, which cultivated an ignorance of the societal changes and 
thickening of the chains of interdependence that bound Britain with Europe. These 
fantastical depictions were enhanced by depictions of an insecure southern 
European border bringing “more terrorism, more immigration” (27.05.2011), as in 
the following account: 
 
“And of course the war in Syria has unleashed a wave of 
migration towards Europe which we see night after night 
on our television screens. Britain has never joined the 
Schengen border-free zone, so we retain our border 
controls. This, and our geographical status as an island, 
means we are less directly affected than other European 
countries by this crisis. Our agreement with France, as a 
                                                 
143 Also see Simms (2016) 
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fellow EU member, means that our main border control with 
continental Europe effectively operates now at Calais, not 
Dover. And our decision to admit 20,000 Syrian refugees 
from the camps was a British national sovereign decision.”  
(10.11.2015; 12.12.2011) 
 
In the account above Cameron made a masculinised contrast between a strong 
Britain and a weak Europe. It speaks of unstable developments in international 
society with the repercussions of the Syrian Civil War through ‘waves’ of people. He 
portrayed the Schengen zone as a source of strong weakness144 that made European 
societies highly vulnerable to waves and ‘swarms’ of harmful transnational 
movement. This depiction of European weakness was contrasted with the declared 
strength of British society linked to the rejection of membership in the Schengen 
area and the supremacy of nationalised borders that extends into France. There 
were vague references to fears about a fragile Europe weakened by broader 
vulnerabilities such as the Euro-zone crisis. This widened circles of disassociation 
between Britain and Europe. The projection of a fragile Europe functioned in 
parallel with depictions of harmful Europeanised movement. European migrant 
outsiders were interpreted as catastrophic risks to established groups in Britain.  
 
In similar ways to Blair, Cameron and May used aquatic metaphors that emphasised 
the onrushing pace and scale of harmful transnational movement. In phrases such 
as “waves of migration/immigration” (28.07.2010; 22.09.2011; 04.03.2014 
26.06.2015); “flows of mass immigration” (10.06.2013; 28.05.2015; 29.05.20 15; 
09.02.2017); “largest wave of migration in our country’s history” (25.05.2013); “the 
demands of ever greater numbers flooding in” (10.10.2011). The last phrase from 
account 10.10.2011 simultaneously invoked a spiritualised onrushing force with 
visceral imaginings of drowning and predatory Viking-esque raiders seeking more 
plunder in destructive behaviour that impoverishes Britain. 
 
                                                 
144 Again this another inversion that ignores the development of more equal power relation among 
European societies, by reinforcing attachments towards British nationalised supremacy.   
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In a Judeo-Christian influenced society like Britain, the consistent use of aquatic 
metaphors began to parallel a scene from the book of Genesis, with the Cameron 
acting out the role of Noah. At the height of the European migration crisis of 2015, 
Cameron and the then Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond used the phases of 
‘swarms’ and ‘marauders’ (BBC 2015a; BBC 2015b). Pasha (2017: 322) remarks 
that the language of ‘swarms’ demonstrates the refurbishment of “civilizational 
binaries” that test liberal notions of hospitality. When people movements are 
understood as mythical ‘floods’ and ‘swarms’. These interpretations can reduce 
societal restraints on behaviours such as violence and verbal abuse, contracting the 
space for emotive identification. References to the web of fears gave insecure 
sections of the established increased reasons to reject migrant outsiders.  
 
Nationalised Laws: The Rejection of Europe  
 
For Cameron and May, the EU became an adversarial threat to British society. There 
was a consistent targeting of EU migrants based on the fears about welfare 
dependency, education and healthcare (10.11.2015; 19.02.2016). Cameron 
remarked that “so I think deal with the welfare tourism and we’ll deal with some of 
the problem of EU migration” (30.07.2014); “around 40 percent of all recent 
European Economic Area migrants are supported by the UK benefits system” 
(10.11.2015). Both of these accounts channel “welfare chauvinistic” claims (a term 
coined by Andersen and Bjørklund 1990: 212). Cameron implied that Europeanised 
movement was a burden to the established of British society by siphoning societal 
resources that could be better spent on other more deserving members of the 
established groups. His assertion cultivated greater ignorance of points made by 
studies such as Dustmann and Frattini’s (2014: 596) analysis of fiscal impacts of 
immigration. This study noted how “immigrants who arrived since 2000, especially 
those from EEA countries, have – through their positive net fiscal contributions – 
helped to reduce the fiscal burden for native workers”. At the height of the surge in 
support for the Leave campaign during the 2016 EU Referendum, an adviser to 
Cameron was reported to have said that “I can’t believe people are really going to 
vote themselves poorer because they don’t like the Poles living next door,” 
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(McTague et. al. 2016). Before the 2016 Referendum, Cameron gave people ample 
reasons to dislike ‘the Poles’ (from the EEA) living next door.  
 
Cameron and May were blinded by belief in the superiority of Britain over Europe. 
Their collective-nationalist attachments intensified broader power struggles with 
the EU. These struggles culminated in ‘the four no’s’. No to closer integration, no to 
the Eurozone (as well as financial assistance countries with the Euro), no to EU 
rules/laws and no to Schengen. Each of these no’s represented idealised national 
symbols and attachments: an independent Britain, with the British pound as 
currency, governed by British/English laws, demarcated by British borders. “Out of 
the open borders. Out of the bailouts. Out of the euro. And out of all those schemes 
in which Britain wants no part.” (19.02.2016; 22.05.2015). Cameron articulated the 
threat that if Europe does not comply with British demands that are from a “major 
European player”, then it is possible that Britain would withdrawal from Europe 
(29.05.2015). He relied on the simultaneous sense of superiority over Europe and 
vulnerabilities about Europe. 
 
This phase of British history also saw increased support for UKIP. Dennison and 
Goodwin (2015: 173, 183) have noted that leader Nigel Farage fused the desire to 
control immigration with questions about Britain’s EU membership, arguing that 
immigration could not be controlled unless Britain left the EU. The fusion of 
suspicions over migration and misgivings about Europe was not a unique quality of 
UKIP. It was only that Farage more explicitly placed migration and Europe at the 
forefront of his party’s bid for greater power, expressing more clearly, the desires 
embedded within the language of Cameron and May.  
 
Vulnerabilities about national borders were interdependently bound up with 
vulnerabilities about “our laws” and the perceived superiority of legalised British 
societal controls. Reference to “our laws” became a symbol for expressions of 
collective attachment that was seemingly threatened by the presence of 
Europeanised societal regulations. Cameron set up a false disjuncture where British 
laws were deemed far superior to the European laws. In account 01.10.2014, 
Cameron used the problem of migration from the EU, as a foil to discuss the 
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regaining of lost nationalised attachments/powers from Europe. He voiced fears 
about the decline of British society, reinforced with the pledge of an in/out 
referendum, and interwoven with dissatisfaction of rulings made by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This institution is separate from the ECJ, yet 
became understood as a threat to the exclusive nationalised authority of Britain’s 
Parliament. Cameron projected the superiority of nationalised values and rulings 
over those made by “judges in Strasbourg145” (01.10.2014), because “not enough 
account is being taken of democratic decisions by national parliaments” 
(25.01.2012).  
 
Cameron confused the distinctions between ECtHR in Strasburg and the ECJ based 
in Luxemburg both of whom can be referred to as ‘the European Court’ 146.  This 
misunderstanding had wider consequences. It fuelled a growing separation 
between Britain and the EU. Cameron demonstrated an ignorance of Britain’s role 
in the ECtHR forgetting that there have been eight national judges from Britain on 
the ECtHR since 1959 (3 of whom were President), second only to the 
Netherlands147. As well as an ignorance of post-war European history, Cameron 
gave limited reflections on Britain’s role in the creation of European Convention on 
Human Rights (hereafter the Convention), and the ECtHR (Simpson 2004; Bates 
2010).  Simpson (2004: 5) notes that “its adoption was seen as a feather in the cap 
of the Foreign Office, rather than as a weapon which might be directed against the 
United Kingdom”. The notion of the Convention as a weapon against Britain is 
exactly what Cameron seemed to believe or wanted others to believe.   
 
The dispute with both the ECJ and ECtHR became entrapped in the masculinised 
and objectified vortex of harmful risk orientations that fuelled commitments to the 
collective-nationalist normative code. Cameron expressed the insecure belief that 
                                                 
145 In a building designed by British architect Lord Richard Rogers. 
146 The ECJ governs broader compliance, ensuring the consistency of interpretation of EU law and 
treaties across all EU members, including compliance with the principle of free movement (see 
account 10.11.2015). The ECtHR is bound to the Council of Europe which has 47 member states  
providing judgements on state and individual violations of civil and political rights set out in the 
European Convention on Human Rights this includes both EU and non-EU citizens.   
147 The Netherlands has had 9 judges, Denmark, Ireland, Luxemburg have all had 7 judges on the 
EHCJ since 1959.  
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features of the Convention were a threat to Britain from the ECtHR, for example, in 
challenges to Article 8 the right to family life. “We will extend our new policy of 
deport first, appeal later to cover all immigration appeals where a so-called right to 
family life is invoked” (28.11.2014). Another remark stated that. “If you read the 
European Convention on Human Rights it says nothing about deportation.  It has 
been extended and expanded by judge after judge, lawyer after lawyer, and 
sometimes it is flying in the face of common sense” (17.12.2010). Rulings of the 
ECtHR offended Cameron’s nationalised attachments, because they did not assist 
his desire to reduce net migration and rid Britain of migrant outsiders  whose 
presence was deemed unacceptable. Confusion about the ECtHR and antagonisms 
over its immigration rulings became bound to fears over Europe interwoven with 
stigmatisations of Europeanised movement as well as other the transnational 




British Prime Ministers from 2001 to 2017 propagated more closed socio-
psychological fortifications, which accentuated the vulnerabilities of particular 
groups within British society.  
 
As the years progressed, British leaders disseminated desires for harsher, more 
brutalised sanctions on the transnational movement of people. This vortex included 
refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, EU migrants and many shades of 
professionalised societal occupations. It is foreseeable that European citizens may 
become the targets of further stigmatisation, which, if unchecked raises the 
possibility of the loss of human life and property.  There are possibilities that a post-
Brexit UK may leave the Council of Europe if British leaders continue to express 
offence at the rulings of the ECtHR, rejecting its’ more open orientations and 
embracing further attachments to nationalised laws. The overall arc of development 
showed a British society that is less open and feels less secure. British Prime 
Ministers have circulated less open and less secure modes of thinking and 




This chapter examined the migration language of British Prime Ministers David 
Cameron and Theresa May from 2010 to 2017. I investigated their speeches, 
interviews and press conferences.  
 
I have argued that the language of Cameron and May expanded the socio-
psychological fortifications in British society. They articulated a widening net of 
harmful catastrophic understandings of transnational movement. The 
reconstruction of the societal processes embedded in their language demonstrates 
the continued expansion of reductive modes of thinking that mobilised shared 
anxieties. Commodified depictions of migrant outsiders were interconnected with 
attachments to the collective-nationalist normative code. Migrant outsiders became 
characterised as risks to established sections of British society.  
 
Societal orientations were dominated by more harmful risk orientations. Cameron 
and May criminalised migrant outsiders and cultivated more masculinised 
orientations, which sustained the reduction of net migration. Fears about 
healthcare, education, welfare dependency, marriage, terrorism, and Europe 
widened circles of disassociation, which legitimised the stigmatisation of migrant 
outsiders and further strained relations with the EU.  
 
The next two chapters will evaluate the migration of language of Australian Prime 
Ministers John Howard, Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott and Malcolm 
Turnbull. The language of British and Australian leaders from 2001 to 2017 showed 
the development of similar societal processes.  As well as some differences bound 
to the distinctive state-formation processes experienced by British and Australian 
society. Chapter 5 and 6 utilise the same model for shared anxieties to illustrate the 
socio-psychological tensions in Australian society through formulations of 
interdependency and power relations nexuses developed by process and risk 





Chapter 5.                                                                                    
An Investigation into the Major Public Migration 
Speeches by John Howard (2001-2007) and             
Kevin Rudd (2007-2010) 
 
The last two chapters reconstructed the societal processes in the migration 
language of British Prime Ministers Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Cameron and 
Theresa May. These leaders spanned a period of British history from 2001 to 2017. 
This assessment used a process and risk sociological approach to understand the 
development of shared anxieties and the fortified societal orientations in British 
society. The language of British Prime Ministers mobilised shared anxieties, 
through the commodification of migrant outsiders and conflicting appeals to 
humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist normative codes. The greater swing 
to collective-nationalist attachments  propagated the notion that migrant outsiders 
were harmful catastrophic risks to British society. British leaders dominated 
societal orientations through criminalised and objectified risk orientations of 
migrant outsiders. Broader societal fears widened circles of disassociation that 
stigmatised migrant outsiders and further separated relations with the EU.  
 
My fifth chapter evaluates the migration language of Australian Prime Ministers 
John Howard (2001-2007) and Kevin Rudd (2007-2010). These leaders covered a 
period of Australian history from 2001 to 2010. My investigation further expands 
the model for shared anxieties developed in Chapters 1 and 2 to understand the 
socio-psychological tensions in Australian society. The vocabulary of process and 
risk sociology and model of independency and power relations nexuses enables the 
reconstruction of the societal processes affecting Australian society. This 
reconstructions uses evidence taken from the speeches, interviews and press 
conferences of Howard and Rudd.   
 
The statements of Howard make up the majority of primary references in my 
investigation. He represented a conservative Coalition government that consisted  
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of the more urban Liberal Party and the mainly rural National Party (hereafter the 
Coalition). Rudd represented the Australian Labor148 Party. Despite his repeated 
claims of abolishing the ‘Pacific Solution’ undertaken by Howard that incarcerated 
the ‘problem’ of asylum seekers into detention centres at Nauru and Manus Island, 
in Papua New Guinea (14.10.2009a; 14.10.2009b). Rudd maintained a system for 
the mandatory detention of asylum seekers at a facility on Christmas Island, an 
Australian External Territory in the Indian Ocean 350km south of Java and Sumatra 
and 1,550km north-west of the closest point on the Australian mainland.  
 
Howard and Rudd preserved a long-standing practice introduced by the Keating 
government in 1992, which enshrined the compulsory detention of people arriving 
in Australia without a visa. The Keating government turned the possibility 149of 
imprisonment because of insufficient travel papers into a reality150 (Betts 2003; 
Crock 1993). Successive Australian governments led by Howard and Rudd 
maintained a system of detaining people first, then processing their claims later, in 
isolated places far removed from major population centres on the east coast of 
mainland Australia. Their language widened circles of disassociation and set the 
tone for the policies, practices and societal expectations that moulded relations in 
Australian society.  
 
I argue that the migration language of Prime Ministers Howard and Rudd fortified 
Australian society. More harmful interpretations of transnational movement 
circulated narrower forms of societal association and widened forms of 
disassociation in Australian society. The language and rhetorical performances of 
Australian leaders mobilised shared anxieties and fortified more reductive modes 
of thinking and narrow societal orientations, through more accentuated collective-
nationalist attachments such as border protection, mandatory detention practices 
and expressions of wider established group fears in Australian society. 
 
                                                 
148 The Australian Labor Party chose the Americanised spelling to differentiate itself.  
149 From the the 1958 Migration Act.  
150 Through the 1992 Migration Amendment Act. 
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When comparing language of British and Australian leaders, three sets of 
similarities and two sets of differences became apparent.   
 
The first interconnection is that similar societal processes reconstructed from the 
migration language of British Prime Ministers were present in the language of  
Australian Prime Ministers. These included the commodification of migrant 
outsiders, pressures of cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and de-
cosmopolitanised collective-nationalist normative codes, which framed the 
development of criminalised and objectified risk orientations.   
 
The second interconnection encompasses the particular pressures of leadership 
and wider societal coordination functions. British and Australian leaders  practiced 
highly involved short-term styles of leadership that blamed, most notably members 
of the political opposition for the development of harmful transnational people 
movements in their respective societies. The material illustrates the high degrees 
of insecure orientations of the leaders themselves and their wider party-
government establishment, which was amplified by their status as a coordinator of 
wider societal functions. They consistently attempted to redirect societal 
attachments towards themselves and away from other areas of society that resisted 
their policies against harmful migrant outsiders.  
 
The third interconnection is that leaders in Britain and Australia confused the 
pursuit of narrower party political survival into efforts to maintain the existence 
wider society as a whole. This is one reason why the humanist-egalitarian code did 
not moderate or restrain persistent oscillations to the collective-nationalist code. 
This also highlights the continuing socio-emotive resonance of national symbols in 
these societies. How it is relatively easy to arouse public support through circulating 
nationalised attachments, yet maintaining that support meant escalating policies to 
validate their nationalist credentials. The fortified orientations propagated by 
British and Australian leaders left little room for deeper alternative attachments 
that did not aid their pursuit of party political survival. Material from their speeches 
and rhetorical performances showed no detectable reflection or contemplation that 
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their practices may contribute to the same ‘problems’ of people movement that they 
are so determined to address.   
 
The first difference was references in the material to the wider interdependencies 
from the regionalised contexts situating British and Australian society. This 
corresponds to the shifting power relations and forms of secure-insecure 
orientations between British and Australian societies their respective regions, 
Europe in the case of Britain and Asia in the case of Australia. State-societal 
formations and nationalised symbols that make up Britain and Australia emerged 
relatively intact from the major events of the 20th century most notably the Second 
World War. European societies and the societies of Southeast Asia and the South 
Pacific underwent wide reaching societal changes through processes and 
experiences for example of decolonisation, industrialisation and becoming the site 
of Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.  
 
The migration representations from British leaders were more recognisably bound 
to the thickening interdependencies and power relations of Britain’s relationship 
with Europe. British leaders seemed to be unwilling and/or unable to grasp the 
societal changes in Europe. Most notably the sophisticated legal-constitutional 
development of the EU. They clung onto past images and symbols of nationalist 
power supremacy through a system of opt-outs, and when those were deemed 
insufficient alongside articulations of ‘the four  no’s’ (see Chapter 4) ‘Brexit’ becomes 
the only option.     
 
The migration representations of Australian leaders were less identifiably bound to 
the wider relations with Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Australia has no land 
border with Asia, unlike Britain and the Euro Tunnel with France. The ambiguous 
maritime boundaries that interconnected Australia with Southeast Asia and the 
South Pacific were interdependent with the maintenance of socio-psychological 
boundaries between Australia and its neighbours.  
 
The development of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) with its 
emphasis on more fortified notions of national sovereignty that freed authoritarian 
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elites from internal and external challenges (see Davies 2018) has fed into the socio-
psychological isolation and unawareness communicated in the language of 
Australian leaders. It is only through the brief moments of asylum seeker arrival 
that longstanding insecure orientations of established groups in Australia vis -à-vis 
Asia became apparent (Viviani 1996; Walker 1999; Walker and Sobocinska 2012 
eds).  
 
Where relations with Southeast Asia have been kept at a fluctuating distance. The 
insecure orientations of Australia’s party-government establishments have been 
more visible in the South Pacific, most notability through the ‘arc of instability’  
thesis that saw unstable decolonised Pacific states as ‘risks’ to Australian society, 
prompting intervention for example in the form of RAMSI in the Solomon Islands  
and ongoing financial development assistance (Shibuya 2006; Wallis 2012). The 
growth of detention centres on Nauru and Manus Island illustrates the regional 
power differentials between Australia and its South Pacific neighbours , which 
maintains nationalised colonial Australian identifications.  
 
The second difference was the particular stigmatisation of migrant outsiders. 
British leaders stigmatised migrant outsiders with more tangible sets of fears, 
linked to particular societal functions such as the provision of healthcare. Australian 
leaders stigmatised asylum seeker outsiders with less tangible societal fears, such 
as queue jumping from highly strict forms of organisation characteristic of 
immobile politico-economic settler citizen identifications.  
 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section explains the development of 
reductive modes of thinking in Australian society, through the mobilisation of 
shared anxieties. The second section explains the growth of narrow societal 
orientations, and the development of socio-psychological fortifications in 







Mobilisation of Shared Anxieties by Howard & Rudd 
 
The following section illustrates the development of reductive modes of thinking in 
Australia. Open and closed attitudes to transnational migration have suffused the 
societal conscience formations of Australian society. Howard and Rudd directed the 
understandings of established groups with a combination of techno -economic 
bourgeois and politico-economic citoyen settler identifications, which commodified 
depictions of transnational outsiders. They gave superficial appeals that channelled 
the humanist-egalitarian code through references to Australia’s international 
humanitarian obligations to refugees. These attachments swung to the collective -
nationalist code through commitments to border protection. Transnational 
outsiders were interpreted as more harmful catastrophic risks to insecure sections 
of established groups in Australian society.  
 
Australian Societal Conscience Formation 
 
Colonisation processes and people movements contextualised Australian societal 
conscience formations into the modern era. Manning (2013) writes that from the 
year 1700 through to the year 2000 there was the acceleration of voluntary and 
involuntary labour movement of people variously classified as slaves, convicts, 
workers, refugees. Australian state-society developed within this 200 year period 
from the colonial settlements of convicts and free settlers from the British Isles from 
1788 onwards. Steady migration culminated in the federation of the Australian 
colonies in 1901. The descendants of these oldcomer groups became the nuclei  of 
established groups in Australian society.  
 
Colonial convict-settler established groups had a shallow awareness of how 
globalised interdependencies reciprocally affected localised interdependencies the 
high power ratio, which they held within Australian society.    
 
The White Australia policy from 1901 to 1975 codified a particular balance of 
societal relations with a mainly Anglo-Celtic establishment at its apex followed by 
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non-British Europeans, non-Europeans and Indigenous Australians. It was “a 
nationalist doctrine which embodied Australia’s desire to maintain itself as a white, 
British nation” (Tavan 2004: 111).  
 
The pursuit of attachments to Britain occurred through the exclusion of non-British 
people. Acts of violence and the regulations over violence contextualised 
established group relations with Indigenous Australians and other 
newcomers/outsiders, such as Chinese settlers in the goldfields of New South 
Wales, Victoria and Queensland (Van Krieken 1999; McGowan 2004). The 
movement of Chinese settlers became the conduit for societal fears around the 
Australian continent’s vulnerability to re-colonisation by a rival imperial power, 
whether from Europe or Asia151.  
 
From 1945 onwards, people movements (especially from post-war Europe) 
contributed to the gradual multiculturalisation of Australian conscience formation. 
Successive political establishments purposefully developed Australian society into 
an immigrant society (Jupp 2007). The White Australia Policy was slowly abolished 
through reforms in 1950’s and 1960’s and culminated with an official renunciation 
in the 1970s under the Whitlam government (Tavan 2004: 122). These reforms 
slowly lowered the degrees of overt discrimination towards the movement of non -
Europeans, paralleling broader changes in international society152. Australian 
society changed from a white settler society with racist and isolationist 
identifications to a “more open society” (Castles 1992: 558-559). 
                                                 
151 From the 1850s areas of the South Western Pacific became part of broader European 
colonialisation processes, with a scramble for the South Pacific that in part mirrored the scramble 
for Africa. Throughout this period European states were taking possession of areas north of 
Australia, with France annexing New Caledonia in 1853, Germany annexing the north coast of New 
Guinea and the islands of New Britain and New Ireland in 1884, and Britain claiming Fiji in 1874,  
and the south coast of New Guinea (see Gordon 1945:  83-89).     
 
Also see Griffiths’ (2012: 15) account of the fears held by pre-Federation Queensland elites about 
the potential colonisation of northern Australia by Chinese immigrants.  
 
152 These shifts included the decolonisation of former European colonies in the Southeast Asia, the 
South Pacific and other areas of the world, with Australia granting independence to Papua New 
Guinea in 1975, a year that also saw the fall of Saigon and the end of the Vietnam War.  There was 
also the desire for Australia to distance itself from societies such as Apartheid South Africa, to shake 
off the lingering image of white Australia or risk hampering business relations with both newly 




Repercussions from the Second World War challenged Australian attachments to 
Britain. Australian society became more Europeanised and Americanised with the 
movement of people from Greece, Italy and the Balkans. The movement of these 
‘new’ European outsiders was soon replaced by people from places such as Indo -
China (now Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) and Lebanon153 and the former 
Yugoslavia. 
 
In reality, this new multicultural Australian society involved contradictions 
between open and closed attitudes. McMaster (2002: 279) no tes the paradox of 
Australia: a multicultural nation formed by immigrant societal identifications with 
a legacy of racial exclusion. Anglo-Celtic Australians were asked to be more tolerant 
and adopt multicultural attitudes, while immigrant communities had to adopt 
“Australian values” (Viviani 1996: 145).  
 
There were cooperation pressures from the webs of interdependence binding 
established Anglo-Celtic Australians with diverse outsiders. Gradually, concerns 
about population size and asylum seekers became the means for political leaders to 
address and incite fears of racial conflict, multiculturalism and community division 
(Jacobs 2015: 806; Devetak 2004: 103-104; Viviani 1996: 5; Burke 2008). The shift 
became visible in the mid-2000s, when Prime Minister John Howard remarked that 
“the dominant consideration must be the integration of people into the Australian 
family” (24.01.2007).  His government indorsed a “retreat from multiculturalism” 
(Poynting and Mason 2008; Fozdar and Spittles 2009). Degrees of openness 
towards a multi-cultural Australia shifted towards a more closed consensus centred 





                                                 
153 By the 1980s, “the Lebanese population in metropolitan Sydney has become one of the largest 
non-British immigrant groups”, this included 10,000 refugees from the Lebanese Civil War between 
1975-1977 (Burnley 1982: 102-103).   
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Commodification & Established Outsider Relations 
 
The migration language of Howard and Rudd represented established bourgeois 
(often white Australian) groupings with a high power ratio in Australian society. On 
the one hand, Australian leaders characterised the beliefs of a more globalised 
techno-economic ultra rich bourgeois established groups. On the other hand, their 
language signified more localised politico-economic convict-settler, and recently 
integrated immigrant settler established groups.  
 
Like British leaders, Australian leaders commodified societal relations through 
relative openness to transnational movements of financial capital and people. This 
belief was distilled in Howard’s remark that Australia should “attract and retain our 
share of the best and brightest” (07.03.2007). The following accounts reveal the 
desire for people movement linked to the movement of financial capital:  
 
“And I want to say there's rarely been a time in the history of 
Australia when the prestige and the respect and the 
reputation that this country enjoys around the world has 
been higher. Our economic strength, our commitment to 
sound values in international relations, our determination to 
stand with other countries to liberate oppressed people154. 
Take all of things together, Australia is very warmly regarded 
around the world at the present time. And one of the reasons, 
one of the main reasons why Australia is now so warmly 
regarded is that we made a decision as a nation some 50 
years ago or more to open up our country to people from 
different parts of the world, to extend a hand of welcome 
to people from all around the world. And of all of the people 
that have come over that 50 to 60 year period to Australia, 
none has made a bigger contribution numerically and in other 
ways than have the Italians in Australia. I want to thank you 
all for that.” (01.06.2003) 
                                                 




“globalisation of course inevitably carries with it the free 
movement of people of talent and ability. And we now have 
an Australian diaspora of over a million, which for a nation of 
20 million, is a very high percentage……But can I say that 
having a diaspora, given the history and the disposition of this 
country for its young as well as its not so young to go abroad 
to get experience and sometimes to make their fortune, 
you're always going to have a diaspora and I think that is a 
good thing…….And I think we have to teach our young and 
our talented to be adaptable, not to be parochial and I think 
we've been very successful at it. So I would make a very, very 
strong plea in any discussion about the human capital aspect 
of globalisation for us all to embrace the notion of the 
mobility of talent around the world, it's part of 
globalisation and Australia can be both a contributor to and a 
beneficiary of that process.” (27.03.2006) 
 
“since the war we have been a country which has 
encouraged people to come here from right across the 
world, including students, and it may be, to go back to the 
basis of your question, that having come here, picked up your 
qualification, the best thing that you decide to do and it may 
be in the interest of your country to spend a couple of years 
back home and then apply afresh to come here. In terms of 
the skills that are relevant to Australia, that will always be 
made independently by people looking at where our 
economy needs people for the next 5, 10, 15, 20 years and 
that skills profile changes from year to year.”  (08.02.2010)  
 
The accounts above demonstrated how established groups in Australian society 
perceived the value of financial capital bound to migration. These accounts 
expressed a shallow open consciousness of Australia’s place in international 
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society. Openness to transnational movement was linked to gaining respect “around 
the world” over five to six decades, expressing nominal commitment to the 
humanist-egalitarian normative code (01.06.2003). Openness of markets equated 
to openness towards people. There was an appreciation of the benefits and 
contributions of the reciprocal free movement as people from Australia ventured to 
other areas of the world (27.03.2006).  However, for inbound migrants there was 
the criterion “of talent”. Meritocratic criteria defined by a bourgeois establishment 
made openness to transnational movement conditional on the degree of talent held 
by particular individuals.  Interpretations of the talent shifted according to the skills 
required by the economy (08.02.2010). Confidence in transnational movement was 
bound to established group confidence in economic growth and competiveness, 
raising the possibility that any perceived decline in the latter could affect attitudes 
towards the former.  
 
Australian leaders commodified people movement into objects that not only should 
be organisable and controllable, but also at its extreme, treated as expendable.  The 
commodification of people movement supported widening societal power 
differentials. In the language of Australian leaders, asylum seekers became tradable 
commodities in the form of a “refugee swap” with the US (18.04.2007). Towards the 
end of this phase under Rudd from 2008 to 2010, there is a shift towards more 
transient interpretations of transnational movement (08.02.2010). While in 
previous phases of Australian society, there was the assumption that outsiders 
could integrate and make their ‘home’ in Australia. This changed to the expectation 
that migrants should return to their ‘original home’, with reduced expectations of 
adaptation and settlement. Transnational outsiders ‘lost’ part of their value as 
commodities.  
 
Howard and Rudd both portrayed immigrants along an open-ended spectrum that 
ranged from harmless to harmful, relative to the rest of Australia. Outsiders were  
defined by their economic value and relatively weaker power ratio in Australian 
society. Australia’s leaders ambiguously depicted transnational outsiders as not 
only harmless students, skilled migrants and refugees, but also as  unauthorised 
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boat arrivals, illegal migrants and illegal asylum seekers. The addition of prefixes 
such as ‘genuine’ or ‘illegal’ presupposed their legitimacy and/or illegitimacy.  
 
In the following accounts, Howard and Rudd articulated a sharp swing towards 
interpretations of harmful transnational outsiders, in particular the unexpected 
people movements of asylum seekers by boat. Depictions of these boat people 
outsiders were infused with broader societal insecurities.   
 
“We are still a very welcoming, friendly country. We have a 
strong immigration program and we'll continue that. We'll 
continue to have a humanitarian refugee program. We 
certainly want to be quite clear though that people who are a 
potential danger to this country are kept out and that's 
absolute and I think all Australians want that to occur. They 
don't want to muck around on something like this, anybody 
who is a potential danger should be kept out . But equally 
people who want to make a contribution to Australia, 
wherever they come from, providing they fit the migration 
criteria they remain very welcome. We're still a country that 
needs immigrants. And in all of these things, the most 
important thing to do is to keep a sense of balance and 
proportion. We have to be more vigilant, but we can't stop 
living our free life. We have to keep out people who are a 
potential danger, but we want to remain open to people 
who will make good citizens and that 99.9 per cent of people 
and welcome them.”  (22.11.2002)  
 
“Well where there has been abuse, that abuse should be 
punished, but you don't close down the whole system 
because some individuals might abuse it, anymore than you, 
you know, change an education system because a few people 
might abuse it, or you walk away from the public hospital 
system. I mean we've got to have a sense of proportion in 
179 
 
these debates. Now we have a shortage of skilled workers 
in this country because the boom in the economy has run 
ahead of the number of skilled workers that are available. 
Now we are taking certain steps to alter that, but in the 
meantime there are gaps and we need to fill those gaps if we 
are to maintain our productivity and we fill those gaps by 
bringing in skilled migrants from overseas, and we do that 
without discrimination. But it does happen, that by far the 
largest source country for skilled migrants, and that's not 
surprising, is the United Kingdom because the language and 
the culture and the way of life and everything is still so 
similar to ours that it's easier to get skilled migrants with the 
right set of skills from that country. But we very happily take 
them from India and China because we do run a non-
discriminatory policy, and the point needs to be made that 
if anybody is to be involved in a responsible debate about this 
issue, they should not misrepresent to the Australian 
community the sources from which our skilled migrants 
come.” (14.09.2006) 
 
“The freer movement of goods, services, people and capital 
across borders has brought many great benefits. It has 
generated high rates of global growth. It has enhanced the 
prospects, in particular, of developing countries which have 
opened themselves to the international economy. The 
economic globalisation of recent decades has also brought 
more people around the world out of poverty more quickly 
than any other time in history. The challenges of economic 
globalisation, however, also need to be faced up to and their 
strategic consequences need to be addressed. The illegal 
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movement of people, drugs, weapons155 and capital across 
borders is accelerating.” (12.08.2008) 
 
Each of these accounts revealed an understanding of transnational movement that 
sharply oscillated between harmless and harmful conceptions. In account 
22.11.2002, Howard expressed an openness to migrant outsiders such as refugees 
and people who can contribute to Australian society becoming “good citizens” in the 
process. This contrasted against the need to exclude “anybody who is a potential 
danger”. In account 14.09.2006, Howard noted a minority of individuals abusing the 
immigration system along with a form of detached understanding of the kinds of 
‘skilled’ movement necessary for economic growth and competiveness, with a 
preference for people from the United Kingdom with similar language and culture.  
However, this preference for certain skilled outsiders narrowly classified 
transnational movement according to strictly planned economistic criteria.  
Uncontrolled, unplanned movement was interpreted as harmful, for example in 
account 12.08.2008, where Rudd noted the acceleration of “illegal movement” 
across borders, and suggested it brought wider societal harms such as the 
consumption of illicit drugs and violence through the movement of weapons.    
 
Tensions over Normative Codes in the Language of Howard and Rudd 
 
Howard and Rudd idealised both cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and de-
cosmopolitanised collective-nationalist normative codes. The power struggles of 
these codes polarised Australian society, through ambiguous representations of 
transnational movement. Howard perceived the tensions as a reductive either/or 
judgement, where attachments to collective-nationalist code eclipsed the humanist-
egalitarian code. Mentions of the latter code were self-referential detailing past 
openness and humaneness to refugees, while avoiding and dismissing present 
questions that challenged the detention and border practices and policies justified 
by the former code. Rudd attempted to balance to both codes, yet still swayed to the 
collective-nationalist code. In similar ways to British leaders, propagations of 
                                                 
155 Rudd’s reference to the movement of weapons is particularly resonant because Australia has very 
strict laws on gun ownership.  
181 
 
humanist-egalitarian attachments did not moderate the greater circulations of 
collective nationalist attachments.   
    
The language of the Howard and Rudd demonstrated attachments to the humanist-
egalitarian normative code. They expressed idealised beliefs that they and their 
party-government establishment behaved humanely towards outsiders (refugees), 
and fulfilled their international humanitarian obligations (06.09.2001; 16.10.2001; 
02.07.2002; 19.07.2002; 22.11.2002; 14.11.2003; 04.12.2008; 22.10.2009; 
09.11.2009; 13.11.2009).  
 
In proclaiming such commitment, Howard in particular distorted relations with 
international institutions, particularly the United Nations (UN). He rejected the 
conclusions of successive UN reports156 in 2002 that criticised the continued 
detention of asylum seekers pursued by his party-government establishment. 
Howard’s rejection of both reports undermined these same globalised institutions. 
In the following accounts both Howard and Rudd verbalised superficial 
attachments to the humanist-egalitarian code: 
 
“There is nothing we are doing that is in conflict with our 
obligations under international conventions. We in fact in the 
action we've taken to deter illegal immigration to Australia, 
the action we have taken has been humanitarian and 
consistent with our obligations and the men and women of 
the Australian Naval Forces in particular that have been 
involved in those actions have often put their own lives at 
risk in order to save the lives of many of the people who have 
sought to come to Australia. It is not an easy issue and it's 
fairly simplistic to mouth an emotional criticism of what we 
are doing. I do ask those who criticise it, and I think the 
questioner is fairly critical of what my Government is doing, I 
                                                 
156 One authored by former Indian Supreme Chief Justice, Rajendra Bhagwati, working under the 
auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the other authored by the UN Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNHROHC 2002; UNESC 2002). 
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do ask them to bear in mind that every time an illegal arrival 
comes to any country which has a humanitarian off-shore 
refugee programme, then a place that might otherwise have 
been available to somebody who might be judged by 
international organisations as being more deserving of that 
place is lost.”   (02.07.2002) 
 
“It's called an orderly migration program and when you're 
dealing with questions of asylum seekers, having an orderly 
process there which deals with humanitarian considerations, 
and our obligations under the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees. If you extend it out, it's having effective 
arrangements with so-called transit countries, like Malaysia 
and Indonesia. Effective also engagement with sources 
countries, in this case Iraq, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. You 
see, if you are dealing with this effectively, it is the entire, shall 
I say, spectrum form source country, transit country, people 
on the high seas, as well as then, proper processing 
arrangements and dealing with asylum seekers if they had 
established to have that status. And if they're not, they are 
illegal immigrants seeking to come here for economic 
reasons and they are sent back home. So you ask what 
success is, it's having effective measures at each stage along 
the way.” (22.10.2009a) 
 
The accounts above argued that Australia fulfilled its “international obligations” 
endeavouring to satisfy attachments to the humanist-egalitarian code. In the 
02.07.2002 account, Howard dismissed “emotional criticism” of his government. He 
stated that Australia acted in accordance with international obligations, which 
ensured places to ‘deserving refugees’. Obligations to “more deserving” refugees 
were being undermined by “illegal arrivals”.  In account 22.10.2009, Rudd 
articulated this same premise that Australia maintained an “orderly process” to 
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manage asylum seekers in line with UNHCR obligations, but “illegal immigrants” 
moving for “economic reasons” should be deported.  
 
Howard and Rudd’s superficial attachments to the humanist-egalitarian oscillated 
more towards the collective-nationalist code. The infamous phrase articulated by 
Howard of “we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in 
which they come” (28.10.2001) encapsulated this shift. The remark was repeated 
in various shades throughout 2001 (06.09.2001157; 02.11.2001; 05.11.2001; 
06.11.2001). The phrase spoke of strong controls over the movement of people that 
harnessed the collective-nationalist normative code (see O'Doherty and 
Augoustinos. 2008: 577). It politicised the issue of border protection and facilitated 
the re-election of the Coalition in the federal election of 2001 (Marr and Wilkinson 
2004). What is less often noted in references to the phrase “we will decide” is the 
sentence that preceded it, which showed the swing from humanist-egalitarian 
attachments: “we are a generous open hearted people taking more refugees on a 
per capita basis than any nation except Canada, we have a proud record of 
welcoming people from 140 different nations”.  
 
The “we will decide” phrase was integrated into broader narratives of national 
insecurities (see Burke 2008), which contextualised conflicting perceptions over 
the we-identifications in Australian society. Depictions of transnational outsiders 
became an objectified means for short-term political dominance in Australia’s three 
year electoral cycle. The language of Howard and Rudd continued to oscillate 
between attachments to both collective-nationalist and humanist-egalitarian 
normative codes as seen in the following accounts.    
 
“We’re a lot more open and less arbitrary than other countries 
and it’s one of the reasons why many people in this country 
get angry when the critics of the Government’s policy talk 
about how harsh and inhumane we are. I was constantly 
                                                 
157 This early articulation said “we are also going to assert the right as every country has the right to 




impressed by the number of people who expressed surprise 
to me when I was in Europe about how large our migration 
programme was for a country of our size. I mean we continue 
to take a lot of legal migrants, we continue to have a 12,000 
person a year refugee programme. So people can’t point the 
finger at us and say we’re insensitive to letting new people 
into this country. But we insist on the right to require people 
to come here legally and that is what we’re upholding.”  
(19.07.2002) 
 
“It's my experience in Government is that everybody has a 
special case in that you quote the example of somebody with 
particular skills, there may be somebody else who's come 
here illegally who's formed a liaison with people in the 
community or an individual - they come to the Government 
and say, well I've got a special case on emotional grounds 
and there's no end to it. You have to have a situation where 
we say to the world, this country will have a substantial 
migrant intake. This country will have a generous refugee 
programme, but this country will not allow people to come 
to Australia illegally and once you start breaking that policy 
down you will throw our immigration policy into chaos and 
you will undermine the integrity of a policy that has worked 
enormously to the benefit of Australia over a very long 
period of time.” (20.04.2004) 
 
“Humanity consists in ensuring that all of our processes in 
Australia, on Christmas Island, and in the Indonesian 
archipelago and Malaysia and elsewhere are consistent with 
UNHCR processes. That's why we have our approach. The 
previous government chose to flout that, and brought in 
instead the Pacific Solution. They had kids behind razor 
wire, they had a range of different interventions which were 
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designed for a domestic political audience, not in dealing in 
a manner which got the balance right between tough and 
hardline on people smugglers on the one hand and being 
balanced and humane and fair in dealing with asylum 
seekers on the other.” (22.10.2009a) 
 
Howard and Rudd on the one hand idealised humanist-egalitarian attachments to a 
humane Australian society. On the other hand, they idealised collective-nationalist 
attachments in reaction against criticisms of harshness and inhumanity and 
emphasised the ‘right’ for controllable legal migration. In account 19.07.2002,  
Howard noted the anger felt by members of the established groups towards the 
“critics” of his migration programme and tried to counter these critiques through 
mentioning Australia’s refugee programme. Account 20.04.2004 cultivated an 
ignorance of the circumstances for illegal movement. Howard rejected emotive 
appeals towards transnational outsiders and gave idealised humanist-egalitarian 
references to Australia’s “generous refugee programme” and “substantial migrant 
intake”.  Howard expressed a pernicious forecast of societal “chaos” should the 
government’s policy of rejecting ‘illegal’ immigrants be reversed.  
 
In accounts 19.07.2002 and 20.04.2004, Howard verbalised a one way mirror of 
idealisations directed towards his party-government establishment. He 
delegitimised beliefs that did not conform to his attachments to the collective -
nationalist code and questioned the humaneness of his government. Strong 
sensitivities to criticism corresponded with highly involved modes of thinking, 
where criticism was understood as a personal insult to himself and his party-
government establishment.  
 
Account 22.10.2009 shows how Rudd similarly made appeals to the same domestic 
political audience in order to criticise his opponents. These target audiences formed 
part of more insecure sections of the established groups more susceptible to 
appeals that emphasised collective-nationalist rejections of deviants such as people 
smugglers. To distance himself from Howard, Rudd still sought the support of more 
secure sections of the established who held greater humanist-egalitarian 
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attachments, uncomfortable with “kids behind razor wire” and subverting “UNHCR 
processes”. Still, from 2001 to 2010, the balance between ‘hardline and humane’ 
sections of the established groups twisted in favour of the former.     
 
‘Lawless’ Borders and Border Protection 
 
Howard and Rudd circulated reductive modes of thinking that fortified Australian 
society, through collective-nationalist attachments to border protection. The 
repetition of border protection language disseminated the notion of a ‘vulnerable’ 
and ‘lawless’ maritime frontier in the Southern Ocean requiring protection.   
 
Howard and Rudd propagated ignorance of international societal regulations such 
as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), such as Article 
98, on the duty to rescue persons in distress (UN 1982).  In doing so, they twisted 
public attention towards the domestic laws of Australia’s party-government 
establishment led by themselves and disregarded wider international laws. They 
maintained the superiority of Australian regulations over broader cosmopolitan 
regulations. Any perceived reduction of border protection measures induced a 
sense of alarm in more insecure members of the established, overtime these feelings 
became habituated in large sections of Australian society. This was particularly true 
under Rudd, who was repeatedly pushed by the media about the supposed failure 
of his immigration policy (25.02.2010; 25.03.2010). 
 
Rudd was constrained by the mythologisation of Howard’s claim to have ‘stopped 
the boats’. In the year 2009 alone, there were 64 occasions where the phrase 
“border protection” was mentioned, either as questions to Rudd from the media, or 
in remarks by Rudd himself. This was a change from no references in 2008, and only 
8 in 2010. For Howard, border protection was mentioned on 21 occasions in 2001, 
13 occasions in 2002, none in 2003, 9 times in 2004, 2 occasions in 2005, 10 
occasions in 2006 and once in 2007. Howard and Rudd consistently appealed to 
collective-nationalist attachments through references of border protection, as 




“we are in the process of maintaining the integrity of a 
border protection system and people are trying to break 
it, there are people in Australia who are political activists as 
well as lawyers and they’re trying to break it. And now we’re 
not going to have it broken. We’ll defend it in a humane 
compassionate fashion but people should understand that 
we do not intend to alter our policy.” (19.07.2002) 
 
“we had a difficult problem to deal with, and we have tried to 
strike a balance between sensitivity and the national 
interest and the national interest is certainly served by this 
country continuing to have a firm mandatory detention 
policy. And whatever people may say about Nauru, we would 
never have stopped the flood of boats coming to this 
country if we had not amongst other things had offshore 
processing. Offshore processing, along with turning the 
boats back to the north of Australia, mandatory detention 
and the excision of islands from the migration zone, all of 
those things taken together stopped the large number of 
boats coming to this country and effectively provided that 
protection for our borders. So I continue to very strongly 
defend the offshore processing of unauthorised arrivals to 
Australia.”  (20.06.2005) 
 
“My job…..is to act in the national interest and you're going 
to have people who attack government decisions when it 
relates to border protection from the far Right, who 
presumably are arguing that we should return children to 
behind razor wire and people from the far Left who 
presumably argue that we shouldn't have an orderly 
migration program at all, or no border protection regime at 
all. Our job is to conduct a tough, responsible, fair policy. 
Hardline on people smugglers, humane on asylum 
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seekers…….We've done so in relation to each of the 
challenges of border protection.” (05.11.2009) 
 
Each the accounts above expressed attachments to the collective-nationalist code 
centred on the protection of Australia’s borders. In 19.07.2002 account, Howard 
attacked lawyers and political activists who in his eyes sought to break his border 
protection system. The 20.06.2005 account reaffirmed that mandatory detention 
fulfilled the “national interest” of Australian society as a whole. He and his policies 
defended Australia by stopping “the flood of boats” and secured the border.   
 
In the 05.11.2009 account, Rudd depicted a precarious balance that is “hardline on 
people smugglers, humane on asylum seekers”, and emphasised fears about people 
smugglers subverting Australian society. Collective-nationalist commitments to 
border protection militarised the maritime space surrounding the Australian 
mainland. This spurred the pursuit of measures short of direct physical violence 
against boat people outsiders. Howard also rejected the creation of a demilitarised 
coastguard institution, by citing the need to avoid the backing of the Maritime 
Services Union and the dilution of military naval capabilities. This move further 
centralised party-government executive control over the maritime spaces beyond 
the Australian mainland (24.10.2001; 07.07.2003).  
 
Transnational People Risks in the Language of Howard & Rudd   
 
Howard and Rudd became more reliant on insecure sections of established groups 
to maintain their place in the balance of societal power in Australian society. 
Transnational outsiders became symbolic risks to Australian society, which 
illustrates the interdependencies of localised power struggles and globalised people 
movements.    
 
Insecure sections of established groups were relative outsiders that were 
uncomfortable with changes in the socio-cultural fabrics of Australian society and 
more sensitive to any perceived encroachment by newcomer transnational 
outsiders. Insecure sections of established groups were more attracted to highly 
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strict forms of societal regulation, in order to ‘regain control over their lives’, and 
they were more prone to rejecting transnational outsiders that threatened their 
societal dominance.  
 
Depictions of border protection propagated fantasies about spatial isolation and 
totalised safety from threats beyond Australian society. These fantasies fed into the 
desire for protectors willing to undertake ‘tough’ practices to safeguard Australian 
society, by disseminating more localised societal vulnerabilities. Writing in the mid-
1990s Viviani (1996: 11) noted that the sensitivity of Australian politicians and 
bureaucrats to boat arrivals is “founded on fears about adverse public opinion”. The 
political survival of Australian leaders and those of their party-government 
establishment was conflated with the survival of Australian society as a whole.  
 
Howard and Rudd’s party-government survival was bound to their perceived 
abilities to regulate people movement into Australia. Their personalised 
insecurities and those of their party-government establishment suffused into 
depictions of transnational outsiders, particularly people categorised as asylum 
seekers and refugees. 
 
Howard’s language juxtaposed the projection of masculinised toughness by him and 
his Coalition government with the perceived weakness of the Opposition Labor 
Party on border protection issues (08.06.2002; 14.07.2004; 17.08.2004). He 
expressed this interpretation directly: “We won the last election158 because the 
Australian people felt we could run the economy better, we could lead the nation 
better at a time of international crisis and also that we were tough on border 
protection and the Labor Party was weak on border protection - that's why we 
won the last election. It had precious little to do with children overboard159” 
(17.08.2004).  
                                                 
158 The Australian Federal election of 2001 
159In late 2001, Howard and his ministers alleged that asylum seekers were del iberately throwing 
their children into the sea to elicit rescue.   
The Senate Report (Commonwealth of Australia 2002: xxi), investigating the ‘Children Overboard’ 
affair noted, 
“The peculiar sensitivity associated with the claim that children had been thrown 




Rudd also used references to ‘border protection’ to bolster his place in the balance 
of societal power noting how “neither Mr Turnbull nor the Liberals, despite 
criticising Government border protection policy, actually have a policy on bo rder 
protection” (03.11.2009). He too appealed to and became reliant on insecure 
sections of the established, through masculinised appeals to toughness, even as he 
criticised his political opponents for their tendency to “whack the asylum seekers 
card” (22.10.2009; 14.10.2009), engaging in a “race to the bottom” (01.06.2010) 
and using a fear campaign (22.10.2009; 02.06.2010).  
 
In the language of Rudd and Howard, migration became a risk to established groups 
in Australian society. Rudd provided the clearest articulation of transnational 
outsiders as risks. He noted the “risk of a large-scale influx of refugees from the 
region” (26.03.2008). Migrants were burdened with Australia’s insecurities about 
regional and global relations. In the space of three sentences, Rudd mentioned the 
“global rise of illegal immigration” from the Middle East, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, 
the rise of China and India, plus North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions, which 
resulted in “increased level of risk within our own region”  (24.04.2009).  
 
Howard implicitly used risk orientations to frame the movement of transnational 
outsiders. This form of framing is evident in remarks such as “we have to keep out 
people who are a potential danger” (22.11.2002). Howard noted his “heightened 
obligation to make absolutely certain who is coming to this country” (08.11.2001). 
He verbalised harmful images of transnational outsiders that reinforced the 
protective authority of his government and legitimised his interpretations through 
reference to the authority of Blair160 and Britain (08.11.2001). While Howard 
                                                 
election campaign, during which ‘border protection’ and national security were key  
issues. That asylum seekers trying to enter Australia by boat were the kinds of people 
who would throw their children overboard was used by the Government to demonise 
them as part of the argument for the need for a ‘tough’ stand against external threats  
and in favour of ‘putting Australia’s interests first’.”  
 
It also singled out “deliberate deception motivated by political expedience” as factor in the children 
overboard claim. 
160 Howard is referring to the following statement by Blair: 
“Here in this country and in other nations round the world, laws will be changed, not to deny bas ic 
liberties but to prevent their abuse and protect the most basic liberty of all: freedom from terror.  
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rejected the direct link between “boat loads of people” and terrorism.  He also cited 
Blair’s “new rules to ensure asylum is not a front for terrorist entry” (02.10.2001), 
and articulated more catastrophic risk narratives that people seeking to enter 
Australia via boat could be terrorists in the future.  
 
Fortified Orientations Expressed by Howard & Rudd 
 
The following section explains narrow societal orientations that fortified Australian 
society. Depictions of transnational outsiders swung between harmless skilled 
movement and more harmful catastrophic boat movement. More harmful risk 
orientations towards boat outsiders dominated societal orientations. The 
criminalisation boat outsiders was interdependent with more masculinised societal 
orientations that legitimised harsher regulations. There was also the objectification 
of boat people outsiders into numerical symbols that justified their exclusion. Fears 
about societal cohesion and people smugglers were reinfor ced by aquatic 
metaphors that mythologised both boat people outsiders and the capacities of 
Australian leaders themselves. Howard and Rudd circulated greater socio-
psychological fortifications through collective-nationalist commitments to 
mandatory detention that distorted Australia’s regionalised relations.   
 
Safe Skilled Migrants & Harmful Refugees 
 
Understandings of transnational outsiders oscillated between harmless safe and 
more harmful catastrophic risk orientations. Howard and Rudd expressed 
characterisations of more acceptable skilled movement, and less acceptable refugee 
and asylum seeker movement.   
 
The prefix ‘skilled’ was highly ambiguous. It reinforced the authority of Australian 
leaders to define what those skills were which determined the limits of inclusion. 
Skilled migration was relatively harmless because it presumed the movement of 
                                                 
New extradition laws will be introduced; new rules to ensure asylum is not a front for terrorist  
entry. This country is proud of its tradition in giving asylum to those fleeing tyranny. We will always 
do so. But we have a duty to protect the system from abuse.” (02.10.2001) 
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people of relatively equal societal status and/or more culturally compatible with 
Anglo-Celtic sections of established groups. Skilled movement was more accepted 
because of techno-economic bourgeois identifications that prioritised movement 
that appeared ordered, controllable and adjustable according to the demands of ‘the 
economy’. Openness towards skilled migration satisfied attachments to the 
humanist-egalitarian code. Howard articulated the belief that Australia is an open, 
tolerant society that has moved beyond a racialized past and adhered to non-
discriminatory identifications (14.09.2006). The preference of ‘skills’ does not have 
an immediate racial undertone. The prefix reinforced the changing tone of power 
relations from racialized criteria to commodified meritocratic criteria, which 
defined the abilities of transnational outsiders to integrate into Australian society.  
 
The preference for skilled movement obscured how Australian society has been 
dependant on unskilled movement. This also blocked understandings of how the 
‘unskilled’ people can become skilled people, via the assistance of government and 
civil society, through sponsored vocational and tertiary education. For example in 
the 1950’s “Australia was actively recruiting millions of migrants from Europ e, 
many of them unskilled workers and from countries previously regarded as beyond 
the pale in cultural and racial terms” (Tavan 2004: 114). Economic preferences 
towards skilled movement were linked to population pressures and demographic 
changes within Australian society such as an aging population. Particularly under 
Rudd, there was the desire for a “big Australia” where migration serves “economic 
circumstances” and can help maintain a young population (27.03.2008; 
30.03.2008). Young mobile skilled migrants were more desirable because they 
could subsidise older more affluent immobile politico-economic citoyen settler 
sections of established groups.   
 
Understandings of skilled movement displayed attachments to the collective -
nationalist code and politico-economic citoyen settler identifications. The following 
accounts showed the interplay of perceived population pressures from techno -




“But when people talk about population policy they are 
really talking most of all I think about the size of the migrant 
intake. Now we have I believe restored the integrity of the 
immigration program. We have dramatically altered the 
balance, we have a lot more skilled migrants now and they 
are making a big contribution and I would see that process 
going on, and you will be aware that over the last several 
years we have modestly increased the intake each year 
and I'm certainly fully in support of that.” (01.08.2001)  
 
“It's very interesting that the surveys that have been carried 
out over the past few years about attitudes to migration, they 
actually show that there's more support for reasonable levels 
of immigration to Australia now than there was five or ten 
years ago. I think one of the reasons for that is they believe 
the immigration program, although its larger than it was a few 
years ago, is under control, and that we are deciding who 
comes to this country. We're deciding to have a greater 
emphasis on skilled migration. We want people who will 
make an immediate contribution and through this country 
enable all people to feel that the immigration program is now 
being run in a well and truly effective fashion.” (28.07.2006)  
 
“On the question of the immigration program, what the 
Immigration Minister Chris Evans has quite rightly done is 
calibrate, or adjust the skilled intake to the current state of 
the economy. And so the overall number of skilled 
migrants will be brought down and those numbers have been 
announced, because that is the right and responsible thing to 





Each of the accounts above articulated established preferences towards skilled 
movement. Both politico-economic citoyen settler and techno-economic bourgeois 
identifications sustained beliefs that transnational movement into Australia must 
remain under the strict control of established groups. In accounts 01.08.2001 and 
28.07.2006, Howard expressed short-term preferences for people pre-existing skill 
sets that give an instantaneous contribution to Australian society. He discouraged 
any form of patience for people who had to build those skills in Australia, because 
to train them would be an added ‘cost’ to Australian society.  
 
Openness towards ‘skilled’ movement swung towards the collective-nationalist 
code that emphasised stringent degrees of selectivity on permissible people 
movement into Australia (28.07.2006). Towards the end of this phase in 2009 -
2010, there was evidence of the globalised infusion of broader economic 
insecurities from events such as Global Financial Crisis, which prompted a 
reduction of skilled movement to ‘protect Australian jobs’ (10.06.2009).  
 
Howard and Rudd circulated more insecure interpretations of transnational 
movement that appeared to be uncontrollable and were deemed more 
unacceptable. They channelled beliefs of the insecure politico -economic citoyen 
settler establishment. There were developing risk narratives that limited 
acceptance and justified the rejection of migrant outsiders, who did not fit within 
established interpretations of safe skilled movement. 
 
In the language of Howard and Rudd, ambiguous accounts of refugee161 movement 
swung towards more harmful catastrophic risk orientations. More controllable 
camp refugees were prioritised over less controllable boat refugees, for example in 
expressions by Howard such as “superior refugee claims get first chance. Because 
there are millions of people living in pitiful conditions in refugee camps who don’t 
have the money to buy a passage on a boat to Australia” (04.09.2001). Assistance to 
                                                 
161 Haddad (2008: 59-60) notes “refugees are an inevitable if unintended consequence of the nation-
state system; they are the result of erecting boundaries, attempting to assign all individuals to a 




camp refugees, who waited patiently162, indicated shallow attachments to the 
humanist-egalitarian code. The needs of camp refugees were more ‘authentic’ than 
boat refugees, who were stigmatised as ‘queue jumpers’.  
 
The following accounts that detailed the distinctions between boat and camp 
refugees are from Howard’s speeches. Rudd shared the same sentiments: his 
response to a comment about queue jumping was to say “I get narky about it as 
well”163 (26.03.2010b; 02.07.2002; 08.07.2003).  
 
“Now I don’t for a moment play down the enormous problem 
the world has with refugees. There are over 20 million people 
who can be broadly classified as refugees around the world at 
the present time. And many of them are living in pitiful 
conditions in refugee camps and many of those people have 
a greater entitlement to come to this country as part of our 
refugee program than many of the people who are preyed 
upon by people smugglers and placed on boats to come to 
Australia. And that is one of the arguments that we have 
constantly advanced that the only way in which we can fairly 
deal with this problem is to have everybody assessed 
according to the same rules and in the same fashion so that 
the most necessitous cases are put at the front of the queue 
and the most necessitous cases are given the most immediate 
and the most compassionate response.” (06.09.2001)  
 
 
                                                 
162 Party-government establishments demand that societal welfare recipients show similar qualities, 
which confirms their lower status.   
163 Responding to the following comment by David Koch, presenter of the morning television 
program Sunrise: “Alright, I don't think anyone would argue that we shouldn't be taking asylum 
seeker be taking asylum seekers, refugees - that's our responsibility as a global citizen. But it is 
people jumping the queue, they're taking the place of others who are doing it the right way. I reckon 
that's what the average Australian gets narky about.” 
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“No, quite the reverse164 because the really pathetic cases are 
people who are waiting years and years in refugees camps 
and for every person that gets to a refugee friendly country 
such as Australia illegally and takes a place away that might 
otherwise be available to a person in a refugee camp. That 
person in the refugee camp suffers. You have to remember 
that there's only a limited capacity on the part of Australia 
to take refugees and if illegal arrivals bump places away 
from potentially legal arrivals, it is those potentially legal 
arrivals in refugee camps who suffer.”  (20.04.2004)  
 
“there is a fundamental principle involved here which has 
not been altered and that is that people who come here in 
an unauthorised fashion must expect a period of 
detention, and they must understand that they are coming 
ahead of people who seek to come here in an authorised 
way, and there are many people in refugee camps, children 
included, who, if others had not taken their places in the 
positions available for refugees coming to Australia, would 
have been here earlier. So that kind of argument can be 
advanced in relation to people whose opportunity has been 
denied” (20.06.2005) 
 
In the accounts above, Howard verbalised associations towards camp refugees and 
disassociations from boat refugees. Humanist-egalitarian compassion was limited 
to camp refugees that “have a greater entitlement to come to this country” because 
of their purported longer experience of suffering, and were subject to careful 
selection as part of “our refugee program” (06.09.2001). Camp refugees were more 
desirable because of their demonstration of greater patience. In account 
(20.04.2004), acceptance of patient camp refugees “waiting for years” was 
underpinned by the notion of scarce societal resources, the “limited capacity” of 
                                                 
164 The interviewer asks “Does that reflect a lack of humanity though that you can't..?” (20.04.2004)  
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Australian society that can only accommodate a limited number of refugees. The 
collective-nationalist notion of scarce societal resources justified the differentiation 
between legal authorised camp refugees, and illegal unauthorised boat refugees. 
The boat refugees were stigmatised as a passive victims of people smugglers 
(06.09.2001).  They were also more active belligerents who had pushed ahead of 
the queue and committed an infringement that justified detention (20.06.2005).  
 
Criminalisation Processes: The 3 D’s of Defend, Deter, Detain  
 
The language of Howard and Rudd criminalised the movement o f asylum seekers 
and refugee outsiders by boat into Australia. This narrowed circles of association 
towards legalised safe movement and widened circles of disassociation between 
established groups and boat people outsiders. They reinvigorated the  longstanding 
three D’s of Australian societal regulation that criminalised boat outsiders: defend, 
deter and detain (McKiernan 1993). 
 
Boat people outsiders justified sustained efforts to defend Australia by ‘stopping 
boats’ through martial force. The policy was to  deter their movement through 
masculinised images of toughness, and to detain boat arrivals in offshore locations 
beyond the Australian mainland. Howard and Rudd legitimised their defence of 
Australia by imprisoning ‘lawbreakers’, and deterring those same outsiders 
through the threat and practice of incarceration.   
 
Australian society maintains highly strict societal regulations and expectations for 
self-regulations. The habituated legacies of convict settlement have sensitised 
sections of Australian society to revulsions against harmful ‘illegal’ practices. These 
aversions are intensified in ongoing moments of alarm about boat asylum seekers, 
who are perceived to be people that do not abide by strict standards of self-
discipline. The arrival of boat people outsiders into Australia via the ‘back door’ 
rather than the ‘front door’ of formal refugee camps perpetuated more coercive, 
stringent societal regulations. Jupp (2007: 43) notes that in 1990 boat arrivals of 
asylum seekers from Cambodia provoked the creation of the mandatory detention 
system first based in Port Hedland, a remote part of Western Australia. This system 
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would expand under Howard into the so-called ‘Pacific Solution’ that encompassed 
the offshore detention of boat people outsiders in places such as Narau, Manus 
Island in Papua New Guinea and Christmas Island. 
 
Boat refugee outsiders were stigmatised as lawbreakers.  The consistent repetition 
of the terms such as “illegal” as well as terms like “unauthorised boat arrivals”, 
orientated Australian leaders to think about more ingenious ways of prosecuting 
the deviance of boat people outsiders. In 2009, the phrase “illegal immigration 165” 
was mentioned 20 times by Rudd. During Howard’s Prime Ministership it was 
mentioned 10 times in 2001, 10 times in 2002, 2 times in 2003, 4 times in 2004 and 
2005, none in 2006 and 4 times in 2007.  The following accounts showed the 
persistent efforts by Howard and Rudd to criminalise boat people outsiders through 
the prefix “illegal”.  
 
“There are other elements to national security. We’ve had 
quite a debate in this country over the last few months on the 
question of illegal immigration. I hold very strongly to the 
view that this country has an obligation as part of the 
international community to conduct a generous refugee 
program and we have done so to our credit now for some 
decades. We are one of only nine countries in the world that 
has a resettlement program and we take more refugees on a 
per capita basis than any country in the world accept Canada. 
But my friends we will decide who comes to this country 
and the circumstances in which they come and we’ll decide 
that applying humane equitable principles and international 
refugee assessment. What is involved in this debate about 
asylum seekers is the proposition that some people have, 
namely if people can quite literally present themselves at 
Australia’s borders and demand entry no matter what the 
                                                 
165 This includes 2 mentions of “illegal people movements”  
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background or no matter what the circumstances are.”  
(02.11.2001)  
 
“I don't want them [the children of asylum seekers] released 
in circumstances where it would undermine the 
effectiveness of the policy. I mean the thing that has got to 
be made constantly is that our policy has worked because the 
boats have stopped coming and we have stopped illegal 
immigration dead in its tracks. And, you know, to cut 
through all of this debate, all aspects of this issue of border 
protection, the one thing I say to your viewers is that our 
policy stopped illegal immigration to this country and I'm 
very proud of that. Now sure, we don't like having children in 
detention, and there's only a small number of children of boat 
people who are in custody, and in fact if their mothers would 
agree to the community arrangements that we want, my 
advice is that they wouldn't be in custody.”  (24.08.2004) 
 
“No we’ve had a very sober understanding of the global, let’s 
call them push factors at work not just for Australia but 
countries right around the world in terms of the number of 
people, illegal people movements right around the world. 
Affecting countries in South East Asia, countries in Europe, 
now this is just the reality. Since then the Government has 
introduced hundreds of millions of dollars worth of new 
measures to work at country of origin, to work at our cop on 
the beat, the navy on the high seas and remember these 
vessels are being interdicted and they are being taken to 
Christmas Island for processing. And also a hardline system 
which says, if this is not a bona fide asylum seeker then they 




In each of the accounts above, Howard and Rudd criminalised boat people outsiders 
using the stigmatising prefix of “illegal”. Howard implied that Australia was more 
secure through the rejection of asylum seekers (02.11.2001). The question of 
“illegal immigration” was escalated to an issue of national ‘security’. He declared 
that collective-nationalist claims were the only authority to define the 
“circumstances” for asylum seekers to enter Australia, and the application of 
“humane equitable principles” (02.11.2001). For Howard, boat people outsiders 
were catastrophic risks to Australian society that legitimised practices such as the 
continued detention of children, whose release was impermissible because it would 
weaken the effectiveness of his policy (24.08.2004). He drew satisfaction from his 
role in protecting Australian society from lawbreakers (24.08.2004). Rudd 
broadened the criminalisation of boat people outsiders to “illegal people 
movements” that affected countries in Southeast Asia and beyond (01.07.2009).  He 
conjured up images of a lawless maritime frontier that demanded the reassertion of 
militarised naval vessels acting as constabularies to interdict harmful vessels 
towards Christmas Island (01.07.2009).  
 
Images of Masculine Toughness by Howard & Rudd 
 
Howard and Rudd expressed masculinised images to deter the movement of boat 
people outsiders, legitimising more coercive practices such as mandatory 
detention. Terms such as “tough” and “hardline” (17.08.2004; 18.04.2007; 
13.10.2009; 22.10.2009a; 22.10.2009b), directed Australian society towards more 
brutalised understandings of boat people outsiders, who were understood through 
greater predatory connotations. This prompted articulations of collective -
nationalist strength in a manner similar to the ways in which certain animal species 
physically inflated themselves to protect against predators.  
 
Howard and Rudd amplified collective vulnerabilities and rejected counter efforts 
deemed to be ‘soft’. They embraced ‘harder’ practices to aimed to ‘deter’ p otential 
‘criminals’. The verbalisation of toughness appealed to insecure sections of the 
established. Sections that felt vulnerable to encroachments on limited sets of 
societal resources, and who were more susceptible to supporting measures that 
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reinforced commitments to the collective-nationalist code. The emphasis on 
strength was set against weakness, with strong resistance to any form of thought 
and practice that relaxed the stance of the government. For example, Howard 
remarked that “they do not want any weakening of mandatory detention, they do 
not want any weakening of our border protection policies” (17.06.2005).  ‘They’ 
meant the sections of the established with greater attachments to hard measures 
and an aversion to soft measures, as shown in the fo llowing accounts.  
 
“Now we are a humane country and we will always in 
relation to this issue, we will always act both legally and 
decently. We have sent a signal through what we did, in 
relation to the people on the Tampa, we have sent a signal 
that this country is no longer a country of easy destination 
or a soft touch for people smugglers………… This will continue 
to be a difficult issue for our country but we have over the last 
several weeks by the actions that I have outlined we have 
presented to the world and to the people smugglers a clear 
message that we are not going to be a soft touch, we are going 
to continue to defend as every country has the right to 
defend the integrity of its borders, and we are also going to 
assert the right as every country has the right to assert and 
that is to decide who comes to this country and the 
circumstances in which they come.” (06.09.2001) 
 
“The issue that concerned rightly the Australian public three 
years ago was that this country was seen as a soft touch for 
people smugglers and illegal immigrants and we set about 
adopting a policy that stopped that and that policy was 
effectively opposed by the Labor Party, is still opposed by the 
Labor Party because of its muddled approach which basically 
invites people who want to come to this country illegally to be 
processed on the mainland. See, the great deterrent in our 
policy was when we took the stand three years ago to say, 
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you're not going to come to this country and be processed on 
the mainland and it was that policy and the boarder 
protection policies that we have enforced that have turned 
the boats around.” (14.07.2004) 
 
“Our job is to conduct a tough, responsible, fair policy. 
Hardline on people smugglers, humane on asylum seekers. 
That's what we've been doing since we formed government. 
That was the policy we took to the previous election. We've 
implemented each of the elements of that policy since the 
election. We've done so in relation to each of the challenges of 
border protection which have arisen over the last couple of 
years and we'll continue to do so into the future.” 
(05.11.2009) 
 
In each of the accounts above, Howard and Rudd articulated masculinised 
depictions of relations with boat people outsiders.  The figure of the people 
smuggler fulfilled the role of a ‘predator’, which enabled Australian leaders to 
position themselves as the ‘tough’ defenders of Australian society. Howard 
expressed the notion of a vulnerable Australia that, through their traditional open 
values, was a “soft touch” to predatory people smugglers and demanded steps to 
“defend Australia” (06.09.2001; 14.07.2004). These steps included the processing 
of asylum claims offshore, away from a defenceless Australian mainland that 
deterred illegalised movement (14.07.2004). For Rudd, asylum seekers were 
assumed to be passive, childlike victims, lead astray by people smugglers. This 
passivity prompted “hardline” preventative measures against the latter and 
“humane” measures for the former (14.10.2009a; 14.10.2009b).  
 
Alarming Numbers of Boat Arrivals 
 
Howard and Rudd objectified transnational people movements into numerical 
symbols, which depicted both overall movements of people into Australia, as well 




Attempts to provide greater context to the movement of boat people outsiders were 
extremely rare throughout this period of Australian society from 2001-2010. Late 
in this period, there was an attempt by Rudd to provide more detached context. He 
noted the “global and regional security conditions” (12.05.2010; 26.03.2010a; 
26.03.2010b; 25.02.2010) and explained how boat arrivals were a relatively small 
number of people, when understood in terms of Australia’s annual migration intake. 
For Rudd, the “historical context” of boat arrivals was a relatively small number in 
the thousands, which was eclipsed by Australia’s “annual permanent migration 
intake” quoted in the hundreds of thousands as “185,000” (03.04.2010).  
 
Boat people outsiders became a quantifiable ‘problem’ through numerical  
depictions as numbers of boat arrivals. For a relatively small society on a large 
continent, such as Australia, numbers of boat arrivals in the thousands provoked 
alarm in insecure sections of established groups. The objectification of boat people 
outsiders perpetuated double bind processes. Greater numbers of boat arrivals 
were failures for the party-government establishment in power. Lesser numbers of 
boat arrivals were successes that legitimised the coercive practices of Australian 
leaders.  Pressures exerted by political opponents, and the media contributed to an 
expanding vortex, where numbers of boat arrivals were bound to the imperative of 
party-political survival.  
 
Objectified boat people outsiders became a dichotomous black and white ‘problem’ 
demanding forms of ‘solutions’ with very little room for any nuance or long -term 
reflections. The use of specific figures as well as more ambiguous terms such as 
“great build up” (06.11.2001) and number of arrivals (16.04.2002; 08.07.2003), 
transformed boat people outsiders into objectified ‘problems’ demanding 
‘solutions’.   
 
“I ask my critics to say to me and to tell the Australian people, 
you dismantle what is called the Pacific Solution, what is the 
alternative. The alternative is that you will be sending a 
signal, I mean if after everything that has happened if we 
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reverse policy that will be seen as a magnet, in current 
economic circumstances, to great and increasing 
numbers of people to endeavour to come to this country. 
And that will present an enormous difficulty for Australia.” 
(08.11.2001) 
 
“We're endeavouring as far as possible and consistent with 
the maintenance of a strong policy and consistent with 
deterring people from resuming the illegal boat trade, we're 
trying to get people, children out of detention. But this policy 
of deterring people from trying to come here illegally has 
been a spectacular success. We don't have boats arriving in 
Australia now. If you cast your mind back three years ago, 
they were coming on almost a weekly basis. And we have 
sent a very strong signal to the world that that would not be 
tolerated, and that involved the Pacific Solution, it involved 
the tough measures that we took, it involved as an element 
mandatory detention”. (06.07.2004) 
 
“I just say this - the period of the Howard government, nearly 
250 boats arrived on our shores bringing about 15,000 or 
almost 15,000 asylum seekers. The two years that we've been 
in Government we've had 37 or 39 boats arrive with about 
1700 or 1800 people. This has been a problem in the past, it's 
a problem today - it'll be a problem in the future. The key is to 
have a balanced policy, one which is both tough but humane. 
That's our approach and we'll stick to it.” (22.10.2009a) 
 
In each of the accounts above, numbers of boat arrivals were an objectified 
‘problem’ for the established groups in Australian society. Howard’s references to 
“increasing numbers of people” propagated the  image of a vulnerable Australia that 
was easy prey to predatory economic movement (08.11.2001). The phrase “coming 
on a weekly basis” circulated a sense of urgency that necessitated more coercive 
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practices, which included mandatory detention in the form of the “Pacific Solution” 
(06.07.2004; 08.11.2001). Rudd echoed Howard’s call from account 22.11.2002 for 
constant vigilance and alertness towards boat arrivals. Numbers of boat arrivals 
became a timeless “problem” for Australian society in the past, present and future. 
Even if the numbers decreased, there was still the need for a “tough but humane” 
policy (22.10.2009a).   
 
Intangible Fear Constellations in Howard & Rudd’s Language  
 
Boat outsiders were stigmatised with the more intangible imprecise fears of 
established groups in Australian society, which widened circles of disassociation. 
The language of Howard and Rudd cultivated suspicious risk narratives that made 
‘boat people’ into ‘problems’ suffused with fears about cohesion and the specific 
mythologised threat from people smugglers.  These fears justified the exclusion of 
boat people outsiders.  
 
Concerns about societal cohesion and the movement of boat people outsiders were 
linked to an idealisation of societal solidarity. Cohesion fears were a bundled set of 
insecurities about the integrative capacities of transnational outsiders. The 
language of Howard showed consistent idealisations of highly stringent forms of 
societal controls over the movement of people into Australian society. He verbalised 
fears about cohesion linked to the movement of boat outsiders who in his view were 
insufficiently able to integrate in accordance with the values of established groups. 
Boat people outsiders were connected with fears about violence (08.11.2001) and 
ghettoisation: the violent splitting of Australian society along ethnic and racial lines. 
He contributed to a suspicious risk narrative that “if you  don't have a policy of 
mandatory detention then the illegal arrivals will simply melt into the community” 
(02.07.2002). Cohesion fears were consistently bound to harmful depictions of boat 
outsiders in the following statements.   
 
“we’ve been prepared to defend the integrity of our borders 
and to insist what is self-evidently true and that is that 
every nation has the right to determine who comes to this 
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country and who lives here and we have also maintained 
that great self of cohesion and fairness within our 
community which has been a hallmark of this country down 
through the years.”  (12.10.2002) 
 
“This country is very proud of its history, we're very proud of 
what we all understand to be the traditional Australia, we're 
also though very proud of the fact that since World War II in 
particular we have accepted into our midst millions of 
people from different parts of the world  and above 
everything else they have overwhelmingly become wonderful 
Australians and have made a wonderful contribution to the 
development of our country and part of the social cohesion 
that we now have is to continue to preserve that great 
tolerance.”  (02.02.2004) 
 
Each of the accounts above expressed cohesion fears. Collective-nationalist 
attachments to border protection practices preserved societal cohesion and 
defended Australia to maintain the “fairness’ enjoyed by localised communities 
(12.10.2002). For Howard, community fairness was fragile. He appealed to insecure 
sections of established groups with pre-existing vulnerabilities, and directed their 
concerns onto depictions of ‘harmful’ boat people outsiders, even though Australian 
society has accepted “millions of people from different parts of the world” 
(02.02.2004). There are limited degrees of acceptance offered to the ‘current’ 
movement of boat people outsiders because of their threat to the integrity of 
national borders and the societal cohesion behind those boundaries.  
 
Fears about people smugglers with the movement of boat outsiders were linked  
established group fears of contact. People smugglers were depicted as mythical folk 
devils in the form of predators, pied pipers, and ‘vermin’. Firstly, people smugglers 
were predators that justified the protective measures proposed by Australian 
leaders to secure a vulnerable Australian society. Secondly, they were manipulative 
pied piper figures that seduced boat outsiders to become lawbreakers. Finally, they 
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were “vermin” that brought sickness and death (14.10.2009). The following 
accounts articulate fears about contact through depictions of people smugglers.  
 
“may I say we’ve had the absolutely contemptible 
contribution of the Leader of the Opposition in the wake of 
that appalling human tragedy where something like 350 
lives appear to have been lost when a vessel sank in 
Indonesian waters, probably containing people wanting to 
come to Australia. It sank in Indonesian waters, yet Mr 
Beazley has tried to exploit that human tragedy to score a 
cheap political point. He implied that that happened because 
of a failure of policy on our part. I think that is contemptible. 
It’s alright to attack your opponent on legitimate grounds but 
to try and score a cheap political point out of an immense 
human tragedy such as that I regard as completely 
contemptible. If anybody is to be blamed for that appalling 
tragedy it’s the people smugglers, not the Government of 
Australia, not the Government of Indonesia but the people 
smugglers. And for the alternative Prime Minister of 
Australia to try and score a cheap political out of that is as I 
say absolutely contemptible.” (23.10.2001) 
 
“an issue where you have to balance the natural desire of 
everybody to administer the policy in a flexible, humane way, 
but also I believe the overwhelming view of the Australian 
community that this country should not again become a 
target for people smugglers.” (31.05.2005) 
 
“Let me just conclude by making some remarks about people 
smugglers themselves. People smugglers are engaged in the 
world’s most evil trade and they should all rot in jail 
because they represent the absolute scum of the earth. We 
see this lowest form of human life at work in what we saw 
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on the high seas yesterday. That’s why this Government 
maintains its hard line, tough, targeted approach to 
maintaining border protection for Australia. And that’s why 
we have dedicated more resources to combat people 
smuggling than any other Government in Australian history.” 
(17.04.2009) 
 
Howard and Rudd mixed fears about people smugglers with depictions of boat 
outsiders. People smugglers were blamed as the perpetrators for the deaths of boat 
people outsiders at sea. Howard absolved himself and the policies of his party-
government establishment from responsibilities for these deaths and attacked his 
political opposition for suggesting otherwise (23.10.2001). People smugglers 
preyed on not just on asylum seekers but also on vulnerable ‘soft’ Australian society. 
Howard reduced humanist-egalitarian compassion towards boat outsiders into 
polarised questions of devotion to his party-government establishment. The 
harmfulness of people smugglers whose actions weakened Australian society 
(31.05.2005), fed into denouncements of humanist-egalitarian attachments 
towards boat people outsiders.  Those attachments gave way to attachments to the 
collective-nationalist code.  
 
Rudd also stigmatised people smugglers as the “the absolute scum of the earth” in 
practice of “the world’s most evil trade” (17.04.2009). The phrase “most evil trade” 
echoes historical efforts to combat human slave trading. Depictions of boat people 
themselves intermingled with fears about the evil practice of people smuggling. 
Contact with people smugglers stigmatised boat people outsiders and justified their 
exclusion from Australian society. They were portrayed as pawns in a mythical 
struggle between the ‘good’ Australian party-government establishment defending 
Australia from ‘bad’ people smugglers.     
 
Howard used aquatic metaphors to mythologise the movement of boat people, and 
the capabilities of himself and his party-government, in similar practices to British 
leaders. His language showed parallel Judeo-Christian influences from British 
society. For Australian society, aquatic metaphors resonate because of ongoing 
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spatial identifications as an ‘island continent’. Phrases such as “outflow” 
(09.11.2009), “flood” (20.06.2005; 16.06.2006) and “flood of boats” (20.06.2005), 
depicted the movement of boat people in a spiritualised fashion. Like Cameron, 
Howard also acted out the role of Noah for Australian society.  
 
Howard steered societal attachments to position himself as a defender of Australian 
society. He mythologised the “Pacific Solution” to the problem of boat people 
outsiders. This was sustained by idealised attachments as ‘protectors’ fulfilling 
collective-nationalist code, while maintaining selective, distorted attachments to 
the humanist-egalitarian code through insistence on the humaneness of his 
treatment of boat people. Howard remarked that “the core of the [asylum  seeker] 
policy was to stop the boats coming and that policy has been an outstanding 
success” (14.07.2004). He also credited his “Pacific Solution” as the antidote to the 
problem of boat arrivals, who must be prevented from reaching a vulnerable 
Australian “mainland” (14.07.2004). Howard blocked perceptions of any other 
alternative pathways that did not endorse or justify his efforts to protect Australia, 
through coercive practices such as mandatory detention.  
 
The “children overboard” story with the overt use of the aquatic term “overboard” 
epitomised and legitimised the stigmatisation of boat people. The so called ‘children 
overboard affair’ involved the misleading allegation by Howard and his ministers 
that asylum seekers had thrown their children into the ocean to elicit rescue. This 
accusation stigmatised boat people and helped the Coalition win the 2001 Federal 
Election166. Howard noted that “genuine refugees don’t throw their children 
overboard into the sea” (08.10.2001). This account continues as follows.  
 
“Quite frankly Alan I don’t want in this country people who 
are prepared, if those reports167 are true, to throw their own 
children overboard. And that kind of emotional blackmail 
                                                 
166 See Marr and Wilkinson (2004), and the report of the Senate Committee that investigated the 
Children Overboard Affair (Commonwealth of Australia 2002). 
167 Howard explained that “On the 9th of October I received an ONA report that read in part as 
follows: Asylum seekers wearing life-jackets jumped into the sea and children were thrown in with 
them. Such tactics have previously been used elsewhere, for example, by people smugglers and Iraqi  
asylum seekers on boats intercepted by the Italian Navy.” (08.11.2001) 
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is very distressing, it must be very distressing for the sailors 
on the vessel, I feel for them, many of them young men and 
women confronting this kind of situation is very difficult and 
I thank them very warmly for the job that they’re doing on 
behalf of Australia. But we cannot allow ourselves to be 
intimated by this. It’s a difficult issue. As of now the boat is 
being denied entry into Australian territorial waters and it’s 
at the border of what’s called the contiguous zone and I think 
I shall have to content myself at this stage in saying that 
various options are being explored.”  (08.10.2001)  
 
The account above accused boat outsiders of trying to emotionally “blackmail” the 
established groups in Australian society.  The allegation that boat people were 
endangering the lives of their children to provoke rescue, confirmed their 
stigmatisation as evil lawbreakers. The children overboard story was linked to 
notions of responsible parentship and the idealisation of family groups. Howard 
appealed to societal revulsions against people/parents who would recklessly 
endanger the lives of their children. He propagated a myth that boat people 
outsiders were ‘bad’ parents. This resonated among sections of the insecure 
established about the decline of ‘the family’ as a form of societal organisation.    
 
Detention Centres & the Regionalisation of Fears 
 
For Howard and Rudd, the mandatory detention of boat people outsiders fulfilled 
the collective-nationalist attachments to defend Australia and deter future boat 
people from reaching Australia. The practice propagated greater socio-
psychological fortifications in Australian society.   
 
Howard and Rudd sustained widening circles of disassociation between established 
groups and boat people outsiders. Mandatory detention directed public 
associations towards the immediate satisfaction of collective-nationalist 
attachments, and symbolised commitments to border protection. Planned and 
practiced mandatory detention measures protected Australian society from the 
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harmful catastrophic movement of boat people outsiders. This practice fulfilled the 
mythologised status of Australian leaders as societal ‘protectors’. Boat people 
outsiders were expected to internalise the fear of incarceration. In the following 
accounts, Howard and Rudd advocated the mandatory detention of boat outsiders.    
 
“I understand that living in a detention centre in Woomera is 
not as comfortable an existence as living in the community in 
Australia, I accept that but it also has to be said, again, that 
these people have come to Australia illegally and if we don't 
have a detention system, which was introduced by the Labor 
Party when in Government 10 years ago and still more or less 
supported by the Labor Party when it suits them, when they 
think that might be the weight of public opinion, then unless 
we have a detention system our immigration control 
processes are going to break down.” (08.03.2002) 
 
“Our position has not changed and it won't change and that is 
that people who seek to come here in an unauthorised way 
face the prospect of mandatory detention, but we have 
introduced some changes which ensure that families with 
children will be looked after in community detention, in other 
words they won't be in a detention centre, and we have also 
put in place an arrangement where if somebody has been in 
detention for two years, then the ombudsman can have a look 
at it and is entitled to make a recommendation to the minister. 
The minister is not forced to follow that recommendation, but 
that will certainly ensure far greater transparency, and far 
greater accountability of the system and I think that strikes a 
very good balance between the national need to prevent 
unauthorised arrival and the human responsibility and 




“Well the first thing Kerry is to ensure that we've got the 
effective interdiction of vessels that are seeking to bring 
asylum seekers from various parts of the world that they are 
properly processed through our mandatory detention 
centre on Christmas Island. And those who are not valid 
asylum seekers sent straight back home, and those who are 
determined to be asylum seekers with legitimate refugee 
claims are then appropriately resettled through the 
resettlement processes.” (22.10.2009a) 
 
Each of the accounts above demonstrated continued support for the practice of 
mandatory detention, which legitimised intangible fears of boat people outsiders. 
For Australian leaders, the mandatory detention of asylum seekers continued to be 
an unquestionable societal regulation.   
 
For Howard, the incarceration of asylum seekers was compassionate in accordance 
with attachments to both humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist codes.  
This came from “the national need” for the incarceration of boat people to deter the 
arrival of others, superficially upholding “human responsibility”, for example with 
the development of “community detention” for children and families (20.06.2005). 
His justification for mandatory detention was through the forecast of societal chaos: 
a breakdown of “our immigration control processes” should the practice be 
discontinued (08.03.2002). He used the possessive pronoun “our” to affirm 
attachments and commitments on different sides of Australian politics for the 
continuation of this practice (08.03.2002). Mandatory detention was an 
unquestionable, unchangeable societal practice (08.03.2002; 20.06.2005).  
 
The accepted consensus behind the mandatory detention continued under Rudd.  
Towards the end of his Prime Ministership, public attention focused on the 
detention centre on Christmas Island.  The speculation that the Christmas Island 
detention centre was nearing full capacity trigged fears about societal cohesion, 
should boat people outsiders be brought to the mainland (02.02.2010; 14.02.2010; 
03.04.2010; 06.03.2010; 24.03.2010). Christmas Island became part of border the 
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militarisation of the maritime space around the Australian mainland that required 
the “interdiction of vessels” (22.10.2009a).  
 
The language of Howard and Rudd distorted depictions of relations with Australia’s 
near neighbours, particularly Indonesia.  Rudd highlighted the “risk of fragile states” 
referring to Australia’s near neighbours places such as the Solomon Islands and 
Timor Leste. He raised the “risk of refugee outflows” with negative consequences 
should Australia fail to act in “times of crisis” (04.12.2008). Relations with near 
neighbours narrowed to cooperation bound to the collective-nationalist defence of 
Australia against the mythologised movement of harmful boat outsiders. Howard 
remarked that his efforts not only required the militarised inception of boats, but 
also cooperation with “Indonesian authorities” (16.06.2006). Rudd also restricted 
relations with Indonesia to “cooperative efforts to deal with the scourge of people 
smugglers, as they represent the vilest form of people on the planet” (14.10 .2009). 
Indonesia became understood as a bulwark against a mythical flood of boat arrivals 
and collaborator in the mythologised struggle against people smugglers. Howard 
and Rudd obscured deeper understandings Australia’s relations with near 
neighbours. In doing so they helped perpetuate longstanding insecure Australian 




This chapter has evaluated the migration language of Australian Prime Ministers 
John Howard and Kevin Rudd from 2001 to 2010. I investigated their speeches, 
interviews and press conferences, which were part of the reconstruction of the 
societal processes that situated the modes of thinking and orientation in Australian 
society.  
 
I have argued that Australian leaders disseminated modes of thinking and 
orientation that fortified Australian society, through more harmful interpretations 
of asylum seeker and refugee movements by boat. Howard and Rudd mobilised 
shared anxieties and propagated more reductive modes of thinking in Australian 
society. Commodified depictions of transnational outsiders were intermixed with 
214 
 
idealised attachment to humanist-egalitarian and collective-nationalist normative 
codes. Although Howard and Rudd showed some differences in approach, there wa s 
consistent movement towards a more closed consciousness underpinned by 
attachments to the collective-nationalist normative code and commitments to 
border protection. Transnational outsiders became risks to insecure sections of 
established groups in Australian society.   
 
More harmful risk orientations dominated understandings of refugee and asylu m 
seeker movement to Australia. The criminalisation of boat people outsiders 
cultivated more masculinised orientations that reinforced objectified 
understandings of boat arrivals.  Fears about societal cohesion and people 
smugglers stigmatised boat people outsiders and legitimised their exclusion.  The 
language of Howard and Rudd twisted Australia’s regionalised relations by 
prioritising collective-nationalist commitments to mandatory detention. These 
practices cultivated greater socio-psychological fortifications against the threat of 
incoming migrants, specifically boat people.  
 
The next chapter will illustrate the expanded socio-psychological fortifications in 
Australian society. The migration language of Howard and Rudd set the tone for 
harmful depictions of asylum seeker and refugee outsiders and the distortion of 
Australian diplomacy. Their successors Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott and Malcolm 
Turnbull strengthened and expanded these understandings of migrants as threats 












Chapter 6.                                                                                    
An Investigation into the Major Public Migration 
Speeches by Julia Gillard (2010-2012), Tony Abbott 
(2014-2015) and Malcolm Turnbull (2016-2017) 
 
The last chapter evaluated the migration language of Australian Prime Ministers 
John Howard and Kevin Rudd during the period from 2001 to 2010. This employed 
a process and risk sociological approach to understand shared anxieties in 
Australian society. I reconstructed the societal processes that fortified Australian 
society. The language of Howard and Rudd mobilised shared anxieties through the 
commodification of relations between established groups and transnational 
outsiders and cultivated conflicting idealised attachments to humanist-egalitarian 
and collective-nationalist normative codes. Commitments to border protection 
underpinned the swing to the collective-nationalist normative code where 
transnational movement and in particular asylum seekers and refugees arriving in 
Australia by boat were seen as risks to established sections of Australian society. 
These processes contributed to widening circles of disassociation that legitimised 
the mandatory detention of boat outsiders and warped Australia’s regionalised 
relations.    
 
My sixth and final chapter evaluates the migration language of Julia Gillard (2010 -
2012), Tony Abbott (2014-2015) and Malcolm Turnbull (2016-2017). The 
synthesis of process and risk sociology developed in Chapters 1 and 2 offers a 
sophisticated model of interdependency and power relations nexuses to 
reconstruct the societal processes in the speeches, interviews and press 
conferences of Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull. The sociological model for shared 
anxieties developed in this thesis, advances a way to understand the socio-





2010 to 2017 was a tumultuous time in Australian politics and society. There were 
four Prime Ministers in 8 years: Julia Gillard, Kevin Rudd, Tony Abbott and Malcolm 
Turnbull. 2013 saw 3 leaders in the space of 12 months, beginning with Gillard, then 
Rudd’s second term (lasting 2.5 months), and ending with the election of Abbott. 
Rudd is not addressed in this chapter, since his remarks were the focus of study in 
the preceding chapter. 
 
Each of these leaders pursued more calculating ‘solutions’ to the ‘problems’ of boat 
people arrivals and the issue of border deaths on Australia’s maritime frontier (see 
Weber and Pickering 2014). According to data from the Australian Border Deaths 
Database there were 1,095168 deaths linked with Australia’s borders from 2010-
2017 (BOb 2018), with 201 fatalities as the largest single loss of life, occurring off 
East Java on the 17th of December 2011.   
 
Gillard sought a more regionalised resolution dubbed the ‘Malaysia Solution’, under 
the auspices of a “Regional Cooperation Framework”, where boat people outsiders 
would have their asylum claims processed in Malaysia rather than Australia  
(25.07.2011). When the full bench of Australia’s High Court invalidated the Malaysia 
Solution (O’Sullivan 2011). She revived the Howard era ‘Pacific solution’ with 
detention centres on Manus Island, and Nauru, which were recast as “regional 
processing facilities” (08.09.2012).  
 
Abbott pursued a less sanitised and more militarised outcomes with “Operation 
Sovereign Borders” that ‘stopped the boats’ through “turning boats around” to 
Indonesia. Abbott’s language made it acceptable for the Australian Border Force 
(ABF) to conduct ‘Operation Fortitude’, the failed attempt on the 28th of August 
2015 to conduct on the spot visa checks at various locations around the Central 
Business District of Melbourne (Davey 2015). Although Turnbull’s language was 
less fervent than Abbott’s, he still sought his own ‘solution’ through a ref ugee swap 
deal with the United States (21.09.2016b), which rejected asylum seekers on Nauru 
and Manus Island, and accepted Central American refugees (21.09.2016b).  
                                                 
168 This figure is just below the number road fatalities experienced each year from 2010-2017, 2010 




The rapid changes in government from the Labor Party to Liberal Party, as well as 
Prime Ministers, did not result in any significant shifts in migration vocabulary. 
Each leader maintained the longstanding practices of Australian party-government 
establishments to defend, deter, and detain boat people outsiders. From 2010 to 
2017, the mandatory detention of asylum seekers whether in onshore or offshore 
facilities continued throughout this period of Australian society.  
 
There was in fact an intensification of harsher migration language. Abbott and 
Turnbull in particular blamed their predecessors Rudd and Gillard for the 
‘migration problem’, while praising themselves and their party-government 
establishment. The statements from Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull propagated 
policies, practices and societal expectations within Australian society. Their 
language contextualised the relations of Australian society within wider 
international society. 
 
I argue that the migration language of Prime Ministers Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull 
deepened the socio-psychological fortifications in Australian society. The societal 
processes found in the vocabulary of Howard and Rudd, continued and expanded 
into the vocabulary of Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull.  
 
Australian leaders in this period demonstrated three similarities with British 
leaders. Firstly, there was the continued commodification of societal relations and 
stresses of cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian and de-cosmopolitanised 
collective-nationalist normative codes, which swayed the criminalisation and 
objectification of transnational outsiders. Secondly, material from Abbott and 
Turnbull in particular showed more involved short-term leadership styles that 
blamed their political opponents for making Australian society vulnerable to 
harmful transnational people movements. Thirdly, the prioritisatio n of party 
political survival favoured attachments to the collective nationalist code, which 





There were also two key differences. Firstly, representations of migration by British 
leaders solely distorted relations with Europe, while Australian leaders in this 
period contributed to a wider distortion not only relations with regional neighbours 
in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, but also Europe. Secondly, Australian 
leaders displayed more extreme fixations on asylum seekers and refugees who 
arrived by boat, who were vilified through connections with people smugglers. The 
persistent language of protective borders and destructive boats raised the barriers 
of societal inclusion and widened the scale of societal exclusion. Gillard, Abbott and 
Turnbull circulated reductive modes of thinking and narrow societal orientations 
in Australian society. 
 
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section shows the mobilisation of 
shared anxieties and ongoing dissemination of reductive modes of thinking in 
Australian society. The second section demonstrates the continuing fortification of 
Australian society through narrow societal orientations.  
 
Continued Mobilisation of Shared Anxieties in Australia 
 
The following section illustrates the perpetuation of reductive modes of thinking in 
Australian society. Continued tensions within multiculturalisation processes 
situated Australian conscience formation. Attitudes towards the transnational 
movement of people became increasing strained through the contradictory 
identifications within established societal groups that commodified the movement 
of transnational outsiders. The language of Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull again 
displayed idealised struggles between humanist-egalitarian and collective-
nationalist normative codes. The balance between these codes favoured the 
collective-nationalist code, which helped to characterise migrants as risks, and was 






Ongoing Multiculturalisation Processes  
 
Tensions from multiculturalisation processes continued to situate Australian 
societal conscience formations. The awareness of wider globalised webs of 
interdependence affected localised power struggles around contemporary 
transnational people movements.   
 
Australian leaders from 2010 to 2017 idealised their society as an open, welcoming 
society, which successfully balanced totalising assimilation, with the acceptance of 
cultural distinctiveness (the multiple cultures that have infused Australian society). 
They spoke with nostalgic reverence towards the contributions of post-1945 
movements of people who have become part of established groups (19.09.2012; 
28.06.2014; 19.03.2017; 22.03.2017). Gillard in particular highlighted her own 
personal experience of post-1945 movement stating that “I'm a migrant” 
(29.06.2010; 26.01.2011). In the following accounts, Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull 
idealised past movements of people into Australia.   
 
“We’ve been a long-term welcoming country of new 
migrations. I mean I migrated to this country. Migration 
really built this nation post World War II and Australians are 
very conscious of that and very conscious and proud of having 
developed a multicultural, peaceful, successful society 
through migration.” (21.02.2011) 
 
“We have had 7.5 million people arrive on these shores since 
the Second World War and 1.2 million arrive on these shores 
since 2000. It is at the core of our being and sense of self as 
Australians that we are an immigrant nation and we should 
be so proud of the fact that people all around the world look 
to us as a place that they might choose to live. We should 
be so proud of the fact that so many millions of people have 
voted with their feet for Australia. Now, I know that 
sometimes the number of migrants is a little scary to 
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those of us who have been here a little longer. There have 
been times in my life when I confess to feeling a little 
apprehensive about the pace of change, but the more you get 
to know migrants to this country the more you understand 
how keen they are to become Australian – yes, in their own 
way and yes at their own pace, but to become Australian as 
quickly as they can. They have come here not to change us, 
but to join us so that, the us, is a greater more diverse and 
richer us than it was before.” 
(24.03.2014) 
 
“Australia is one of the most successful multicultural 
societies in the world – from the oldest human cultures of our 
First Australians, to those people who come from almost 
every UN member state. Ours is indeed an immigration 
nation. More than a quarter of our people were born 
overseas. Australians are not defined by religion or race, we 
are defined by political values; a common commitment to 
democracy, freedom and the rule of law, underpinned and 
secured by mutual respect. These values drive our approach 
to migration. We invite 190,000 migrants each year to join 
our nation of 24 million. And our commitment to refugees is 
longstanding – our humanitarian resettlement program dates 
back to 1947. This has made Australians truly global 
citizens, connected by family, culture and language to people 
across the globe. These links drive economic development, 
trade and innovation. Australians are enriched by the cultural 
diversity of our community - we regard our people as our 
greatest assets and our unity in diversity, one of our greatest 
strengths.” (19.09.2016) 
 
In the accounts above, Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull articulated beliefs that 
transnational people movements have made Australian society successful and 
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prosperous in the present. This did not extend to future movements. Each leader 
channelled collective attachments to an Australian society that has become “one of 
the most successful multicultural societies in the world”, a positive magnet for 
“people all around the world” and a “peaceful society” (19.09.2016; 24.03.2014; 
21.02.2011).  
 
Abbott and Turnbull expressed different interpretations of contemporary 
transnational migrants. Turnbull articulated the attitudes of more secure techno -
economic bourgeois sections of established groups. He spoke of how “190,000 
migrants each year” transformed Australians into global citizens highly 
interconnected through bonds of family, culture and language (19.09.2016).  
 
On the other hand, Abbott channelled the beliefs of more insecure immobile 
politico-economic citoyen members of the established groups. The phrase “they 
have come here not to change us, but to join us”, expressed lingering attitudes of 
insecure Anglo-Celtic established groups resistant to societal diversifications, who 
sought comfort in a singular national identification. There was the implicit the belief 
that newcomers must change “to become Australian as quickly as they can”, to join 
the unchanging oldcomers (also see 21.08.2014). He noted concerns of people “who 
have been here a little169 longer”, which implied the descendants of British settlers 
and convicts.  
  
Commodification of Transnational People Movements  
 
Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull verbalised the understandings of established ultra -
commercial bourgeois societal groupings with a high power ratio in Australian 
society. These groupings commodified transnational people movements into 
objects that can be controlled and traded. Turnbull expressed the desire for “the 
brightest and best” (21.04.2017; 06.03.2017) people of the world with pre-existing 
status and financial capital that contributed to values such as ‘our economy’. He 
                                                 
169 The phrase “a little longer” carries a British understatement in the sense that it excludes  
Indigenous Australians, who of course have been in Australia a lot longer.  
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mirrored formulations of this same phrase by Cameron (10.10.2011a), May 
(21.11.2016) and Howard (07.03.2007).  
 
The Gillard to Turnbull years also saw an expansion of a more dominant national 
security establishment with coordinated bureaucratic functionaries. By the end of 
2017, Australia experienced a period of sizeable bureaucratic reorganisation that 
saw the creation of a Home Affairs Ministry, which bound functionaries such as 
ASIO170, AFP171 and the ABF into a singular bureaucratic portfolio reporting directly 
to the Home Affairs Minister (18.07.2017). These groupings were highly sensitive 
to any form of transnational movement deemed harmful to Australian society. 
 
The new national security establishment utilised a militarised vocabulary in 
relations with incoming migrants. This stressed the importance of politico -
economic citoyen settler identifications, which divided societal relations into those 
that were threatening and non-threating to the timeless value of ‘the nation’. The 
functions of the Home Affairs Minister incorporated societal regulations over 
transnational movement. Turnbull described the Home Affairs Minister as “the  chief 
recruiter for Australia to get the best and brightest from the world and to make sure 
that the people we want to come into Australia come in, and those who we have not 
permitted to come in do not” (19.03.2017). The following accounts showed 
articulations of a bourgeois establishment and the creeping prominence of a 
national security establishment.  
 
“We are seeing the century of growth and development in the 
Asian region, the economic weight of the globe moving to 
the region in which we live. The resources boom is a down 
payment on the prosperity that will flow during this century 
of change and, certainly, strong demand for Australia’s 
services, including high quality education services, will be a 
boom industry for us during this century of change. It is, 
therefore, good news for Australia that APEC is getting on 
                                                 
170 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Australian equivalent to Britain’s MI5.  
171 Australian Federal Police  
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with the job of making sure that we can look forward to a 
future of greater mobility and exchange in education . I 
want to see more students from our region study in 
Australia. I want to see more Australian students go into the 
countries of our region and do some section of their education 
in the countries of our region.”  (08.09.2012) 
 
“Our Party went to the last election with a plan to build a 
strong, prosperous economy and a safe, secure 
Australia.……..For over seventy years, the Liberal Party has 
built modern Australia – not on ideology, but on backing hard 
working Australians – people prepared to have a go………If 
you’re a migrant who came the right way to build a better 
life for your children – we’re for you. ………Our party has been 
built by hundreds of thousands of men and women from all 
walks of life, from every nook and cranny under the Southern 
Cross. We believe in family, in community and that our 
nation’s greatest achievements come when our people are 
encouraged to have a go. We reflect the length and breadth of 
Australian life: young and old, rich and poor, farmer and 
suburbanite, indigenous and immigrant, tradies and nurses.” 
(27.06.2015) 
 
“So the immigration program operates in our national 
interest, to support our economy……You know you’ve got 
to recognise that in a global economy, it’s important to be able 
to bring people in with skills from overseas, it’s important for 
Aussies to go and work overseas. I mean as you know, there’s 
well over a million Australians working overseas at any time. 
But at the same time we’ve got to make sure we put 
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Australian jobs first. That’s what I did when we abolished 
the 457172 program, which was getting rorted.” 
(31.08.2017) 
 
Each of the accounts above discussed the importance of transnational people 
movements to the movement financial capital and skilled labour. In account 
08.09.2012, Gillard characterised an Australian establishment increasingly more 
comfortable and accustomed to the movement of people from the Asian region. She 
expressed techno-economic bourgeois identifications that “the economic weight of 
the globe” is now closer to Australia creating a future of “greater demand” for 
desired movement through education exchanges and the growing demand for 
Australian service industries. In account 27.06.2015, Abbott noted an openness to 
migrant outsiders who come in “the right way to build a better life”. He assumed 
that there were wrong ways to enter, which would jeopardise the government’s 
“plan to build a strong, prosperous economy and a safe, secure Australia”. 
 
There were growing expressions of more immobile politico -economic citoyen 
identifications. Turnbull noted how transnational movement must serve “our 
national interest” and support “our economy” (31.08.2017). Although he 
highlighted the importance for Australians to work overseas. He gave precedence 
to jobs for citizens over strangers. There was a growing inclination to ‘protect’ 
employment within Australia from transnational movement beyond, by putting 
“Australian jobs first”. Abbott and Turnbull revealed the development of national-
militarised understandings that were less open to reciprocal exchanges of people 
and capital, more focused on one-way benefits to established groups in Australian 
society.        
 
Australian leaders commodified migrants along a spectrum that swung from 
relatively harmless to relatively harmful.  These outsiders were characterised by a 
lower power ratio. Harmless migrants included students from places such as 
Indonesia, China and India (03.11.2010; 11.04.2014; 25.05.2014; 05.09.2014), 
                                                 
172 A temporary skilled work visa where applicants could work in Australia for up to 4 years that was 
discontinued by Turnbull’s government.  
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more harmful migrants indicated refugees and asylum seekers, often with the prefix 
‘illegal’ and specialised phrases like “unauthorised arrival”. The following accounts 
showed the continuation of more harmful interpretations of transnational 
movement, specifically the movement of asylum seekers and refugees arriving by 
boat.     
 
“Today I am announcing steps to strengthen Australia's 
border protection arrangements. I am setting out the long-
term approach we will take to dealing with the pressure of 
unauthorised arrivals. We are taking these steps in 
response to the increase in unauthorised people 
movements in our region and around the world. I am also 
making the Government's policy goal clear: it is to wreck the 
people-smuggling trade by removing the incentive for boats 
to leave their port of origin in the first place; to remove both 




“This is the first boat which has got as close to success, if you 
like, as one has in many a long month. We are determined to 
respond to this one in ways which underline – underline – our 
absolute implacable opposition to people smuggling and 
our complete and utter determination to do whatever we 
legally can, whatever we morally and ethically can to stop 
the boats because every boat that comes is exposing its 
passengers to potentially lethal risk. Every boat that comes 
is encouraging people smugglers and their customers to 
think that there is an illegal way to Australia. Well, there's 
not. The message I repeat – the message I repeat – is that if 
you come to Australia illegally by boat you will never ever 
get permanent residency. So, if you want to come to this 
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country, come the right way, not the wrong way, because if 
you come the wrong way you will never stay here.” 
(26.07.2014) 
 
“It is a critically important strong message to send to the 
people smugglers. They must know that the door to Australia 
is closed to those who seek to come here by boat with a 
people smuggler. It is closed. We accept thousands of 
refugees, and we do so willingly, but we will not tolerate any 
repeat of the people smuggling ventures which resulted in 




Each of the accounts understood the movement of asylum seekers and refugees 
arriving by boat as a commodified harm to Australian society.  In account 
06.07.2010, Gillard remarked that the globalised and regionalised “increase in 
unauthorised people movements” compelled efforts to “strengthen Australia's 
border protection arrangements”. Australian leaders as a whole stigmatised boat 
outsiders, the “customers” of people smugglers engaged in a harmful illicit trade 
that in Abbott words exposed “passengers to potentially lethal risk” (26.07.2014).  
At the same time, Gillard, Abbott, and Turnbull emphasised humanist-egalitarian 
attachments that idealised their capacities to prevent fatalities that reduced the 
“profitability” of a dangerous trade.    
 
Australian leaders maintained nominal degrees of openness towards refugees, as 
stressed by Turnbull in account 30.10.2016. The difference between the harmful 
boat outsiders and safe refugees is that the latter were more controllable and 
selectable, like any commodity, according to the tastes of the party-government 
establishment at the time. There was an expressed preference for Central American 
refugees in exchange for boat people from Nauru and Manus Island through a swap 
deal with the US (21.09.2016b), as well as the preference for refugees from 
Christian communities in Syria and Iraq (21.04.2017). The oscillating 
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interpretations of transnational movement between less harmful refugees and the 
more harmful boat movement represented competing idealisations between 
humanist-egalitarian and collective nationalist codes.   
 
Normative Code Tensions of Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull 
 
Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull idealised both cosmopolitanised humanist-egalitarian 
and de-cosmopolitanised collective-nationalist normative codes. The power 
struggles between these codes played out in their representations of migration.  
Superficial human-egalitarian attachments did not restrain persistent fluctuations 
to the collective-nationalist code.  
 
They verbalised a relative commitment to the humanist-egalitarian normative code. 
The more positive articulations of “refugees” and refugee movement sustained 
collective idealisations of Australian society as a compassionate society. Australian 
leaders tied collective compassion to vague references towards upholding “our 
international obligations” and “legal obligations”, as well as indifferent mentions of 
the Refugee Convention. There was very little discussion on what those obligations 
and conventions actually entailed for the treatment of refugees (08.09.2012; 
25.07.2014; 26.07.2014). Selective compassion was used to deflect criticism from 
sections of Australian and international society (Davidson 2018; Cody and Nawaz 
2017). The degree of openness towards refugees was paradoxically conditional on 
widened circles of disassociation that enabled arbitrary selection by the 
government at the time. The term refugee was often modified with the prefix 
“genuine” (04.07.2010; 25.07.2011; 28.08.2012; 09.09.2012; 22.03.2014; 
19.09.2016). Australian leaders preferred “genuine refugees” so long as they waited 
their turn, and were more open to camp refugees rather than boat refugees 
(07.09.2015; 10.07.2017).  
 
All three Australian leaders channelled superficial human-egalitarian attachments 
through openness to refugee movement into more collective-nationalist 




“The size of our humanitarian intake needs to be determined 
by the Australian government, we're a compassionate and 
generous people and we step up and do more than our fair 
share in terms of taking refugees from refugee camps 
around the world, so we do have an intake there.” 
(20.12.2010) 
 
“I think Australians are pretty sick of being lectured to. I 
really think Australians are sick of being lectured to by 
the United Nations, particularly given that we have stopped 
the boats, and by stopping the boats we have ended the 
deaths at sea. The most humanitarian, the most decent, the 
most compassionate thing you can do is stop these boats 
because hundreds, we think about 1,200 in fact, drowned at 
sea during the flourishing of the people smuggling trade 
under the former government. So, the best thing you can do 
to uphold the universal decencies of mankind , the best 
thing that you can do to ensure that the best values of our 
world are realised is to stop the boats and that’s exactly what 
we have done. We have stopped the boats and I think the UN’s 
representatives would have a lot more credibility if they were 
to give some credit to the Australian Government for what 
we’ve been able to achieve in this area.” 
(09.03.2015) 
 
“above all, the most compassionate thing we can do is 
keeping the boats stopped. The only policy - and we know 
this from experience, you may say we know it from bitter 
experience - the only policy that works is the strongest 
position on border security. That is very clear. So we are a 
compassionate nation, we bring in a lot of refugees, but 
we decide which refugees come here. We will not ever, as the 
Labor Party did, outsource our refugee policy to people 
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smugglers. That's what Labor did and we paid a terrible price 
for it and above all, the 1,200 at least who drowned at sea, 
they paid a shocking price. They lost their lives because of 
people smugglers.” (20.09.2017) 
 
Each of the accounts above displayed idealised commitments to the humanist-
egalitarian code through openness to refugee outsiders. Gillard, Abbott and 
Turnbull said in melodramatic tones that “we're a compassionate and generous 
people”, and “uphold the universal decencies of mankind”, making Australia “a 
compassionate nation” through the acceptance of refugees (20.12.2010; 
09.03.2015; 20.09.2017). Australian leaders maintained more fantastical humanist-
egalitarian idealisations of themselves and their party-government establishment. 
Their language showed consistent efforts to evade criticism from globalised 
institutions such as the UNHCR (2013), which have noted Australia’s 
inconsistencies with international human rights law (Davidson 2018; Cody and 
Nawaz 2017).   
 
In accounts 09.03.2015 and 20.09.2017, Abbott and Turnbull distorted humanist-
egalitarian compassion into a fig leaf justification for collective-nationalist 
attachments and militarised efforts towards the stopping of harmful boats. Abbott 
rejected criticism by asserting that “Australians are sick of being lectured to by the 
United Nations”, by implication delegitimising the authority of the United Nations, 
which questioned their treatment of boat people (09.03.2015).  
 
Turnbull directed nationalised attachments towards his government and their 
prevention of deaths by drowning in Australian waters, but only through having 
“the strongest position on border security” (20.09.2017). ‘Protecting’ refugees 







Border Worship in Fortified Australia 
 
Constant emphasis on “the national interest” became a totalising ethos that 
legitimised the actions and behaviours of Australian leaders, and delegitimised 
criticism from other sections of Australian society. Transnational outsiders were 
expected to become part of “Team Australia” (21.08.2014; 18.12.2014; 24.05.2015), 
and to venerate “Australian values” (26.01.2011; 19.03.2017; 18.04.2017; 
20.04.2017; 21.04.2017). Turnbull remarked that these included “rule of law, 
democracy, freedom, mutual respect, equality for men and women. These 
fundamental values are what make us Australian” (20.04.2017). Abbott and 
Turnbull overlooked the fact that the values they defined as uniquely “Australian” 
were found in a range of liberal-democratic societies. The projection of a singular 
nationalised attachment to ‘Australia’ was incommensurable and superior to any 
other forms of attachment.  
 
Australian leaders displayed strident idealisations of national borders. They 
consistently reinforced a standard that all state-societies must have totalised 
control over their borders. Those societies that cannot control their borders 
catastrophically reduced their status in international society. The maintenance of 
borders was dependant on vulnerabilities within Australian society that 
necessitated the strengthening of boundaries beyond Australian society. The 
following accounts demonstrated collective-nationalist attachments to the 
preservation of borders, which encapsulated the stopping of boat outsiders.  
 
“That there is nothing humane about a voyage across 
dangerous seas with the ever-present risk of death in leaky 
boats captained by people smugglers. That Australia's basic 
decency does not accept the idea of punishing women and 
children by locking them up behind razor wire or ignoring 
people who are fleeing genocide, torture, and persecution; 
nor does it allow us to stand back and watch fellow human 
beings drown in the water, but equally there is nothing 
inconsistent between these decencies and our commitment to 
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secure borders and fair, orderly migration. The rule of 
law in a just society is part of what attracts so many people 
to Australia. It must be applied properly to those who seek 
asylum, just as it must be applied to all of us. That no-one 
should have an unfair advantage and be able to subvert 
orderly migration programs. That there should be no 
incentive for people smugglers to take even bigger risks 
with people's lives in the name of mercenary profits. That 
people smuggling is an evil trade to be punished.”    
(06.07.2010) 
 
“I said that we would stop the boats and I am not declaring 
victory, but my friends, we are stopping those boats. The 
most compassionate thing we could do coming into 
Government was to stop the boats, because not only does 
stopping the boats stop the Budget blowouts, not only does 
stopping the boats save billions in unnecessary future 
spending, but stopping the boats stops the deaths. That’s 
why the most decent and the most compassionate thing that 
this Government has done is to ensure that for more than six 
months now there has been no successful people smuggling 
venture to our country. We will never waver. We will never 
waver in our determination to stop the boats. We will never 
waver in our commitment to do what we have to do to stop 
the boats because we must have secure borders. The sign 
of a sovereign country is that it has secure borders. While 
we are stopping the boats, what’s the Labor Party doing? Well, 
the Labor Party, as we know, can never stop the boats because 
it is in alliance with The Greens and as far as The Greens are 
concerned, if you can get here, you can stay here. Well ladies 
and gentlemen, this is the problem: you just cannot trust the 





“In particular our strong border protection policies have 
ensured that Australians know once again…….that it is only 
their Government which determines who comes to 
Australia…. Howard’s strong policies were dropped by Labor 
when they were elected in 2007 and over six years there were 
50,000 unlawful arrivals and at least 1,200 deaths at 
sea.…….As Europe grapples today with unsustainable 
inflows of migrants and asylum seekers, the Australian 
experience offers both a cautionary tale and the seeds of a 
potential solution. The lesson is very clear: weak borders 
fragment social cohesion, drain public revenue, raise 
community concerns about national security, and ultimately 
undermine the consensus required to sustain high levels of 
immigration and indeed multiculturalism itself. Ultimately, 
division. In contrast, strong borders and retention of our 
sovereignty allow government to maintain public trust in 
community safety, respect for diversity and support for our 
immigration and humanitarian programs.” (10.07.2017)  
 
Each of the accounts above discussed the importance of secure borders. In account 
06.07.2010, Gillard channelled humanist-egalitarian notions of “basic decency”, and 
the refusal to not “stand back and watch fellow human beings drown”. This shifted 
to collective-nationalist notions of repelling any violation of “secure borders”. Boat 
people outsiders were stigmatised as people who could destabilise the values of 
fairness and organisation through links with the “evil trade” of people smuggling 
(06.07.2010).  
 
In account 12.07.2014, Abbott twisted collective compassion to the stopping of 
boats as objects (not vessels with human beings) that appealed to techno -economic 
bourgeois identifications, prioritising economic growth. Stopping boats through 
securing borders became a totalising symbol of party-government establishment 
dominance in Australian society, hence “the sign of a sovereign country is that it has 
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secure borders” (12.07.2014). Abbott viciously stigmatised other established 
groups such as the Labor Party and the Greens for making Australian society more 
insecure through lack of devotion to border protection. These groups are presumed 
to place the relative independence of Australian state-society in peril.  
 
Turnbull channelled the collective-nationalist code through depictions of harmful 
boat outsider movement and vociferous commitments to border protection. He 
condemned the Rudd and Gillard governments for abandoning “Howard’s strong 
[border protection] policies”, which resulted in “50,000 unlawful arrivals and at 
least 1,200 deaths at sea”. He not only further mythologised the policies from the 
Howard era of Australian society, but also implied that the Rudd and Gillard  
governments were solely responsible for bringing deaths to the boundaries of 
Australian society, and that only his Coalition government could protect Australia. 
Turnbull divided international society into strong and weak states: strong states 
have impermeable borders, and weak states have porous borders. Europe was 
condemned as a place of weak governments, and Australia was glorified as place of 
strong government. Turnbull invoked fears about loss of societal cohesion, control, 
scarcity of societal resource and death, through depictions of “unsustainable 
inflows of migrants and asylum seekers”. 
 
Globalised People Risks 
 
The narrow focus on borders and boats made Australian leaders more reliant on 
the support of insecure sections of established groups. The movement of boat 
people outsiders became symbols of global risks, which threaten localised power 
relations in Australian society.    
 
Insecure sections of established groups were people who were uncomfortable with 
the diversification of Australian society, with pre-existing concerns over population 
growth, which may only be tangentially linked to the contemporary movement of 
newcomers into their communities. To them, Australian leaders presented highly-
distorted depictions of transnational outsiders, particularly boat people outsiders, 
who were depicted using high fantasy content images. Refugees and asylum seekers 
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were misunderstood as representing the majority of movement to Australia when 
they were in fact the minority. The persistent focus on borders and boats 
disseminated a fictive cause and effect relationship: weak borders became a 
symbolised ‘cause’ of societal vulnerabilities.   
 
Gillard recoiled against “a language of crisis” that sought “to mount those anxieties 
for political profit”, she still felt compelled to remark that “I do understand the 
anxiety and indeed fears that Australians have when they see boats, they see 
boats intercepted” (24.06.2010), without explaining what those fears were.  
 
On the other hand, Abbott and Turnbull manufactured the notion of border chaos 
to reinforce their hold on the balance of societal power. Public confidence was 
bound to border protection. They consistently blamed their political opponents and 
idealised themselves as the rescuers of Australian society from the ‘mess’ of their 
opponents through their greater devotion to ‘border protection’. Their vocabulary 
displayed their personal vulnerabilities about sustaining public confidence and 
losing their status in Australian society (27.07.2015; 23.03.2016a; 21.09.2016a; 
30.10.2016; 30.01.2017; 01.02.2017; 21.04.2017; 19.03.2017; 18.04.2017; 
13.06.2017).  
 
Transnational people movements were represented as risks to established sections 
of Australian society. The involved pursuit of public confidence insulated Australian 
leaders from awareness of the repercussions fostered by their publicised 
vocabulary. They concentrated on the short-term preservation of their own societal 
standing. In the following accounts, Australian leaders including Gillard took a 
populist approach and exploited harmful depictions of boat people and more 
broadly refugees to maintain the support of insecure sections of Australian society.  
 
“Look, what I meant by those comments is I think on a debate 
like asylum seekers people should feel free to saw what they 
feel. And for people to say they're anxious about border 
security doesn't make them intolerant. It certainly doesn't 
make them a racist. It means that they're expressing a 
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genuine view that they're anxious about border security. 
Same token, people who express concern about children 
being in detention, that doesn't mean they're soft on border 
protection. It just means they're expressing a real, human 
concern. So I'd like to sweep away any sense that people 
should close down any debate, including this debate, through 
a sense of self-censorship or political correctness. People 
should say what they feel. And my view is many people in the 
community feel anxious when they see asylum seeker 
boats. And obviously, we as a Government want to manage 
our borders.” (04.07.2010)  
 
“I think it's very important that we carefully consider the 
security status of people, particularly people who are 
coming to us from difficult countries and with difficult 
backgrounds and claiming asylum. Now, you know, I don't 
want to suggest that people who are coming to Australia 
under our various humanitarian programmes are 
security risks – I don't. Nevertheless, it is important that if 
there are any doubts they are resolved. That's why it's so 
important that ASIO and our other agencies are allowed to do 
their work and this is why, under the former government, we 
were so concerned when there were suggestions that ASIO 
should be streamlining or short circuiting these processes. 
The important thing is to ensure that wherever there is a 
significant risk that people will do us harm, we take the 
appropriate action. The point I've been making all along is 
that we do have people in this country who are of 
considerable security concern. I mean, just to go through 
some of the figures, we've got about 70-odd Australians who 
are currently with terrorist groups in the Middle East. 
We've had upwards of 20 come back from serving with 
terrorist groups overseas. We've got at least 100 who are 
236 
 
supporting and funding these terrorist groups overseas. So, 
there are not thousands of people here, but there are certainly 
hundreds of people who are at least of potential interest to 
our security services and that's as it should be given the 
reality of the world we live in.” 
(17.12.2014) 
 
“Now our success as a multicultural society is built on strong 
foundations, which include the confidence of the Australian 
people that their government and it alone, determines who 
comes to Australia. Uncontrolled irregular migration flows 
have posed an existential threat to many countries where as 
Honourable Members know they have fuelled anxiety and 
political disorder. Now our Government has secured 
Australia’s borders - there has not been a successful people 
smuggling expedition to Australia for 1052 days. And when 
we accept refugees into Australia - and we have one of the 
most generous humanitarian programs in the world - we take 
great care with security checks, as we have done with the 
12,000 refugees from the Syrian conflict zone. Those checks 
are only possible if the Government determines which 
refugees are admitted and if the security of the border is not 
outsourced to people smugglers.” 
(13.06.2017) 
 
Each of the accounts above depicted the movement of transnational outsiders as 
potential risks to established groups in Australian society. In account 04.07.2010, 
Gillard bound the management of borders to anxiousness surrounding asylum 
seekers. She and her successors were fearful of any reduction in public confidence, 
because the perception that they could not protect the border would delegitimise 




In account 17.12.2014, Abbott appealed to insecure sections of established groups 
sensitive to the presence of violence in their own lives.  Harmful depictions of 
asylum seeker and refugee outsiders were linked with the flow of violence from the  
Middle East into Australia. This prompted increased security checks because of “a 
significant risk that people will do us harm” (17.12.2014). 
 
Turnbull saw “uncontrolled irregular migration flows” as a static cause of  public 
“anxiety and political disorder”, which in his view reinforced the need for highly 
strict controls on transnational movement (13.06.2017). Any perceived reduction 
of these controls undermined the “strong foundations” of Australia’s multicultural 
society (13.06.2017). Phrases such as “existential threat” disseminated collective-
national idealisations for more totalised comprehensive border control.  
 
Expansion of Fortified Orientations by Australian Leaders 
 
The following section illustrates the continued the expansion of  narrow societal 
orientations that fortified Australian society. Depictions of transnational outsiders 
oscillated between safe skilled movement and more catastrophic boat and refugee 
movement. Societal orientations were dominated by more harmful risk orientations 
towards boat outsiders, who were criminalised through the prefix ‘illegal’ and 
vilified via associations with the practice of people smuggling. Boat people outsiders 
became objectified in the form of numbers of boat arrivals, deaths and wider 
references to immigration figures. Australian leaders expressed fear constellations 
about societal resources, transnational violence, cohesion, and death, which 
propagated risk orientations about boat people outsiders and mythologised their 
own capabilities. Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull galvanised greater socio-
psychological fortifications through sustaining more authoritarian collective -
nationalist practices of mandatory detention, and ‘the turn back’ of boat people 







Acceptable Skilled Movement & Unacceptable Boat Movement 
 
Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull all constructed narrow articulations of more 
acceptable skilled movement. These understandings favoured more politico-
economic citoyen identifications that reduced the acceptance of other forms of 
movement such as family reunions and refugee movement.  The culmination of this 
process was the abolition of the 4 year 457 skilled migration visa and the 
introduction of more temporary 2 year visas with tighter restrictions and a reduced 
list of occupations (18.04.2017). The change shows an established group desire to 
restrict opportunities to outsiders, which had the effect of decreasing the chances 
for them to settle in Australia. In the following accounts, Gillard, Abbott and 
Turnbull raised the barriers of acceptance into Australian society.   
 
“In the modern age I think people recognise that we do need 
to continue to have some skilled migration come into the 
country to keep fuelling this wealth and this resources boom, 
but I also think Australians rightly ask themselves the 
question ‘how can it be that big mining companies in the 
North-West of this country are crying out for workers, where 
at the same time in the city of Perth in Western Australia we 
still have high youth unemployment?” And they’re asking us 
to do better at making sure we’re skilling Australians and 
getting them into work and I’ve certainly indicated as Prime 
Minister that is a very big part of my vision for the future of 
this country, that we leverage this wealth to get more people 
into work with greater skills. Now we will still need skilled 
migration and we will still draw on it and it will be part of the 
mix, but we can’t use skilled migration as an excuse for 
leaving that teenager unemployed in Perth when he or she 





“Look, the whole point of our labour market laws, the whole 
point of our immigration laws is to protect Australian 
jobs, and nothing changes with our 457 arrangements 
under this Free Trade Agreement173. Nothing changes to our 
labour market laws under this agreement – nothing changes. 
That's why people like Bob Carr say that this agreement is 
good for jobs – very good for jobs – and the Labor Party 
should stop telling xenophobic lies. They should stop telling 
racist lies about this agreement. They know it's in Australia's 
best interests. They absolutely know it's in Australia's best 
interests. They should stop playing politics with it, get on, 
back our future, back this export agreement.” 
(03.09.2015) 
 
“Our skilled visa program has allowed us to tap into the best 
and brightest minds around the world. More than 65 per cent 
of permanent visas accessed in 2015/16 were by skilled 
professionals who are now an integral part of our workforce. 
But migration must be in our national interest. And now 
that we are back in control, we can use it to bolster the 
workforce with the skills we need while making sure that 
vacancies are filled by Australians first. Australian jobs for 
Australians first. That must be the commitment, that must 
be the objective. That is our obligation. Now, Labor not only 
mishandled this aspect of migration, but under Bill Shorten as 
the employment minister it upended the usual practice and 




                                                 
173 The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement 
240 
 
Each of the accounts above gave narrow definitions of safe skilled movement. 
Australian leaders desired people with pre-existing rank and status that brought 
quantities of financial capital into Australia. Gillard remarked that the movement of 
skilled migrants was more acceptable because of their contribution to the “resource 
boom” (21.02.2011). Turnbull noted the continued attraction towards the “the best 
and brightest minds around the world” (19.03.2017).  
 
Abbott and Turnbull contributed to the development of suspicious risk narratives 
about transitional movement. They articulated collective-nationalist desires to 
“protect Australian jobs” and popularised slogans that emphasised “Australian jobs 
for Australians first”. They also maintained the desire for greater financial capital 
through ‘free trade agreements (03.09.2015; 19.03.2017). In account 19.03.2017, 
Turnbull blamed his political opponents for putting “foreign workers first” and 
directed collective-nationalist attachments towards himself and his government 
(19.03.2017).  
 
Ongoing Criminalisation of Boat People 
 
Australian leaders propagated hyper-sensitisations to the movement of boat 
outsiders, which sustained harmful risk orientations. Their language criminalised 
boat people in two interconnected forms, by conscious use of the prefix ‘illegal’ and 
through vilification form their proximity to the practice of people smuggling.  
 
Repeated use of the prefix “illegal” circulated double bind processes. The movement 
of boat outsiders validated images of a chaotic lawlessness maritime frontier. This 
in turn facilitated harsher measures to ‘restore order’ and directed societal 
attachments towards the leaders themselves and their party-government 
establishment.  
 
Australian leaders supported more masculinised restoration of societal ‘order’ 
practices. Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull were united by the common desire for 
“tough border protection” and the admiration of ‘tough’ measures to protect 
borders (06.07.2010;  25.07.2011; 13.08.2012; 19.08.2012; 23.06.2014;  
241 
 
23.03.2016b; 21.09.2016a; 21.09.2016b; 07.11.2016). Abbott and Turnbull offered 
exceedingly sycophantic praise of the Immigration/Home Affair Minister: “you 
don’t want a wimp running border protection” (23.02.2014; 21.12 .2014; 
19.03.2017). Their articulations of demonstrable ‘toughness’ were juxtaposed with 
presumed weakness. 
 
The criminalisation of boat outsiders through the prefix “illegal” alongside 
projections of masculinised strength were a persistent feature in the public 
statements by Australian leaders across this period174, as per the following 
accounts: 
 
“To reiterate: I am committed to treating people with 
decency while they are in detention in Australia, but if 
people are not found to be refugees, I am committed to 
sending them home, and whilst ever boats are attempting to 
enter Australian waters there must be effective policing. We 
are successfully prosecuting dozens of people smugglers 
through our courts. We have successfully extradited alleged 
people smugglers from other countries. Since September 
2008 we have made 149 arrests for offences related to people 
smuggling. 48 people have been convicted and a further 99 
prosecutions are now underway in our courts. We are also 
investing in eight new patrol boats with improved 
surveillance and response capability - strengthening our 
Border Protection Command, which already has 18 vessels 
and 18 aircraft available for patrolling Australian waters all 
year round. We already have more assets deployed for this 
task than any other Australian Government has ever had. We 
ultimately destroy the illegal boats we intercept.” 
(06.07.2010) 
                                                 
174 Although the years 2014 and 2015 showed a notable acceleration and deceleration of usage.  
There is scope for future research to understand the societal processes that shaped this these 2 years  
in particular. 2014 alone saw 53 mentions of the combinations consisting of “illegal arrivals”, “illegal 




“Can I repeat what has been the standard rule of this 
Government – we do not comment on operational matters 
on the water. We do not discuss things in ways which would 
give aid and comfort to the people smugglers. This has been 
an iron law of this Government and I’m certainly not going to 
change it today. What I am going to do is reiterate our 
absolute determination to ensure that people will not come to 
this country illegally by boat – they will not come to this 
country illegally by boat. And if any – by hook or by crook – 
actually get here, they will never get permanent residency 
in this country. Because as long as anyone thinks that by 
coming here by boat, they will get the great prize of 
permanent residency here in Australia, the evil, dangerous, 
deadly trade of people smuggling will continue and this 
Government will do everything we humanly can to stamp 
this trade out (21.07.2015). 
 
“We175 discussed the importance of border security and the 
threat of illegal and irregular migration, and recognised 
that it is vital that every nation is able to control who comes 
across its borders. We discussed the very principles that I 
raised at the United Nations last year when I made the point 
there that our strong border protection - which the 
Coalition Government, under the leadership of PM Abbott in 
2013, continued under my Government and enhanced under 
my Government - our strong border protection gives 
Australians confidence in the immigration system, gives 
them confidence in our humanitarian programs, underpins 
the commitment in our - the most successful multicultural 
society in the world.” (30.01.2017) 
                                                 




Each of the accounts above used the prefix illegal to criminalise boat people 
outsiders. Gillard called for greater policing measures to destroy “illegal boats”, a 
practice similar to the seizure and obliteration of illicit narcotics. She also retained 
shallow humanist-egalitarian attachments to boat people in detention, reaffirming 
her obligations to treat possible refugees “with decency” (06.07.2010). Gillard 
contributed to the militarisation of Australia’s maritime frontier by “strengthening 
our Border Protection Command” (06.07.2010). 
 
Depictions of illegal boat arrivals sustained harsher regulations to deny “permanent 
residency” in Australia. Abbott stated an “absolute determination” to ban the 
movement of boat arrivals, making out a mythical struggle against “the evil, 
dangerous, deadly trade of people smuggling” (21.07.2015). Turnbull similarly 
mentioned the “threat of illegal and irregular migration” that reinforced 
masculinised orientations to maintain “our strong border protection”. For Turnbull, 
the multicultural success of Australian society was jeopardised by the movement of 
boat arrivals. In account 30.01.2017, he fostered the fears of insecure sections of the 
established who were already doubtful of the ‘success’ of multicultural 
developments in Australian society. Boat outsiders became scapegoats for cases of 
‘failed’ ethnic integration. 
 
Vilification & the Mythologisation of People Smugglers 
 
The second form of criminalisation was connected with people smuggling. This 
sustained more harmful risk orientations that vilified boat arrivals. The figure of the 
people smuggler resembled Sirens from Greek mythology, which lured migrants to 
detention and death with promises of permanent residency in Australia. The 
demonization of people smugglers turned boat outsiders and their aspirations into 
illicit ‘products’. Boat people outsiders became symbols of indeterminate societal 
catastrophe, which was only preventable through coercive practices such as 
mandatory detention.  
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Australian leaders orientated Australian society away from the more detached 
understandings of globalised transnational movement, and towards more involved 
insecure politico-economic citoyen settler identifications.   
 
In accounts 06.07.2010 and 21.07.2015, Gillard and Abbott targeted people 
smugglers as the cause of harmful boat arrivals. Gillard highlighted the numbers of 
arrests, convictions and prosecutions for people smuggling. Abbott vilified people 
smuggling as an “evil, dangerous, deadly trade”. The threat of people smugglers 
supported idealised humanist-egalitarian attachments that “this Government will 
do everything we humanly can to stamp this trade out” (21.07.2015). The following 
accounts offer further evidence that Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull stigmatised b oat 
outsiders through the vilified connection to people smuggling.  
 
“I accept that this is a difficult problem, a global problem. 
We're seeing large numbers of people moving around the 
world, fleeing war, fleeing persecution, fleeing famine. 
Australia is one nation that sees people arrive on its 
doorstep, but look at the countries in Europe and the 
numbers that they face, America and the numbers that they 
face, the Canadians of course have started to deal with this 
problem too, in terms of boat arrivals. What we can do as a 
country is have strong border protection, strong laws on 
people smuggling, work with our regional neighbours on 
law enforcement, have mandatory detention. But I do want 
to do more than that, we want to achieve a Regional 
Protection Framework and a Regional Processing Centre, 
which would take out of the hands of people smugglers the 
very product they sell. Why would people move if from a 
Regional Processing Centre, if they got on a boat and were just 





“I want to make it absolutely crystal clear that no one who 
comes to Australia illegally by boat is ever going to get 
permanent residency of our country. That is an absolute 
commitment by this Government. You come to Australia 
illegally by boat you will never get permanent residency 
of our country. Our absolute determination is to stop the 
boats and thank God the boats are stopping, because if the 
boats stop the deaths stop as well. We stop the boats by 
denying to the people smugglers a product to sell. The 
product they are selling is permanent residency of 
Australia. Well, it's off the table – now and forever.” 
(11.09.2014) 
 
“we have to send the most unequivocal message to the people 
smugglers - you cannot get into Australia. Now they still try 
from time to time and we’ve turned back over 30 boats over 
the last three years or so. They’ve been turned back during 
my prime ministership as you know. But if we were to start 
bringing asylum seekers who had come by boat into Australia, 
you would be getting dozens and dozens of boats, building 
up to hundreds. Believe me, people smuggling is a much 
bigger, more sophisticated, more dangerous industry now 
than it was even a few years ago. All of the connectivity and 
communications ability that the internet gives and 
smartphones give, have made it even more potent. So we have 
to be absolutely resolute. You cannot get to Australia with a 
people smuggler. We have taken their product away from 







Each of the accounts above criminalised the movement of boat outsiders through 
their connections with people smugglers. For Gillard, “boat arrivals” were an 
objectified “problem” and commodified ‘products’ that needed to be blocked from 
reaching the grasp of people smugglers. Boat arrivals as ‘problems’ demanded 
solutions that encompassed ever stricter measures through greater collective -
nationalist attachments to “strong border protection and strong laws on people 
smuggling”.  
 
Boat arrivals as ‘products’ were their presumed aspirations for “permanent 
residency” in Australian society. In accounts 11.09.2014 and 15.09.2017, Abbott 
and Turnbull eliminated the possibilities for boat outsiders to integrate with 
established groups in Australian society. Boat outsiders were expected to 
internalise their own exclusion by never attempting to reach Australia in the first 
place. Interpretations of boat arrivals were entrapped in a dichotomised black and 
white struggle between ‘responsible’ Australian leaders (Abbott and Turnbull) who 
prevented deaths at the frontier through stopping boats, and people smugglers who 
lead boat outsiders to their own destruction (11.09.2014). The focus on people 
smugglers absolved Abbott and Turnbull from humanist-egalitarian 
responsibilities towards boat people outsiders, although many boat arrivals may be 
refugees. The stigmatised connection of boat arrivals with people smugglers, 
cultivated ignorance that undermined humanist-egalitarian openness towards 
refugees. The threat of people smugglers was justification for collective-nationalist 
commitments to protect borders. Australian leaders painted images of lawlessness 
on the maritime boundaries of Australian society forewarned by the “dozens and 
dozens of boats, building up to hundreds” (15.09.2017). 
 
Objectification: Boat Arrivals & Deaths 
 
Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull’s consistent discussion of numbers of boat arrivals, 
deaths and larger immigration figures cultivated more harmful risk orientations 
towards transnational movement (06.07.2010; 16.12.2010; 20.12.2010; 




Numerical representations of boat movement can provide a more detached 
contextualised awareness of broader globalised webs of interdependence. These 
can help explain that boat arrivals remain a relatively small number understood in 
the broader context of Australia’s annual migration program, and that state -
societies such as Pakistan, Lebanon and Turkey host the largest number of refugees 
(see UNHCR 2018). Greater numerical context could also promote deeper societal 
reflection on the forms of relations between Australian society and other large 
countries, for example, the state-societies in the Middle East that have experienced 
the consequences of Australian supported military intervention from the years 
2001 onwards.  
 
There was only one substantive attempt at greater contextualised understanding of 
transnational movement throughout this entire phase of Australian society. It was 
provided by Gillard as follows.   
 
“the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat to Australia 
is very, very minor. It is less than 1.5 per cent of new migrants, 
and indeed it would take about 20 years to fill the great 
MCG176 with asylum seekers at present rates of arrival.…. The 
total number of people accepted into Australia in 2009 as 
migrants under our refugee and humanitarian program, the 
total number accepted each year, is 13,750 people. This is 
a fraction of our annual migration intake. This number has 
remained stable for many years and does not increase, even 
when we face surges in boat arrivals. If more boats arrive, 
fewer people can be sponsored under a special humanitarian 
program. Fewer such people are sponsored, meaning the total 
numbers are unchanged. We should also understand that 
what drives the peaks and troughs in the numbers of boats 
trying to get to Australia has less to do with what we do here 
and more to do with the conditions people are escaping - 
                                                 
176 MCG stands for the Melbourne Cricket Ground, a space that hosts a range of large sporting events, 
particularly cricket and AFL (Australian Rules Football).  
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conditions like war, genocide, imprisonment without trial, 
torture, harassment by authorities, the disappearance of 
family and friends and children, the growing up of people and 
whole families in refugee camps with no prospect of ever 
seeing their home again. And when conditions deteriorate in 
countries with sea routes to Australia, as they did between 
1999 and 2001, more boats come - some 5,516 people came 
to our shores in 2001. But then, when conditions improved, 
as happened after 2001 with the downfall of the Taliban 
regime, fewer and fewer boats came. This ebb and flow has 
been evident since the time when Malcolm Fraser was our 
Prime Minister in the 1970s and the people arriving in boats 
were from Vietnam. (06.07.2010) 
 
On the one hand account 06.07.2010 from Gillard, represented a rare occasion of 
more constructive detached understanding of transnational movement into 
Australia. She utilised a comparison with the Melbourne Cricket Ground, appealing 
to common attachments towards sports, something that has particular resonance 
in Australia. Gillard highlighted the kinds of societal circumstances that prompted 
large-scale people movement in the first place, such as the breakdown of human 
groups through mass violence and persecution.  
 
On the other hand, Gillard emphasised more harmful risk orientations between the 
established groups and boat people outsider. Less boat arrivals were favoured over 
more boat arrivals. There was the commitment to the unchanging figure of 
accepting “13,750 people” as part of Australia’s special human itarian program, 
which set up distinctions between boat outsiders and camp refugee outsiders. The 
commitment to the “13,750 people” figure reduced understandings of the “what 
drives the peaks and troughs in the numbers of boats” to an expendable figure and  
blocked understandings of changing societal conditions beyond Australian society. 
These might mean an adjustment of that figure. She limited interpretations of safe 




Abbott and Turnbull cultivated the misleading belief that refugee and asylum seeker 
movement was the largest form migration into Australia. This was perpetuated by 
statements such as, “Australia is a nation that has been built up on migration and a 
significant portion of that migration are humanitarian migrants or refugees. So 
the fact is, we are not only supporting the intake of refugees, we are increasing it.” 
(01.11.2016). According to the Home Affairs Department, Australia’s humanitarian 
intake totalled 17,555 places in 2015-16 (DIBP 2016), which is less than 10% of the 
yearly “welcome [of[ around 200,000 permanent migrants to join our 24 
million”(21.09.2016a; 10.07.2017).   
 
They also expanded definitions of harmful destructive transnational movement to 
all forms of movement into Australia. Like Cameron and May, Abbott and Turnbull 
used expressions of net migration, for example, Turnbull remarked that “under 
Labor net migration peaked at an unsustainable 315,000 migrants a year. It is 
now less than 200,000” (19.03.2017). He used the figure of net migration to blame 
the Labor Party for allowing uncontrollable levels of overall people movement. 
Turnbull directed public attachments toward himself and his government, through 
images of inherited border chaos from his predecessors.   
 
Abbott and Turnbull substantiated the border chaos claim through two interlinked 
figures.  The first was the figure of 50,000 boat outsiders/arrivals. The second was 
the figure of 1,200 deaths that was also expressed using the word “thousands”177. 
The following accounts are examples of the objectification of boat arrivals that 
contributed to an imagery of border chaos.  
 
“Because I'm not in the business of implicitly or explicitly 
giving information to people smugglers and I'm not in the 
business of watering down the border protection policies 
which have saved Australia from a border protection 
                                                 
177 See the following accounts 16.02.2014; 02.03.2014; 09.07.2014; 02.08.2014; 30.08.2014; 
05.12.2014a; 09.04.2015; 11.04.2015; 12.06.2015b; 23.07.2015; 27.07.2015; 15.08.2015; 
27.07.2016b;  29.09.2016; 30.10.2016;  01.11.2016; 07.11.2016; 13.11.2016; 14.11.2016a 
14.11.2016b; 19.11.2016; 01.02.2017; 19.03.2017; 08.04.2017; 18.04.2017; 22.05.2017; 
10.07.2017; 15.09.2017; 20.09.2017. 
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catastrophe created by the former government. Now, let's 
again go through the facts. Under the former government, we 
had almost a thousand boats. We had more than 50,000 
illegal arrivals by boat. We had more than a thousand 
deaths at sea. In July of 2013, because of the catastrophic 
failure of the former government, people were arriving at the 
rate of 50,000 a year. People were arriving at 
Mediterranean levels, because of the disastrous border 
protection policies of the former government. We came in 
with the strongest possible mandate to do what was needed 
to protect our borders. We have done it, it's worked, we are 
going to keep doing it because it needs to keep working.”  
(12.06.2015b)    
  
“Under the Labor Party, their neglect of Australia’s 
borders saw 50,000 unauthorised arrivals, courtesy of the 
people smugglers, at least 1,200 deaths at sea and as a 
consequence, rendered the integrity of our borders, 
destroyed the credibility of our borders, our borders became 
porous under the Labor Party. The Coalition was elected in 
2013 and we restored the integrity of our borders. Tony 
Abbott, Scott Morrison stopped the boats.” (19.11.2016)  
 
The accounts above from Abbott and Turnbull showed the persistent use of figures 
such as 50,000 boat arrivals and the 1,200/1,000 deaths. They propagated 
imageries of border chaos, and mythologised their governments’ purported 
attempts at rescue. In this context, Abbott not only mobilised collective-nationalist 
attachments that he had “saved Australia from a border protection catastrophe 
created by the former government”, but also defended shallow humanist-
egalitarian attachments, by arguing that the protection of borders had saved the 




For Abbott and Turnbull, Australian society was experiencing a crisis at its maritime 
frontier. The mention of “Mediterranean levels” implicitly linked images of the 
Mediterranean migration crisis effecting Europe, to the boat arrivals experienced 
by Australia (12.06.2015b). This demanded the reassertion of border protection 
measures fortified by collective-nationalist attachment that were seemingly 
disregarded by Rudd and Gillard, whose “neglect of Australia’s borders saw 50,000 
unauthorised arrivals” and “1,200 deaths at sea” (19.11.2016; 12.06.2015 b).  
 
Enduring Fear Constellations of Boat Outsiders 
 
Abbott and Turnbull stigmatised boat outsiders with a range of overlapping societal 
fears. These included concerns over societal resources, returning 
“jihadists”/transnational violence, cohesion, and death. These fears gave insecure 
sections of the established reasons to reject boat people outsiders. Australian 
leaders from 2010 to 2017 circulated risk orientations that widened circles of 
disassociation between boat arrivals and established groups in Australian society.  
 
Fears about societal resources and the movement of boat outsiders were linked to 
notions of financial sustainability. Abbott manipulated concerns about the economy 
and beliefs in the scarcity of fiscal resources.  He often referred to “g etting the 
Budget under control”178 in the same breath as border protection, and persistently 
reasserted established group controls over budgets and borders.  
 
Abbott reiterated combinations of the following catchphrase:  “we would stop the 
boats, we would scrap the carbon tax, we would build the roads of the 21st century 
and we would get the Budget back under control” (21.05.2014). The repetition of 
an electioneering slogan revealed Abbott’s party-political vulnerabilities. He 
amalgamated budget and border concerns, in phases such as gaining a “budget 
dividend” (19.06.2014; 04.05.2015) to prevent any further “border protection 
budget blowouts” (16.02.2014; 28.02.2014; 09.07.2014; 12.07.2014; 30.10.2016). 
                                                 
178 See accounts 02.04.2014; 06.04.2014; 29.04.2014; 18.05.2014; 18.05.2014; 19.05.2014; 
19.05.2014; 20.05.2014b; 21.05.2014; 22.05.2014; 22.05.2014; 19.06.2014; 01.07.2014; 
03.07.2014; 10.07.2014; 22.08.2014; 07.09.2014; 11.10.2014; 15.11.2014; 02.12.2014; 22.01.2015; 
02.02.2015; 28.03.2015; 15.08.2015.  
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The hypocrisy of the phrase “border protection budget blowouts” is that it did not 
apply to Abbott’s own policies, which in 2016-2017 cost 4 billion Australian dollars 
(Karp 2018).  
 
Abbott also the amplified belief that “the vast majority of the people coming to 
Australia illegally by boat were economic migrants” (22.03.2014). This latter 
term has parallels from the 20th century. The notion of economic 
refugees179/migrants was first used to categorise Jews fleeing Germany in the 
1930s, who were stigmatised as “Wirtschaftsemigranten” (Loescher 1996: 17). Boat 
outsiders were scapegoats for fears about the economic sustainability and the fiscal 
decline of Australian society.   
 
Abbott and Turnbull expressed greater fears about returning “jihadists” and the 
movement of boat outsiders linked to concerns over transnational violence. Many 
sections of Australian society have become accustomed to the absence of violence 
in their everyday lives. Mentions by Turnbull of “the advantage of our island 
geography, our effective border protection and counter-terrorism agencies mean 
we have confidence that we know who is arriving” (23.03.2016a; also see 
21.09.2016a), further enhanced attachments to the collective-nationalist normative 
code and established group dominations over violence.  Abbott remarked that.       
 
“We have for the last six months stopped illegal boats 
arriving in Australia and we are determined to be just as 
tough in stopping jihadists arriving in Australia. We've 
stopped the illegal boats, we will ensure that we stop the 
jihadists as well because the last thing we want is people who 
have been radicalised and militarised by experience with 
these al-Qaeda offshoots in the Middle East – the last thing we 
want is these people who have been radicalised and 
militarised returning to create mischief here in Australia.”  
(23.06.2014) 
                                                 
179 Also note Blair’s use of the term as highlighted in Chapter 5.  
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In account 23.06.2014, Abbott expanded border protection obligations to the 
realisation of societal protection against transnational violence. Abbott argued that 
having “stopped illegal boats” was sufficient to “stop the jihadists”. He circulated 
fears about the breakdown of established group dominations over violence, to 
reassert societal regulations “stripping citizenship from terrorists who are dual 
nationals” (24.06.2015). Boat people outsiders became brutalised carriers of 
violence, which confirmed their exclusion, and spurred pre-emptive measures such 
as mandatory detention.    
 
The entanglement of fears about cohesion and the movement of boat outsiders were 
linked to the idealisation of stringent personal regulations. Australian leaders 
revealed implicit attachment to the legacy of an authoritarian convict settler society 
that practiced strict modes of societal orientation, with subsequent fears of 
disorientation.  
 
Abbott and Turnbull propagated established group fears about the breakdown of 
cohesive societal ‘laws’ linked to the safeguarding of borders. They circulated 
continued ignorance of international societal regulations such as the Law of the Sea.  
Abbott accentuated fears about the breakdown of established ‘laws’ and 
orientations, via the imagery of “border protection disaster” (01.07.2014) . Turnbull 
maintained distorted depictions of a lawlessness maritime frontier through his 
sycophantic commendation of Immigration Minister Peter Dutton for doing “an 
outstanding job in restoring and maintaining the rule of law on our borders” 
(27.07.2016a). Abbott and Turnbull upheld the misleading notion that the only 
societal regulations shaping maritime relations were the ‘laws’ crafted by 
themselves and their government. The belief that their predecessors had ‘lost 
control of the border’ and endangered Australian society, helped legitimise 
measures “do whatever is necessary to once more ensure that our borders and 
totally and fully secure” (28.02.2014).  
 
Fears about death were linked with the movement of boat outsiders. Australian 
leaders equated the prevention of deaths at sea with measures against vilifie d 
people smugglers, who were blamed for bringing of death into Australian society, 
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as people “lost their lives because of people smugglers” (20.09.2017; 06.07.2010; 
11.09.2014; 12.06.2015a; 12.06.2015b 19.11.2016). Abbott in particular, equated 
the arrival of boats, with the onset of death into Australian society.  For the majority 
of groups in Australian society, death is not an everyday experience. When 
confronted with images of death at the maritime frontiers of society through mass 
media and the vocabulary of Australian leaders, there are fears about contact, in 
combinations of repulsions, indifference and voyeuristic fascination.  
 
The persistent reference to border deaths Abbott sensitised Australian society  to 
the presence of death on maritime frontiers. Struggles over the balance of societal 
power in Australian society were infused with necropolitics/nécropolitique 180 
obsessions over life and death. Abbott channelled necropolitical desires to prevent 
deaths at the frontier through the practice of turn backs, which showed the 
habituated legacy of his unfinished training as a Catholic priest by expressing 
theological obsessions over death and salvation:  
 
“the only way to stop the deaths at sea is to stop the boats and 
that means – I have to say – turning boats around. Now, the 
Australian Government is prepared to turn boats around, 
we’ve been able to do it safely and effectively” (17.05.2015)  
 
In account 17.05.2015, Abbott glorified the prevention of death, through ‘turning 
back the boats’. This practice ensured that deaths were better if they occurred 
elsewhere and worse if they happened within the boundaries of Australian society.  
The only deaths that mattered were those occurring in the purview of Australia’s 
party-government establishment, which might be blamed for those avoidable 
fatalities.   
 
Abbott polarised Australian society, emphasising the divisions between the actions 
of his government and resistance by sections of Australian society. He and his 
government “want to keep life safe” (04.05.2015) by saving Australia from the 
                                                 
180 See Mbembe (2003). 
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menace of death. His opponents that include other members of established groups 
such as opposition parties, and “human rights lawyers” were purportedly in league 
with vilified people smugglers, jeopardising people’s lives (21.04.2015). Images of 
boat outsiders became stigmatised by a morbid obsession, a fear of contact with 
death that left no room for any diversification of understanding in a one -way mirror 
of attachments towards an increasingly national-militarised establishment 
assigned to the prevention of deaths on Australia’s maritime frontier.    
 
There was the continuation of aquatic metaphors from Howard and Rudd years into 
the Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull phase of Australian society, which paralleled 
articulations by British leaders. All of these leaders fortified their societies to defend 
against mythologised transnational movement.  
 
Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull noted the “surges in boat arrivals” (06.07.2010; also 
see 17.05.2015; 21.09.2016a; 21.04.2017) and the prevention of the “inflow” of 
people (09.07.2014; 13.06.2017; 10.07.2017). These harmful depictions simulated 
thoughts of societal drowning, a society whose institutions and capacities are on the 
verge of being submerged ‘under the water’ by transnational movement, which 
included “a humanitarian program that was swamped by these unauthorised 
arrivals” (30.10.2016).  
 
More harmful catastrophic transnational movement was understood as a more 
supernatural ‘act of god’ in similar ways to depictions of natural disasters 181 such 
as floods, bushfires, cyclones, and storms. Aquatic depictions of transnational 
movement escalated into understandings of impending societal calamity, Turnbull 
discussed the “‘the perfect storm’ attacking Europe, where Daesh and others have 
successfully taken advantage of porous borders and uncontrolled humanitarian 
flows” (01.09.2016). The repetition of objectified boat arrivals and deaths 
enhanced notions of societal inundation and legitimatised practices such as 
mandatory detention and turn backs.  
 
                                                 
181 See Steinberg (2006). 
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Continuation of Mandatory Detention Practices 
 
The vocabulary of Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull circulated societal orientations that 
fortified Australian society. The criminalisation and objectification of boat arrivals 
led to the continuation of mandatory detention, and from 2013 onwards, in the 
guise of “Operation Sovereign Borders”, the additional militarised pledge to turn the 
arrival of boats back/around (26.04.2011; 05.12.2014b). Collectively these 
practices formed part of totalising collective-nationalist attachments and 
commitments to border protection that perpetuated the stigmatisation of boat 
people outsiders as lawbreakers.   
 
The practice of mandatory detention, whether onshore on the Australian mainland 
or on offshore locations such as Nauru and Manus Island confirmed the harmful 
stigmatisation of boat outsiders. Gillard explicitly remarked that “I am a very big 
supporter of mandatory detention. It is the right thing to do” (26.04.2011). The 
arrival of boat people outsiders perpetuated coercive practices that mirrored the 
imprisonment of people suspected of other illegalised activities, for example the 
trafficking of illicit narcotics or weapons. Abbott commended functionaries such as 
“Strategic Border Command…..who are keeping our borders secure, these are the 
people who are stopping the boats, stopping the guns and stopping the drugs” 
(25.03.2015). In the following accounts, commitments to mandatory detention 
illustrated continued idealisations from the humanist-egalitarian and collective-
nationalist normative codes.   
 
“As a nation we use a mandatory detention system for good 
reason, if people arrive unauthorised in our country then 
it is appropriate for us to take steps to detain people whilst 
we ascertain their identity, their health status, any security 
concerns and we work through whether or not they are a 
legitimate refugee for whom we should extend our 
compassion and concern. Mandatory detention is a 
longstanding Labor policy; it was introduced into Australia 
by a Labor Government for good reason. Of course when 
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people are in immigration detention, we seek to treat them 
in a fair and decent way and successive Ministers for 
Immigration under this Government, Minister Evans and now 
Minister Bowen, have worked hard to ensure that is the case.” 
(26.04.2011) 
 
“The most humane, the most compassionate, the most 
decent thing you can do is stop the boats and a very important 
part of stopping the boats, as both sides of the Parliament now 
accept, is offshore processing at Nauru and at Manus. So, 
that's exactly what's happening. That's what we'll be 
continuing. Obviously, the Nauru camp is under the control of 
Nauruan Government officials, just as the Manus camp is 
under the control of PNG Government officials…..I'm 
confident that this Government has largely stopped the 
boats. I'm also confident that only this Government can 
keep them stopped because any other government, I suspect, 
would quickly succumb to the cries of the human rights 
lawyers and others and what that would mean, very quickly, 
is that the people smugglers would be back in business, 
the boats would start again and the drownings would start 
again. I'm determined to make sure that that doesn't happen 
– full stop. My absolutely clear message to the people 
smugglers is we are more than a match for you. Our 
determination to save lives at sea is greater than your 
determination to profit from putting people's lives at risk. 
(21.04.2015) 
 
Our ability to restore the integrity of our borders, to our 
ability to stop the people smuggling trade, has enabled us now 
not only to close 17 detention centres in Australia, not only 
to take the thousands of children out of detention  that the 
Labor Party put into detention. But now to reach the new 
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arrangement with the United States that will offer 
resettlement in the United States to persons on Nauru and 
Manus, who are currently on Nauru and Manus. This is a one-
off deal, a one-off opportunity. It applies only to refugees on 
the regional processing centres on Nauru and Manus. It is 
not available to anyone who seeks to come subsequently to 
Australia. The foundation of our multicultural society - the 
most successful in the world. The foundation of our generous 
humanitarian programs is secure borders. It is the 
security of those borders and the ability to ensure that it is the 
Australian Government, on behalf of the Australian people, 
that determines who comes to Australia. That is the 




Each of the accounts above expressed tacit support for the practice of mandatory 
detention.  Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull showed idealised attachments to both 
humanist-egalitarian principles and the collective-nationalist code. Shallow 
references to humanist egalitarian “compassion” maintained the unequal power 
ratio between the established groups in Australian society and people boat 
outsiders.   
 
In account 26.04.2011, Gillard remarked that compassion should only be extended  
to “legitimate” refugees that are defined as harmless.  The presumption was that 
“unauthorised” arrivals were harmful catastrophic risks to established groups in 
Australian society that demanded their detention while still ensuring “fair and 
decent” treatment. Both Gillard and Abbott displayed superficial humanist-
egalitarian attachments to saving the lives of boat people through offshore 
processing in Nauru and Manus Island (21.04.2015).  
 
Humanist-egalitarian compassion to incarcerated boat arrivals were outweighed by 
collective-nationalist attachments to border protection and the struggle against the 
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people smugglers, which could not be undermined by the “cries of the human rights 
lawyers” (21.04.2015). Abbott threatened that should the resolve of his government 
become weakened, there was the increased possibility of more boats, and more 
deaths on Australia’s maritime frontier (21.04.2015).   
 
In account 14.11.2016a, Turnbull’s commodified refugee swap with the United 
States expressed party-political survival and collective-nationalist idealisation of 
borders, rather than humanist-egalitarian compassion towards refugees. The 
struggle against people smugglers has become a conflict with no prospect of 
conclusion, so long as “the integrity of our borders” seems threatened 
(14.11.2016a), and unless Australian leaders reduce their sensitivity to the smallest 
degree of boat movement.  
 
Militarisation: Distortion of Regionalised & Globalised Relations 
 
The consistent idealisation of border protection empowered the militarisation of 
Australia’s maritime frontier, further politicising the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF). As well as integrating broader immigration functions into functionaries such 
as the Home Affairs Ministry. The militarisation of the maritime frontier appealed 
to the idealisation of the military by certain sections of established groups in 
Australian society and helped perpetuate the ‘Anzac myth’ 182. There was the 
appropriation and equation of nostalgic memorialised defences of Australia during 
the 20th century with contemporary efforts to protect borders. Abbott remarked 
how. “It is the Liberal Party that kept Australia strong by signing the ANZUS Treaty, 
by properly funding our defence force and by stopping the boats – not once but 
twice!” (28.06.2014).  
 
Commitments to border protection justified the formation of a paramilitary 
organisation in the shape of the ABF. Australian leaders propagated the views of an 
emboldened national-security establishment that required “the legislation that they 
need to keep us safe” (25.06.2017), as well as the material means of carrying out 
                                                 
182 See Seal (2007). 
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that regulation through the acquisition of “border security aircraft” such as the P8A 
Poseidon aircraft (28.02.2014; 16.11.2016). Border Protection personnel that 
included the ADF and the ABF were persistently commended for keeping 
“Australia's borders secure” (06.07.2010; 28.02.2014; 14.11.2016a). Even the title 
of “Border Force”, presumed a reassertion and projection of masculinised strength 
against indeterminate objects, reinforced by ABF officers being donned in military 
style uniforms with gold and black/dark navy buttoned coats, gold epaulets, gold 
badges, and trained in the use of force (Hasham 2015; Hartcher 2015).  
 
Australian leaders, through their statements on asylum seekers and refugees 
disseminated the societal orientations that helped legitimise ‘Operation Fortitude’.  
Where ABF officers would be “speaking with any individual we cross paths with” 
seeking out those who had committed “visa fraud” (ABF 2015). This proceeding was 
cancelled as a result of strong societal resistance (ABC 2015). The original press 
release from the ABF demonstrates the growing criminalisation of transnational 
movement and greater controls over law enforcement functions, as “officers will for 
the first time join forces with a diverse team of transport and enforcement agencies 
to target crime in the Melbourne Central Business District” (ABF 2015). Even 
though Operation Fortitude was cancelled the insecure modes of thinking and 
orientation that legitimised its draconian practices continued through the Abbott 
and Turnbull phase of Australian society.  
 
Australia’s regional neighbours were expected to feel the same vulnerabilities and 
harmful depictions of boat arrivals as the sections of the Australian e stablished 
groups. The more unequal relations between Australia and its near neighbours 
contributed to the burden shifting of responsibilities towards migrants. Regionally, 
however, the ban on boat people from ever coming to Australia, even those found 
to be refugees (19.11.2016; 20.09.2017), shifted the burden for the resettlement of 
recognised refugees towards Australia’s less developed near neighbours. Abbott 
called Cambodia’s acceptance of refugees from Australian camps in Nauru a sign of 
“Cambodia’s readiness to be a good international citizen” (31.08.2015). In account 
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31.08.2015, he distorted understandings of good international citizenship 183 by 
increasing the exclusiveness of Australian state-society, by urging another a state-
society’s accept boat people outsiders that were unwanted by Australia. This 
reinforced the more exclusive, highly unequal power relations between Australia 
and Cambodia (also see 20.05.2014a; 20.09.2017).  
 
Australian leaders articulated a pernicious form of international friends hip or 
alliance. There was the expectation that Indonesia, Cambodia and Papua New 
Guinea would join the struggle against people smugglers. Gillard and Abbott 
expressed the regionalised criminalisation of movement targeting people 
smuggling (03.11.2010; 07.07.2010a; 16.02.2014; 19.06.2014; 04.06.2014; 
15.03.2015; 12.06.2015a). As well as support for the detention of asylum seekers in 
the form of a regional processing centre (07.07.2010b), all in the spirit of “fraternal 
support – of regional mateship” (21.02.2014; 14.06.2015).  
 
Beyond Asia, Australian leaders stigmatised European states as exemplars of 
catastrophic outcomes that might be experienced by Australian society. Harmful 
depictions of the broader humanitarian crisis in the Middle East effecting Euro pe 
(04.09.2015; 06.09.2015; 10.09.2015), “that ISIL is using the refugee crisis to send 
operatives into Europe” (23.03.2016a), merged with beliefs that Australia was 
experiencing its own “border protection crisis” (05.12.2014b). European state -
societies were “countries where governments have lost control of their borders and 
their migration system has got out of control” (19.03.2017).   
 
For Turnbull, European state-societies failed their collective-nationalist obligations 
to border protection. Images of Europe became highly distorted by fears about 
transnational violence184 and cohesion185. He circulated catastrophic imageries of 
Europe to act as exemplars of what should not happen to Australian society. This 
helped legitimise the fortification of societal orientations against globalised crises 
                                                 
183 This is defined by Linklater (1992: 27) as the “means of weakening the exclusionary character of 
the modern state and of overcoming an ancient tension between the rights of citizens and the duties  
to the rest of humanity”. 
184 “terrorist attacks in Brussels remind us once again of the global threat of terrorism, the need to 
be vigilant at home, to maintain the security of our borders” (23.03.2016a). 
185 “the Europeans regrettably lost control of their borders” (08.12.2016) . 
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beyond, which reinforced the hold of Australian leaders on the balance of societal 




Australian Prime Ministers from 2001 to 2017 exploited the societal vulnerabilities 
of insecure groups within Australian society. They propagated more closed socio-
psychological fortifications. Harmful depictions of transnational movement, in 
particular the movement of boat outsiders circulated desires for more brutalised 
societal regulations.  There were developing circumstances for people to be more 
fearful of each other, through widened circles of disassociation between established 
sections of Australian society and transnational outsiders.  
 
It is foreseeable that the militarised regulation of boat people could also be applied 
to other societal outsider groups. Operation Fortitude offered a glimpse into the 
future of Australian society, where inspection, arrest and imprisonment are 
ordinary societal procedures faced by all members of society. The cumulative arc of 
development indicated an Australian society that is less open and feels less secure. 
Australian Prime Ministers have influenced the expansion of less open and less 
secure modes thinking and orientations in the society they have lead.   
 
This chapter has examined the migration vocabulary of Australian Prime Ministers 
Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull from 2010 to 2017. I examined 
their speeches, interviews and press conferences and reconstructed the societal 
processes that have fortified the modes thinking and orientating in Australian 
society.   
 
I have argued Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull verbalised more extreme obsessions 
about harmful catastrophic movements of boat outsiders that fortified Australian 
society. They mobilised shared anxieties and propagated more reductive modes of 
thinking. Commodified understandings of boat outsiders demonstrated the growing 
influence of a national-security establishment. Australian leaders cultivated more 
harmful destructive understandings of asylum seeker and refugee movement by 
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boat to Australia, which reinforced collective-nationalist attachments to stronger 
border protection. For Australian leaders asylum seekers and refugees became 
definite risks to established sections of Australian society.   
 
More harmful risk orientations of asylum seekers and refugees dominated societal 
relations. Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull criminalised boat outsiders, and vilified them 
through their links to people smugglers.  This reinforced the objectification of boat 
arrivals and the infusion of fears about societal resources, returning 
“jihadists”/transnational violence, cohesion, and death. These fears widened circles 
of disassociation that legitimised the stigmatisation of boat arrivals and distorted 
Australian diplomacy.    
 
The conclusion of my thesis will recap the development of socio-psychological 
fortifications in British and Australian societies. I will also discuss the scope for 






















Political leaders in liberal-democratic societies are often torn between diverging 
sets of human attachments. Interpretations of transnational people movements 
have cultivated degrees of inclusive societal openness and exclusive societal 
closure. On the one hand, political leaders have directed their societies into more 
open societies, more comfortable with the movement people and exchanges of 
ideas, cultures and lifestyles. Transnational people movements have symbolised the 
possibilities for more multifaceted forms of human relations. This open outlook has 
fostered practices for greater societal inclusion of various human groups.  On the 
other hand, political leaders have directed their societies into more closed societies, 
more hostile to the movement of people, ideas and lifestyles. Transnational people 
movements have symbolised the decline and destruction of particular societal 
relations and perpetuated stringent regulations. This closed outlook has cultivated 
practices aimed at greater societal exclusion of migrants and ‘foreigners’.        
 
My thesis has investigated how political leaders in Britain and Australia have 
managed these conflicting trends, and the associated anxieties, through their 
depictions of transnational migration.  
 
I have researched the speeches, interviews and press conferences of Prime 
Ministers in Britain and Australia from 2001 to 2017. The British example focused 
on Prime Ministers Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Theresa May. 
The Australian example concentrated on Prime Ministers John Howard, Kevin Rudd, 
Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull. 
 
I have argued that shared anxieties embedded in depictions of transnational 
movement have fortified the orientations in British and Australian society.  
 
British and Australian leaders mobilised shared anxieties, in ambiguous 
interpretations of transnational movement, which contextualised the conscience 
formations in these societies. The language of leaders channelled the attitudes of 
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various established societal groups with conflicting techno -economic and politico-
economic identifications. Transnational outsiders were commodified into harmful 
and harmless side effects. This process illustrated attachments to the humanist-
egalitarian and collective-nationalist normative codes. British and Australian 
leaders propagated greater more idealised attachments towards the collective-
nationalist code, sustained by commitments to border protection. They circulated 
the vulnerabilities of insecure sections of established groups, through harmful risk 
interpretations of transnational outsiders.  
 
British and Australian leaders dominated societal orientations with more harmful 
risk orientations towards transnational outsiders. The movement of transnational 
outsiders became criminalised, masculinised, and objectified. British and Australian 
leaders circulated harmful risk orientations that helped widen circles of 
disassociation. Transnational outsiders were stigmatised with broader societal 
fears, which legitimised their exclusion. These leaders steered societal orientations 
that contributed to the estrangement of British relations with the EU, and the 
distortion of Australian diplomatic relations.  
 
British and Australian Prime Ministers have propagated more reductive modes of 
thinking and narrow orientations, which have fortified these societies by raising the 




My thesis was divided into two parts. The first part built a sociological model for 
shared anxieties. Chapter 1 explained the model and vocabulary of process 
sociology. Chapter 2 explained the model and vocabulary of risk sociology. I argued 
that a synthesis of process and risk sociology expanded understandings of shared 
anxieties.  
 
The second part of the thesis reconstructed the societal processes embedded within 
the migration speeches, interviews and press conferences of British and Australian 
Prime Ministers from 2001 to 2010, using the vocabularies of process and risk 
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sociology. This evidence substantiates the development of socio-psychological 
fortifications in British and Australian societies. Chapters 3 and 4 evaluated the 
migration language of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (2001-2010), and David 
Cameron and Theresa May (2010-2017). Chapters 5 and 6 assessed the migration 
of John Howard and Kevin Rudd (2001-2010), and Julia Gillard, Tony Abbott and 




My thesis has provided two interconnected contributions to understanding the 
sociological processes that situate relations in human societies. The first 
contribution developed a sociological model for shared anxieties. I synthesised the 
models and vocabularies of process sociology and risk sociology. The second 
contribution outlined the migration language representations that fortified British 
and Australian societies. These contributions expanded the literature of 
International Relations and Sociology, through more verifiable understandings of 
the societal processes contextualising relations in two state-societies. I have 
brought together understandings from process and risk sociology to broaden 
research into transnational migration within International Relations  and wider 
Sociology and Societal Science.  
 
The first contribution of my thesis developed a sociological model for 
understanding shared anxieties through a sophisticated synthesis of knowledge 
processes, interdependencies and power relations.   
 
A synthesis of process and risk sociology provided a relational reconstructive model 
to understand shared anxieties through the interdependence of knowledge 
processes and corresponding power relations. Process models used an open people 
model that focused on webs of human interdependencies to understand how people 
form their most basic orientations through the involvement detachment balance, 
and changing power ratios. Risk models emphasised the awareness and 
unawareness of risks, the side effects from global interdependencies, and the power 
relations of risk consciousness.  
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Process and risk vocabularies offered complementary sets of expressions to 
conceptualise shared anxieties. Process sociology offered terms to understand the 
power struggles between secure and insecure sections of established groups in 
relations with outsider groups in the form of conflicting attachments to nation-state 
normative codes. These struggles contextualised the means societal orientation 
with the development of circles of association and disassociation, bound to certain 
established group fears and stigmatised depictions of outsider groups. Risk 
sociology presented terms to grasp the power struggles of cosmopolitanisation and 
anti-cosmopolitan movements. Cooperation pressures from experiences of 
globalised interdependencies circulated societal contestations over harmful 
catastrophic and harmless safe risks, which effected the societal management of 
fears.   
 
The second contribution of my thesis, traced the migration language articulated by 
political leaders in Britain and Australia. The models and vocabulary of process and 
risk sociology offered a sophisticated power and interdependency method to 
reconstruct the societal processes implicit in the migration language of British and 
Australian leaders.  
 
Three main similarities interconnected the material from British and Australian 
leaders.   
  
Firstly, similar societal processes embedded in the migration language of British 
leaders appeared in the language of Australian leaders. These processes 
encompassed the commodification, criminalisation and objectification of 
transnational outsiders and the masculinisation of established group orienta tions. 
The commodification of transnational outsiders emphasised presumed 
harmfulness and/or harmlessness. This reflected established group preferences for 
‘harmless’ people with extreme quantities of financial capital. Criminalisation 
processes sustained more harmful risk orientations towards particular groups of 
transnational outsiders. The objectification of transnational o utsiders into 
numerical symbols confirmed the perceived threat of ‘illegitimate’ movement to 
societal cohesion and justified more brutalised regulations. British and Australian 
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leaders were entrapped in double bind processes that emphasised more 
masculinised characteristics of established group strength and over weakness.     
 
Secondly, British and Australian Prime Ministers practiced highly involved short-
term leadership styles, which blamed their political opponents for harmful 
transnational people movements into their respective societies. They attempted to 
redirect societal attachments towards themselves to manage their party-political 
insecure orientations. Thirdly, they prioritised and confused their party political 
survival for the survival of their society as a whole. Their propagation of collective-
nationalist attachments and symbols such as border protection, became the means 
by which they secured their hold on the balance of societal power.   
 
There were also two main differences between British and Australian leaders. The 
first difference was that for British leaders, relations with Europe came to dominate 
and distort their representations of transnational movement. Australian leaders 
shifted the responsibilities of managing boat arrivals onto less developed regional 
neighbours in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.  
    
The second difference was in the specific stigmatisation of transnational outsiders.  
British leaders used more precise sets of fears bound to the cohesive qualities of 
particular societal institutions such as healthcare. The stigmatisation of asylum 
seekers by Blair expanded over time, through his successors Brown, Cameron and 
May to European movement. Australian leaders focused on the boat arrivals of 
asylum seekers and refugees, and articulated less precise, more intangible fears 
such as the breakdown of societal cohesion. They channelled the idealised fears of 
established groups bound by stringent personal regulations. The habituated 
remnant from an authoritarian convict settler society. Both sets of leaders 
disseminated acceptance for more brutalised measures against boat people 
outsiders and European migrants.  
 
The migration language of British and Australian Prime Ministers fortified their 
respective societies.  They propagated socio-psychological fortifications that have 
increased the reasons for established groups to be more fearful of transnational 
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outsiders. This is setting the scene for more destructive human practices in British 
and Australian societies.  
 
I have revealed the common patterns and sets of processes across two liberal-
democratic societies in the period from 2001 to 2017.  This opens the space for 
further studies into shared anxieties and the webs of human interdependencies 




This section explains the areas for further exploration to deepen and widen 
understandings of shared anxieties set out in the thesis, hereafter FSMSA (Fortifed 
Societies. The Mobilisation of Shared Anxieties).   
 
The first avenue deepens FSMSA using further documentary materials.  
 
An extension of thesis would investigate the statements from Gillard, Rudd and 
Abbott from 2013 that were omitted from Chapter 6. This study would outline in 
miniature, the societal process from FSMSA. It would proceed in chronological 
order starting in January with Gillard, progressing to Rudd, then concluding with 
Abbott in December.  
 
Another extension would explore the private remarks of British and Australian 
leaders from cabinet discussions that are currently under embargo. These 
documents would be available from 2032 onwards. The study would compare these 
private remarks with the public remarks detailed in FSMSA.  
 
These two extensions would need to be combined with an investigation of how 
certain phrases from leaders were repeated in the public and private reports of 
functionaries and other Ministers, as well as newer mediums of public 




Further research will also need to explore the public remarks of other key members 
of the party-government establishments in Britain and Australia. As well as Prime 
Ministers across other thematic areas beyond migration, such as foreign policy, 
economic affairs and social welfare. This research would need to be repeated across 
other liberal-democratic societies in this same time period, for example France, 
Germany, Italy, the United States, Canada. South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and Japan.   
 
The purpose of these additional studies would be to build more variable webs of 
understanding that provides a more detailed picture of these societies across the 
time period surveyed.   
 
The second avenue for further studies widens FSMSA through additional research 
collaboration with other areas of scholarship. This would expand the 
conceptualisations of shared anxieties, leadership, commodification objectification, 
criminalisation, and stigmatisation processes.  
 
Understandings of shared anxieties would benefit from greater engagement with 
the psychologised research work of Kierkegaard and Freud. This cannot sacrifice 
the sociological commitment to understanding the development of human relations 
in the plural rather than the reductive singular. Some of the broader societal fears 
outlined in FSMSA, should be verifiable in clinical psychological studies of personal 
anxieties.    
 
Understanding leadership and the societal steering functions of leaders would need 
to break the domination of management studies and public policy research. The 
focus of this sociological work would demythologise the functions of leadership and 
the mythical claims of leaders.  
 
Understanding commodification and objectification processes would explore how 
some groups of people and interrelated practices become 
commodified/decommodified into tradeable objects overtime. These sociological 
studies would challenge the knowledge dominations of commerce and economic 
studies.    
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Understanding criminalisation processes would further investigate the sociological 
interdependencies of guilt, innocence and punishment. This study would focus on 
the long-term regulation of human desires and the development of sets of societal 
rules and laws often remarked in phrase such as ‘rule of law’. The study would break 
the knowledge dominations of criminology and legal studies for understanding the 
development of ‘rules’ within and between human societies, showing the 
codification processes that simulated emergence and habituation of collective -
nationalist and humanist-egalitarian codes.     
 
Understanding stigmatisation processes would expand the process and risk 
synthesis from FSMSA. This would integrate the work of Mary Douglas (1992), 
specifically, her essays on Risk and Blame and Witchcraft and Leprosy. The purpose 
of this refined synthesis would challenge the artificial divide between cultural 
theory and the conceptualisation of wider socio-historic developments. Douglas’s 
social anthropology approach to risk finds common cause with Elias and Beck’s 
critique of reductive knowledge processes. Her approach also rejects closed person 
understandings found in the social sciences: “the egocentric theoretica l position of 
most psychology, economics, and cognitive science inhibits their understanding [of] 
collective behaviour” (1992: x).  
 
Two final remarks on fortification processes in societies. First, the statements of 
British and Australian leaders between the years 2001 and 2017 appear to be 
similar to the more recent public statements by leaders such as Donald Trump in 
America, Victor Orban in Hungry, Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland, Sebastian Kurz in 
Austria and Matteo Salvini in Italy. Each of these leaders have guided their societies 
through idealised attachments to the collective-nationalist code and harmful risk 
orientations towards transnational outsiders. Each leader and their wider party-
government establishment fortifies themselves and reduces the scope of societal 
cooperation.   
 
British and Australian leaders have contributed the legitimisation more brutalised 
global practices against transnational outsiders. They have set the scene for the 
development of authoritarian democracies that are undermining both the EU and 
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broader international humanitarian conventions.  At present, it is foreseeable that 
pernicious alliances between authoritarian democracies could develop into the 
future with destructive consequences for international humanitarian conventions 
within and between societies.   
 
Second, the developments I have highlighted in FSMSA are changeable. Many 
groups of people within British and Australian societies would be happy with 
ongoing fortification processes. Other groups would experience resigned 
indifference. If your reaction to my study is to defortify these societies, or at least to 
reflect on the development of societal fortifications. Then I have succeeded in 
provoking degrees of catharsis, through the verifiable reconstruction of societal 
processes. Hopefully, I have opened constructive avenues for thinking and 
orientating that enable more tactful negotiations of shared anxieties in 
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